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Essays on the Spatial Distribution of Economic Activities
Yi Jie Gwee
This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine the spatial distribution of economic
activities. The first chapter, co-authored with Jacob Field and Di Song Tan, examines how disasters
as well as individuals’ expectations of what others will do affect the development of cities. The
development of cities often involves the rejuvenation or replacement of existing structures. However,
history, in the form of the sunk cost of existing durable structures, often serves as an impediment
to urban development. In theory, by reducing the opportunity cost of waiting to rebuild to zero,
disasters can eliminate these frictions and bring about higher quality structures. In addition, the
simultaneous rebuilding after a disaster would allow property owners to experience stronger cross-
building spillovers which would encourage further upgrades of nearby buildings. Nevertheless,
these are not sufficient to guarantee higher quality buildings. This is because individuals’ investment
decisions also depend on their expectations of what others will do. Therefore, in this chapter, we
examine both of these issues using the 1666 Great Fire of London as a natural experiment. First,
using a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy, we show evidence that the Fire was able to free
parishes within London from the constraints of their existing durable structures and move them to a
new equilibrium involving higher quality structures. Second, using DiD and an IV strategy, we find
that legal rulings arising from the Fire Court – a court specially set up by the English Parliament to
hear rebuilding disputes – were able to anchor expectations and in so doing, helped to facilitate the
development of London. Providing causal evidence that legal rulings can be a main driver in the
formation of expectations is the main contribution of our paper.
The second chapter examines how the quirks of history shape present-day economic outcomes.
Building on Bazzi et al. (2020), I study how a particular episode of history – time at the frontier –
helps to explain the present-day manufacturing production patterns across American counties. First,
I show empirical evidence that there are fewer establishments and lower employment in counties that
spent a longer time on the frontier. The same results hold for industries that are more “contractible”
(i.e., easier to specify in contracts and hence less susceptible to holdup). Second, using a DiD
strategy, I show that firms in high “contractibility” industries sort into producing at counties that
spent a longer time on the frontier. I hypothesize that due to “rugged individualism”, individuals
in counties that spent a longer time on the frontier are less likely to trust other people. Therefore,
anything that is not “contractible” becomes harder and more costly to enforce. Consequently, only
the more “contractible” industries locate in counties that spent a longer time on the frontier.
The third chapter, co-authored with Di Song Tan, examines how land use regulations and NIMBY
(“not in my back yard”) behavior affect housing prices in the UK. In the UK, developers have to
apply to the local planning authority to seek development permission. Applicants who have their
plans rejected can appeal to the Secretary of State, via the Planning Inspectorate. The Planning
Inspectorate then assigns an inspector to decide whether to overturn the local authority’s decision.
We propose a theoretical model which shows that in locations with high levels of NIMBY-ism,
developers are better off getting their plans rejected by the local authority and gambling on drawing
an inspector who is less sympathetic towards locals’ NIMBY behavior. Our empirical strategy
exploits the fact that inspectors are quasi-randomly assigned to the appeals. This allows us to use
inspector leniency as an instrument for whether an appeal is successful. We find that overturning
the local authority’s decision does not lead to a large fall in housing prices. For some projects, the
impact may in fact be positive because they also add to local amenities such as retail shops. This
suggests a prevalence of NIMBY-ism, as locals pressure authorities to reject even relatively benign
projects.
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Dedication
All cities are transient, except for the one to come.
To all who have ever had to say goodbye to someplace, something or someone.
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Chapter 1: Great Expectations: Urban Development in 17th Century
London (with Jacob Field and Di Song Tan)
1.1 Introduction
The development of cities often involves the rejuvenation or replacement of existing structures.
However, history, in the form of the sunk cost of existing durable structures, often serves as an
impediment to urban development. In every period, property owners face a trade-off between
receiving rent from the existing building or incurring a cost to tear down the building and rebuilding
it. As a result, they often wait long periods of time for their building to depreciate before embarking
on upgrading. Furthermore, without some gain to being the first to upgrade their property, property
owners may rationally wait for others to upgrade first. In theory, by reducing the opportunity cost
of waiting to rebuild to zero, disasters (such as a Fire) can eliminate these frictions and bring
about higher quality structures. In addition, the simultaneous rebuilding after a disaster would
allow property owners to experience stronger cross-building spillovers. As described by Hornbeck
and Keniston (2017), this “virtuous circle” of cross-plot externalities results in building upgrades
encouraging further upgrades of nearby buildings.
Nevertheless, the opportunity cost of waiting to rebuild falling to zero coupled with the prospects of
stronger cross-building spillovers, are not sufficient to guarantee higher quality buildings. This is
because individuals’ investment decisions also depend on their expectations of what others will do.
For example, if a city (or more generally, an area) is growing, then individuals will expect other
individuals to build higher quality buildings. By contrast, if the expectations are that the area is in
decline, then individuals may not even rebuild or may invest at a lower quality since they expect
other individuals to do the same.
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Therefore, in this paper, we examine both of these issues using the 1666 Great Fire of London as
a natural experiment. Our research questions are as follows. First, we examine whether the Fire
was able to free parishes1 within London from the constraints of their existing durable structures
and move them to a new equilibrium involving higher quality structures. In line with the historical
context, we define the quality of structures based on the number of hearths in the property. While the
first research question that we examine is similar to the papers on the 1872 Boston fire by Hornbeck
and Keniston (2017) and the 1906 San Francisco fire by Siodla (2015), our second research question
departs from these papers. In particular, we study what anchors individuals’ expectations of what
others will do and how this can consequently facilitate the development of cities. We find evidence
that legal rulings arising from the Fire Court – a court specially set up by the English Parliament to
hear rebuilding disputes – were able to anchor expectations and in so doing, helped to facilitate the
development of London. Providing causal evidence that legal rulings can be a main driver in the
formation of expectations is the main contribution of our paper.
For the first part of the paper, to examine whether the removal of development frictions through
the Fire resulted in higher quality structures being rebuilt, we employ a difference-in-differences
(DiD) strategy. The DiD strategy exploits both the cross-sectional and time-series variations arising
from the Fire. The time-series variation comes from the timing before and after the Fire which was
exogenous. The cross-sectional variation arises because different parishes in London were affected
differently by the Fire. For example, some parishes were burned whereas some parishes did not
experience any damage from the Fire at all. A null effect from our regression would suggest that
there were no frictions to upgrading before the Fire – the quality of properties was optimal. By
contrast, a positive effect suggests the presence of upgrading frictions which the Fire effectively
removed.
1Parishes were administrative units within a city that played a role in both civil and ecclesiastical matters.
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Using our DiD strategy, we find that a few years after the Fire, burned parishes experienced a
highly statistically significant increase in the number of hearths per property compared to unburned
parishes. In addition, the effect varied with the level of damage. Parishes which were more
badly damaged saw a highly statistically significant increase in the number of hearths per property
compared to parishes which were less damaged. Finally, the effect was biggest for parishes whose
neighboring parishes were all burned compared to parishes whose neighboring parishes were not all
burned.
The result from the first part of the paper suggests that individuals had positive expectations
that others will be rebuilding at a high quality. Nevertheless, it does not tell us what is driving
these expectations. Therefore, in the second part of the paper, we examine the role of legal rulings
in driving expectations. In 17th century England, tenants were legally obliged to rebuild in the
event of any disasters which damaged the property, even if it was not their fault. However, the Fire
took place amidst a plague and war – an unprecedented joint occurrence of events. To expedite the
rebuilding of London, the English Parliament established the Fire Court.
The second part of the paper begins with a model that shows that legal rulings affect expectations
because they affect the bargaining between landlords and tenants who do not go to Court. This
is because their outside options are based on the Fire Court’s initial rulings. For our empirical
strategy, we turn once again to a DiD strategy. Just as before, the time-series variation comes from
the timing before and after the Fire. However, the cross-sectional variation now arises because
different parishes experienced different Fire Court rulings. For example, some parishes saw a
disproportionate number of initial cases where the Fire Court voided the existing contracts between
the landlord and tenant and consequently assigned the rebuilding to the landlord. This is what we
refer to as pragmatic rulings. Voiding the contract means that both the landlord and tenant surrender
their contracts. This allows both parties to negotiate a new contract with each other or other parties.
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Our regression results show that parishes with a greater share of pragmatic rulings had more
hearths per property compared to parishes where there was a lower share of cases with pragmatic
rulings. In addition, because only a very small proportion of properties in each parish went to the
Fire Court, our results suggest that the rulings of these few cases had an outsized effect on the
quality of other buildings in the parish.2 Why would this be the case? We argue that this is because
the small share of cases was enough to anchor expectations.
While we have included a number of time varying parish-level controls in our regression, a
threat to identification in the DiD strategy is that we might not have controlled for all possible
confounders. As a result, the change in the number of hearths may be related to changes in parish
level characteristics that are not due to the Fire Court rulings – a violation of the parallel trend
assumption. Therefore, we augment our DiD strategy with an instrumental variable (IV) strategy.
Our IV strategy exploits the fact that at the parish level, Fire Court judging panels that have
different political alignments (i.e., whether they were predominantly Royalists or Parliamentarians)
were assigned to the cases. The 1666 Great Fire took place in the midst of the Second Dutch War
(1665-1667) and the Great Plague which began in 1665. King Charles II was relying on loans from
London and its wealthiest citizens to finance the war. The destruction of the customs house, wharves
and more than 13,000 buildings caused a significant drop in royal revenue. The King had a vested
interest for London to be rebuilt quickly. Therefore, judging panels that consisted predominantly
of Royalists (i.e., more aligned with the King) were more likely to decree pragmatic rulings so
as to facilitate the rebuilding of London. As a result, we can use the composition of the judging
panels as an instrument for the share of cases in the parish that had pragmatic rulings. This gives us
exogenous variations in legal rulings for each parish.
2Based on the initial cases, the average proportion of properties in each parish that went to the Fire Court was 6%.
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We find that the results from our IV analysis re-affirm our DiD results – legal rulings can indeed
anchor expectations and help to facilitate the rebuilding process. To the best of our knowledge,
while there are theoretical papers such as Cooter (1998), Basu (2000), McAdams (2000, 2005),
Myerson (2004) and Hadfield and Weingast (2012) that examine how legal institutions can affect
expectations and hence the behavior of individuals, there are relatively fewer empirical papers that
provide causal evidence of this.
In examining how expectations affect the behavior of economic agents, our paper is related to
Krugman (1991) and Rauch (1993). In addition, our paper is related to how cities recover from major
shocks and whether they move to a new equilibrium. Beginning with Davis and Weinstein (2002),
there has been an extensive literature that examines whether long-run city size is robust to temporary
shocks. These shocks include wars and bombing (Davis and Weinstein (2002) and Miguel and
Roland (2011)), natural or man-made disasters (Siodla (2015) and Hornbeck and Keniston (2017)),
political events (Redding et al. (2011) and Michaels and Rauch (2018)), technology (Bleakley and
Lin (2012)) and even diseases (Jedwab et al. (2019)). Our paper provides evidence of how the
Great Fire of London freed London from the constraints of history and enabled it to move to a new
equilibrium with more hearths per property.
By addressing how legal rulings contribute to the development of cities, our paper is related
to the literature on the economic consequences of legal origins. This literature shows how legal
origins affect particular legal rules and these in turn affect economic outcomes such as growth,
financial development, property rights and contract enforcement. Examples of these studies include
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Djankov et al. (2003), La Porta et al. (1997), La Porta et al. (1998) and Dell
(2010). In using judging panels that consisted predominantly of Royalist as our instrument in our
IV analysis, our paper is also related to North and Weingast (1989), Acemoglu et al. (2005), Jha
(2015) and Angelucci et al. (2020). These papers examine the tensions between Parliamentarians
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and Royalists during various times in English history (e.g., the English Civil War (1642-1651) and
the Glorious Revolution (1688)) and show how these affected the development of institutions that
facilitated growth in England.
Finally, our paper is related to the historical literature on the impact of the Great Fire of London.
Field (2008) notes that the 1666 Great Fire of London is such an iconic moment in the history
of London that the contemporary media frequently used the phrase “The Second Great Fire” to
describe the London Blitz during World War II. While the 1666 Fire has been extensively studied
by historians (e.g., Reddaway (1940), Porter (1996) and Field (2018)) and even legal scholars
(e.g., Tidmarsh (2016)), our paper contributes to this largely qualitative literature by providing a
quantitative analysis on the impact of the Great Fire of London.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 presents the historical background of
the 1666 Great Fire of London. Section 1.3 discusses the novel data sources that we use for our
analysis. Section 1.4 examines the effect that the Fire had on the quality of properties that were
rebuilt. Section 1.5 presents our main contribution which is that legal rulings anchored individuals’
expectations of what others will do and this consequently facilitated the development of parishes
within London. We conclude in Section 1.6.
1.2 Historical Background: The 1666 Great Fire of London
This section draws extensively from Reddaway (1940), Porter (1996), Field (2008), Tidmarsh (2016)
and Field (2018). The Great Fire of London began on September 2, 1666, in a bakery on Pudding
Lane in the City of London. The City of London covers an area of 2.8 km2 or 1.1 miles2 within
London and was home to about one sixth of London’s inhabitants. The structure of the city made it
easy for the Fire to spread. Streets, lanes and alleys were narrow and buildings were made from
timber. In addition, the upper floors of houses often cantilevered over the pathways below. This
meant that the top floors on one side of the street nearly touched those on the other side, making it
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easy for the Fire to spread. The Fire lasted for three and a half days and destroyed approximately
13,200 buildings in the City of London. An estimated 70,000 out of 80,000 inhabitants living in the
City of London lost their homes.
Tidmarsh (2016) notes that despite the urgency to rebuild London, there were significant challenges.
At the time of the Fire, the institution of fire insurance had not yet developed. Instead, the common
practice was that leases had a covenant that obligated the tenant, regardless of whether the tenant was
at fault, to repair or rebuild the premises in the event of disasters or wars. This created substantial
challenges for both the tenants and landlords. For the tenants, there was the issue of fairness in
whether they should bear the full cost of rebuilding. Many tenants could not afford to rebuild.
Moreover, tenants who had a short time left on their lease had little incentive to rebuild. As for the
landlords, there were long delays and huge cost in bringing disputes to the common-law courts.
Even if the case was brought before the common-law courts, the powers of these courts were
constrained by the existing tenancy agreements. As a result, the judges could not calibrate or void
the existing contracts to achieve the best incentives for the parties to rebuild. Furthermore, due to
the existing tenancy agreements, landlords could not prematurely re-enter the leased premises in
order to facilitate reconstruction.
In order to expedite the rebuilding of London, the English Parliament established the Fire Court
to adjudicate between landlords and tenants as to who would bear the burden of rebuilding (Fire
of London Disputes Act 1666). The bill was passed in the House of Lords on January 23, 1667.
A few days later, on January 31, 1667, the House of Commons assented to the bill.3 Tidmarsh
(2016) notes that the Fire Court heard a total of 1,585 cases. Some cases involved more than one
property so the 1,585 cases understate the extent of the Court’s work. As mandated by the Fire
Court legislation, each case was heard by a panel of at least three judges. The judges were given the
3The year of the enactment of the statute was listed as 1666 even though the bill was passed in the House of Lords
on January 23, 1667. This is because based on the calendar that was used during that era, the new year began on Lady
Day (March 25).
7
power to void existing contracts and decide the details of the new contracts (e.g., who rebuilds, new
rent and length of the tenancy agreement, etc.). The typical process when a case is brought to the
Fire Court is that the judges would first try to mediate and get the tenant and landlord to come to an
agreement. In the event that the parties are unable to come to an agreement, the Court will then
make a ruling which is legally binding.4
In concluding our discussion about the historical background of the Great Fire of 1666, we would
like to highlight that there were previously other fires in London that also resulted in substantial
damage. For example, Richardson (2001) notes that the Great Fire of 1133 damaged St Paul’s,
St Bride’s, London Bridge and properties as far east as Aldgate. Another example was the Great
Fire of 1212 which began at Southwark, destroyed the church and spread to London Bridge. Legal
issues surrounding the responsibility of the tenant to rebuild would have also existed back then.
Why then was the Fire Court only set up after the 1666 Fire and not earlier? The existing literature
is surprisingly silent on this.
One reason could be that while previous Great Fires caused substantial damage, the damage
to property from the 1666 Fire was arguably the greatest (see for example Garrioch (2016)). London
had grown substantially since the 12th and 13th century. Therefore, even if the entire city was almost
destroyed due to the 1133 Fire, by 1666 the size of the city would have been far larger. Nevertheless,
due to the lack of data (most of the evidence is qualitative), it remains debatable whether the damage
from the 1666 Fire was the greatest. For example, Garrioch (2016) notes that about 3,000 people died
4Reddaway (1940), Porter (1996) and Tidmarsh (2016) note that besides setting up the Fire Court, the Parliament of
England also put in place other legislation and measures to facilitate the rebuilding of the city. There were new building
regulations to limit damage from subsequent fires (buildings must be made of brick, be of a minimum size, not exceed a
certain height and must not cantilever over the streets). To determine boundaries and settle disputes among neighbors, a
survey system was put in place. Since properties were taken for public purposes (e.g., widened streets), there was a
formal channel to value property. To finance the reconstruction of public buildings, a tax on coal was introduced. To
ensure that property owners rebuilt within a reasonable time, sanctions were meted out if this was not done. There were
provisions requiring owners to share rebuilding costs that benefited multiple properties (e.g., party walls). Regulations
on the price and quality of raw materials used for the rebuilding were implemented. Incentives were given to encourage
skilled craftsmen to come to London to help with the rebuilding.
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in the 1212 Fire, far more than the eight people that was estimated to have died due to the 1666 Fire.5
Therefore, we think that the main reason was due to the joint occurrence of war, plague and
Fire – a combination of events that was absent in the previous Great Fires. The Great Plague which
began in 1665 resulted in the death of almost a quarter of London’s population within 18 months.
This means that there was now a huge excess supply of vacant properties which vastly increased the
bargaining power of tenants. The King could wait for the landlords and tenants to reach a bargained
outcome. For example, whether the landlord contributes to the rebuilding or changes the terms of
the tenancy contract even though by law the tenant has to rebuild. However, given the ongoing
Second Dutch War (1665 to 1667), King Charles II simply could not wait for this to play out.
Tidmarsh (2016) argues that the King was relying on loans and taxes from London and its wealthiest
citizens to finance the war. The destruction of the customs house, wharves and buildings caused
a significant drop in royal revenue from custom and hearth taxes. The Fire Court was therefore a
way to expedite reaching a somewhat equitable outcome. It gives the landlord class some portion of
what prior precedent would suggest but it also tilts things sufficiently toward tenants to mirror the
shift in bargaining power owing to the plague.6
1.3 Data
Urban investment. In line with how the value of a property was assessed in 17th century London,
we measure quality by the number of hearths that are in each property before and after the Fire.
This information is available from the historical manuscripts of the hearth tax assessment records
that are held at The National Archives, United Kingdom.
5Despite the destruction, the largest estimate of deaths directly due to the Fire was eight. This is a shockingly small
number and historians such as Field (2018) have offered a number of explanations. First, the incineration of bodies in
the Fire meant that corpses could not be recovered and so the death records are underestimates. Second, the Fire took
place over three and a half days. This gave sufficient time for people to evacuate. Third, historians postulate that the
relatively tight-knit nature of the neighborhoods meant that there was help and assistance for the vulnerable.
6We would like to thank Don Davis for helping us to sharpen this argument.
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According to the University of Roehampton, Centre for Hearth Tax Research,7 the hearth tax
was introduced in England and Wales in 1662 to provide a regular source of income for King
Charles II who was the newly restored monarch. Parliament had estimated that the King required
an annual income of £1.2 million. However, by 1661, there was a shortfall of £300,000 and it was
hoped that the hearth tax would make up for this. The hearth tax was essentially a property tax on
dwellings graded according to the number of fireplaces in the property. The tax was paid in two
equal installments at Michaelmas (September, 29) and Lady Day (March, 25) by the occupier. If the
property was vacant, the landlord paid the tax. In order to administer the tax, a list of householders
was compiled and this formed the hearth tax assessment records.
Our pre-Fire hearth data come from two sources. First, we use the full records from the 1666
London and Middlesex hearth tax, along with portions of the 1663 and 1664 documents that have
been cleaned and digitized by the London Hearth Tax project.8 Since the hearth tax was collected
twice a year in March and September, the 1666 records are based on the March collection which
took place before the Fire in September. Second, we supplement this with the 1664/1665 Southwark
hearth tax records that come from the assessment for Surrey. The Southwark data were manually
transcribed by Field (2008) for his history PhD thesis.9
As for the post-Fire hearth data, we rely on the records from the 1675 London and Middlesex
hearth tax records as well as the 1673 Surrey (Southwark) hearth tax records. These data were also
7https://www.roehampton.ac.uk/research-centres/centre-for-hearth-tax-research/
8In June 2007, the London Hearth Tax project was formed to systematically analyze and digitize the hearth tax
records. The project united the expertise of the British Academy Hearth Tax Project, the Centre for Hearth Tax
Research (University of Roehampton), Birkbeck College (University of London), and the Centre for Metropolitan
History (Institute of Historical Research). In 2011, the full records from the 1666 London and Middlesex hearth tax,
along with portions of the 1663 and 1664 documents, were published electronically via British History Online at
https://www.british-history.ac.uk/london-hearth-tax/london-mddx/1666.
9While the data from Southwark is undated, Field (2008) notes that they are most certainly from the period between
1664 and 1665.
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manually transcribed by Field (2008).10
The unit of geography for our analysis is at the parish level. Due to the differences in the scope and
range of the hearth tax assessments, some parishes only appear in the pre-Fire records while others
only appear in the post-Fire records. In our regressions, we only use data from the parishes that
appear in both the pre- and post-Fire records. Table 1.1 shows the summary statistics of the hearth
tax data which we use in our regressions.
Table 1.1: Summary statistics (Hearth Tax data)
Mean SD Min Max N
Number of hearths (pre-Fire) 3.83 3.79 0 193 44,724
Number of hearths (post-Fire) 4.33 3.36 0 135 35,006
Number of parishes . . . . 70
Some might question whether the number of hearths is a reasonable way to measure the quality
of the building. We believe that it is reasonable for a few reasons. First, unlike assessed values
or market values, the number of hearths is an objective measure and is not based on a valuation.
Second, Field (2008) documents that research has shown that there is some correlation between the
number of hearths and wealth, as well as occupation. To the extent that the wealthier and those with
higher social standing live in higher quality buildings, then we should expect the number of hearths
to be a reasonable proxy for the quality of the building.
Details of Fire Court judges. The Fire Court was composed of England’s twelve common-law
judges. There were three common-law courts (Common Pleas, King’s Bench, and the Exchequer)
with four justices appointed to each court. In the years after the Fire, some judges retired or passed
10Although the London and parts of the Middlesex hearth tax records were presented to Parliament sessions on
February 1, 1675, Field (2008) states that a faded note on the manuscript linked it to a collection on 1674. Other parts
of the Middlesex records were based on an assessment between 1674 and 1675. The data for Southwark come from an
assessment for Surrey that was not dated. Field (2008) notes that it is probably associated with a collection in 1673.
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away and hence our sample contains fourteen judges and not twelve.
Table 1.2: Summary statistics (Judges)
Mean SD Min Max N
Year of birth 1603.14 6.79 1587 1611 14
Year called to bar 1629.14 6.51 1614 1637 14
Year knighted 1658.71 7.02 1643 1668 14
Pro-restoration of monarchy .57 .43 0 1 14
Pro-established church .57 .43 0 1 14
Studied at Oxford University .36 .5 0 1 14
Served in Grays Inn .07 .27 0 1 14
Served in Lincolns Inn .36 .5 0 1 14
Served in Inner Temple .5 .52 0 1 14
Served in Middle Temple .07 .27 0 1 14
From Common Pleas .43 .51 0 1 14
From King’s Bench .29 .47 0 1 14
From Exchequer .29 .47 0 1 14
Head of common-law Court .29 .47 0 1 14
Number of judges . . . . 14
In order to get details about the Fire Court judges, we referred to various sources such as
the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004) and Sainty (1993). From these sources, we
obtained information on the judges. Many seismic political events took place in 17th century
England. For example, the English Civil War (1642-1651), the restoration of the monarchy (1660),
as well as the Puritans’ (English Protestants) continuous attempts to get the Church of England
(established church) to abandon its Roman Catholic practices. Therefore, from these books, we also
obtained information on the judges’ religious views and their views on the 1660 restoration of the
monarchy (i.e., whether they were Royalists or Parliamentarians). We define binary variables for
whether the judges were supportive of the restoration of the monarch (Royalists) and whether they
were supportive of the established church. We assign the value of 0.5 if the judges had moderate
views. In our IV analysis, we use the composition of the judging panels an instrument for the share
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of initial cases in the parish that had pragmatic rulings.
Table 1.2 shows us the summary statistics of the Fire Court judges. On average, the judges
tend to be slightly pro-restoration of the monarchy and pro-established church. Around 36% of the
judges attended Oxford University with the rest attending Cambridge University. The majority of
the judges trained at the Inner Temple. Finally, 43% of the Fire Court judges were from the court of
the Common Pleas and 29% of them were the respective heads of their common-law courts (i.e.,
Lord Chief Justice or Lord Chief Baron).
Details of Fire Court cases. The transcripts of the cases that were heard by the Fire Court were
compiled into nine volumes. These records survive up to today and are housed at the London
Metropolitan Archives. To commemorate 300 years since the Fire, in 1966, four volumes (volumes
A, B, C and D) were calendared (summarized) and converted to modern English by Philip E. Jones.
These were subsequently published as two books – Jones (1966, 1970). The summaries contain
extremely detailed information. For example, they give us details on who the landlords and tenants
are, the location of the property, the rent and tenure of the tenancy contract before the Fire, the
day that the case was heard by the Fire Court, the judges who heard the case, as well as the new
rent and tenure that were decreed by the panel of judges. Figure A.1 shows how some of the case
characteristics evolved over time (within the first 716 days).
As part of his history PhD thesis, Field (2008) transcribed some of the information associated
with the cases in these four volumes into a dataset. We augment this dataset by transcribing
additional information that was not captured by Field (2008). Table 1.3 shows us the summary
statistics of the Fire Court data based on the cases that we have sufficient information. In 13%
of the cases in our sample, the Fire Court voided the existing contracts (i.e., both landlord and
tenant surrendered the existing contract) and assigned the cost of rebuilding to the landlord. In
1.3% of the cases, the judges altered the existing contracts (i.e., no surrendering) and assigned the
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rebuilding to the landlord. In 71% of the cases, the judges altered the existing contracts and assigned
the rebuilding to the tenant. In 10% of the cases, the Fire Court voided the existing contracts but
decreed the sharing of cost in the rebuilding. Finally, in 5.2% of the cases, the judges altered the
existing contracts but decreed the sharing of cost in the rebuilding. The fine paid is the lump-sum
payment made on execution of the lease. For each judging panel, we calculate the share of judges
that were supportive of the established church and the share of judges that were supportive of the
1660 restoration of the monarchy (Royalists). On average, in each judging panel, 48% of the judges
tend to be supportive of the restoration of the monarchy and 46% tend to be supportive of the
established church. This suggests that the judging panels were on average quite moderate in their
views.
Table 1.3: Summary statistics (Fire Court data)
Mean SD Min Max N
Both parties surrender: Owner rebuilds .13 .33 0 1 696
No surrender: Owner rebuilds .01 .11 0 1 696
No surrender: Tenant rebuilds .71 .46 0 1 696
Both parties surrender: Cost sharing .10 .30 0 1 696
No surrender: Cost sharing .05 .22 0 1 696
Degree of separation from owner 1.18 .52 1 6 696
Start year of tenancy 1655.74 10.23 1591 1666 679
Years left in tenancy 34.75 387.83 0 9996.92 663
Fine paid 69.08 202.61 0 4000 696
Rent per annum 31.29 36.91 0 474 692
Amount spent on improvements 48.46 233.07 0 3000 696
Average pro-monarchy of panel .48 .22 0 1 696
Average pro-church of panel .46 .21 0 1 696
Head of common-law Court .57 .6 0 3 696
Number parishes . . . . 67
Number cases . . . . 696
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Finally, since we are interested in examining whether legal rulings of the initial cases in each
parish can anchor expectations, we do not actually need to observe the rulings of all the cases that
went to the Fire Court. Therefore, the four out of nine volumes which have been calendared would
suffice for our purposes as these four volumes cover the earlier cases. We refer to these cases from
the first four volumes as the “initial” cases.
Regression sample. Putting all our data sources together, using the shapefiles provided by Satchell
et al. (2018), Figure 1.1 shows the parishes that are included in our regressions. In the diagram, we
label a parish as “burned” as long as any part of it was damaged by the Fire.
Figure 1.1: Regression sample
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1.4 The Effect of the Fire
The 1666 Great Fire of London had both quantity and quality effects on the development of London.
On the quantity side, the Fire affected the total number of properties and hearths in each parish. As
for quality, the Fire affected the number of hearths per property in each parish. In this paper, we
focus on the effect that the Fire had on quality. This is because the plague wiped out about a quarter
of London’s population. Therefore, we should expect fewer properties to be rebuilt in the immediate
aftermath since there are now fewer people to house. However, the effect on quality is not clear.
In addition, the reduction in the number of properties is consistent with post-Fire regulations that
stipulated that properties needed to be of a certain minimum size. Finally, our data end in 1675 (nine
years after the Fire) so it could be the case that London had not reached a new stationary state – i.e.,
it is too early to tell if the number of properties converged to a new steady state. For these reasons,
the main focus of our analysis is on quality as opposed to quantity. Nevertheless, in Appendix A.1,
we examine the effect that the Fire had on the total number of properties and hearths in each parish.
1.4.1 Empirical strategy
To examine the effect of the Fire on the number of hearths per property, we use a DiD empirical
strategy:
ln (Hearthsijt) = αj + δPostF iret + βBurnedj × PostF iret + γ′Xjt + εijt (1.1)
ln (Hearthsijt) is the log number of hearths in property i in parish j in period t. The two periods
are before the Fire and after the Fire. Burnedj is an indicator variable that denotes whether property
i was in a parish that experienced damage from the Fire. PostF iret is an indicator variable for the
period after the Fire. Xjt is a vector of controls. Finally, αj are parish fixed effects. We cluster
the standard errors at the parish level. A null effect would suggest that there were no frictions to
upgrading before the Fire – the quality of properties was optimal. By contrast, a positive effect
suggests the presence of upgrading frictions which the Fire effectively removed.
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For those interested in the cross-sectional regressions in each time period, the results are reported in
Table A.7. In the pre-Fire period, the number of hearths per property in burned versus unburned
parishes was statistically indistinguishable.
1.4.2 Results and discussion
Higher quality structures. Table 1.4 reports the impact that the Fire had on the number of hearths per
property in the burned parishes relative to the unburned parishes. The estimate in column 1 shows
that controlling for parish and time fixed effects, burned parishes saw a highly statistically significant
increase of around 26.3% more hearths compared to unburned parishes. While in percentage terms
this magnitude might seem large, given that the average number of hearths before the Fire was 3.83,
this translates to an increase of 1.01 hearths.
Table 1.4: Effect of Fire on the number of hearths per property
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Parish Burned X Post Fire 0.263*** 0.239** 0.219* 0.283**
(0.092) (0.098) (0.127) (0.116)
Observations 77,093 77,093 77,093 77,093
R-squared 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.014
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 70 70 70 70
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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There could be concerns that there are other time varying parish-level variables that are driving
the results. For example, larger or richer parishes may recover faster from the Fire as they are able
to bring together more resources. To address these concerns, in column 2, we include a series of
parish controls interacted with PostF iret. These include the number of properties in the parish
before the Fire, the share of peers,11 high-ranking military personnel (i.e., Colonel or Captain) and
doctors living in the parish. The estimated effect remains robust to the inclusion of these time
varying parish-level controls.
Next, to control for geographical characteristics, we classified the parishes into broader locations
(i.e., abutting the City of London walls, within the walls and outside the walls). In column 3, we
show that the results are stable to the inclusion of these broader locations-by-post fixed effects.
Finally, we grouped parishes into terciles based on the number of hearths in the parish before the
Fire. This is to control for the possibility that there may be persistence in the number of hearths –
parishes with more hearths may rebuild with more hearths and those with fewer hearths may rebuild
with fewer hearths. In column 4, we show that the results are relatively stable even when we include
these pre-Fire hearth terciles-by-post fixed effects. Figure A.2 shows the binned scatter plot of the
results in column 4.
Our results show that after the Fire, inhabitants of the parishes constructed more hearths per
property. This suggests that there was indeed the presence of substantial frictions that was
impeding development. By reducing the opportunity cost of waiting to rebuild to zero and forcing
everyone to build at the same time, the Fire freed the parishes from the constraints imposed by their
existing durable structures. This consequently spurred development through stronger cross-building
spillovers and led to a new equilibrium which involved more hearths per property.
11These are Duke, Duchess, Marquess, Marchioness, Earl, Countess, Viscount, Viscountess, Baron, Baroness, Lord,
Lady, Sir, Dame and Ambassador.
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Finally, as our dependent variable has been log transformed, there could be issues of Jensen’s
inequality. In particular, running the regression with the log transformed dependent variable could
result in an opposite treatment effect as compared to if we were to run the regression without taking
logs. In Appendix A.2 we provide a discussion about this potential issue and show that we get a
positive treatment effect in both the regression without logs and the regression in logs.
Effect varied with the level of damage. A priori, we should expect the effect of the Fire to vary with
the level of damage. For example, in the extreme, if the Fire was so small that it only damaged one
building, then the Fire would not have been effective in removing rebuilding frictions and there
would be no widespread reconstruction.
We use two different approaches to examine such heterogeneous effects. First, we split the
Burnedj × PostF iret variable into two dummy variables – SlightlyBurnedj × PostF iret and
CompletelyBurnedj × PostF iret. As the names suggest, SlightlyBurnedj refers to parishes
where less than half of the parish (in terms of geographical area) was burned while the variable
CompletelyBurnedj refers to parishes where more than half of the parish was burned. Table 1.5
reports the results of this heterogeneous treatment effect regression. Across all columns, we see that
the effect of the Fire was greater in parishes that were completely burned.
The second approach is to use whether the church in the parish was damaged as a proxy for
the level of destruction in the parish due to the Fire. We think that this is reasonable given that the
church was often the center of economic and social life during this period of time. To do this, we
run regression 1.1 comparing burned parishes where the church was damaged to unburned parishes.
In the same regression, we also compare burned parishes where the church was not damaged to
unburned parishes. Table 1.6 reports the results. Across all columns, the effect of the Fire was
greater in parishes where the church was also damaged. Both approaches suggest that the effect of
the Fire was greater in parishes where the destruction was more widespread.
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Table 1.5: Effect of the extent of Fire on the number of hearths per property
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Parish Completely Burned X Post Fire 0.403*** 0.445*** 0.471*** 0.607***
(0.064) (0.089) (0.073) (0.102)
Parish Slightly Burned X Post Fire 0.173 0.136 0.144 0.192
(0.117) (0.133) (0.146) (0.130)
Observations 77,093 77,093 77,093 77,093
R-squared 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.018
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 70 70 70 70
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before the Fire, the share
of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors living in the parish. Standard errors are
clustered at the parish level. Notation for statistical significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.6: Effect of the church being damaged on the number of hearths per property
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Parish burned and church damaged X Post Fire 0.393*** 0.401*** 0.400*** 0.485***
(0.073) (0.100) (0.115) (0.122)
Parish burned but church not damaged X Post Fire 0.210* 0.189 0.190 0.252**
(0.108) (0.115) (0.131) (0.118)
Observations 77,093 77,093 77,093 77,093
R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.015
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 70 70 70 70
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before the Fire, the share of peers, high-
ranking military personnel and doctors living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
20
Nonetheless, some of the positive effect that we find in Tables 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 could be
mechanical. This is because as noted by Field (2008), new houses had to be built according to strict
regulations that specified the size and materials used. In addition, given the excess supply of land
due to the plague, land was probably cheaper. This could lead to people wanting larger houses
with more hearths per house. We discuss how we can rule out such mechanical effects in the next
paragraph.
Effect varied with the level of damage in surrounding parishes. To rule out the mechanical effect of
larger houses having more hearths, we split the Burnedj × PostF iret variable into two dummy
variables – AllNeighorsBurnedj ×PostF iret and NotAllNeighorsBurnedj ×PostF iret and
re-run regression 1.1. If the increase in the number of hearths per property is purely due to larger
houses, then it should not vary with the level of damage in the surrounding parishes.
Table 1.7: Effect of spatial spillovers on the number of hearths per property
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Not All Neighbors Burned X Post Fire 0.174 0.143 0.145 0.178
(0.113) (0.123) (0.144) (0.131)
All Neighbors Burned X Post Fire 0.395*** 0.410*** 0.409*** 0.474***
(0.069) (0.098) (0.102) (0.124)
Observations 77,093 77,093 77,093 77,093
R-squared 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.014
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 70 70 70 70
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before the Fire, the share
of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors living in the parish. Standard errors are
clustered at the parish level. Notation for statistical significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.7 shows that spatial spillovers matter. Burned parishes that were completely surrounded
by other burned parishes experienced building investments that were two to three times higher than
burned parishes that were not completely surrounded by burned parishes. This regression shows us
strong evidence that the increase in the number of hearths per building is driven by cross-building
spillovers and not the mechanical effect of larger properties.
1.4.3 Robustness checks
Dropping parishes which merged after the Fire. One concern could be that the Fire led to the
merging of some parishes and so our results could be driven by these enlarged parishes which might
have more resources. In Table A.8 we re-run regression 1.1 using only parishes that did not merge
with other parishes after the Fire. Reassuringly, the coefficient estimates remain very similar to our
baseline results.
Using different control groups. There could be concerns that some of the unburned parishes
in our control group may not be appropriate for our analysis. To see this, consider a hypothetical
unburned parish (parish U) that is surrounded by many burned parishes. Given the destructive
nature of the Fire, it is somewhat surprising that parish U did not suffer any damage from the Fire.
This could suggest that parish U is fundamentally different from its neighboring parishes that were
burned. For example, parish U could have been more wealthy and hence more able to quickly
mobilize fire-fighting efforts. It could also be the case that more buildings in parish U were made of
bricks as opposed to wood. In addition, parish U could have also pre-empted the spread of the Fire
by tearing down buildings that were near to the parishes that were burning. The Fire Court records
suggest that this indeed happened in parishes such as St Botolph Bishopsgate and St Mary-le-Strand.
Therefore, it might not be suitable to use such parishes as the control group to the burned parishes.
To address this concern, we run separate regressions based on two samples. First, a “nearby”
sample which consists of all burned parishes plus unburned parishes that share a boundary with any
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burned parishes. The results for this are reported in Table A.9. Second, a “further away” sample
which consists of all burned parishes and unburned parishes that do not share any boundaries with
any burned parishes. The results using this sample are reported in Table A.10. The results using
both samples are very similar, suggesting that our analysis is not sensitive to the choice of control
groups.
Accounting for zeros in the outcome variable. There are 2,637 observations which are recorded as
having zero hearths in the property. Taking logs results in these observations dropping out of the
regression. Therefore, to account for the zeros in the outcome variables, we adopt two approaches.
First, applying the inverse hyperbolic sine transform to hearths. Second, using a Poisson pseudo-
likelihood (PPML) regression. The results are reported in Tables A.11 and A.12 respectively. While
the estimated effects remain positive, the magnitudes are now halved and are imprecisely estimated.
Trimming extreme values of the outcome variable. As another robustness check, we drop the
top and bottom one percentile of ln (Hearthsijt). While the estimated effects are now halved, they
remain positive and are mostly statistically significant. The results of this robustness check are
reported in Table A.13.
Checking for parallel trends. A key assumption of a DiD strategy is that of parallel trends. There
are two methods to argue that the number of hearths per property in the burned versus unburned
parishes had the same trends before the Fire. The first method is to rely on the historical context.
The historical setting suggests that the Fire spread based on where the wind blew and not due to the
economic or social characteristics of the parish. While the Fire started in Pudding Lane which was
in the eastern part of the City of London, contemporaneous reporting by the The London Gazette
(1666) notes that due to the “violent Easterly wind”, the Fire spread mostly to the west. As a result,
almost all the parishes that were damaged were to the west of Pudding Lane.
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The wind blowing from the east to the west during the Fire is an important point. This is because
Heblich et al. (2020) show that in England, the wind usually blows from the west or south-west.
Therefore, we can make an argument that whether a parish ended up being burned was unexpected,
random and independent of pre-trends.
The second method would be to run a placebo DiD regression to compare the number of hearths
per property in the burned versus unburned parishes in the periods before the Fire. We should find
no effect if there are parallel trends. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, we are not able to do
so in the most robust manner. This is because the hearth tax was introduced in 1662 and for the
pre-Fire period, we only have data from the 1662, 1664, 1665 and 1666 hearth tax records. Due to
the differences in the scope and range of the pre-Fire hearth tax assessments, almost all parishes (65
out of 70) appear only in one year. In addition, Table 1.8 shows that in some years, the data we have
were either all for burned or unburned parishes. Therefore, we had to pool all the 1662, 1664, 1665
and 1666 data to form the pre-Fire period in our regressions.
Table 1.8: Pre-Fire data
Year Burned parishes in the data Unburned parishes in the data Total
1662 16 0 16
1664 0 2 2
1665 0 2 2
1666 38 17 55
To run placebo regressions to test for pre-trends, we would need data for both burned and
unburned parishes in at least two pre-Fire years. However, with the exception of 1666, the other
three pre-Fire years only consist of data from either burned or unburned parishes. In order to try our
best to provide statistical evidence to rule out pre-trends, what we can do is to classify the pre-Fire
period into two categories. First, the year 1666 would be period t− 1 and the years 1662 and 1664
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would be t− 2.12 This method has some limitations such as assuming that the data in 1664 are very
similar to 1662 and the two unburned parishes in 1664 are representative of all the other unburned
parishes. Nevertheless, accepting these limitations allows us to run the following placebo regression
to test for pre-trends:
ln (Hearthsijt) = αj + δP laceboF iret + βBurnedj × PlaceboF iret + γ′Xjt + εjt
PlaceboF iret is an indicator variable for the period after a placebo fire. We set this as the period
after 1665. Finding a large and statistically significant effect from this phantom event would cast
serious doubts on the validity of our identification strategy. If our regression passes the parallel
trends test, then we should expect β to be small and statistically insignificant. Table 1.9 shows
that this is indeed what we get when we run this placebo regression, suggesting the absence of
pre-trends.
Table 1.9: Effect of placebo Fire on the number of hearths per property
(1)
VARIABLES ln(No. Hearths)






Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
12We do not include year 1665 because the two parishes that appear in 1665 are south of the river and are hence very
different from the other parishes in the data for the placebo regression.
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1.5 The Effect of Pragmatic Legal Rulings
1.5.1 Overview
In the previous section, we found that the 1666 Great London Fire resulted in a higher number of
hearths per property in burned parishes relative to unburned parishes. While our results suggest
that individuals had positive expectations about how much other individuals in their parish would
be investing, it does not tell us what is driving these expectations. Therefore, in this section, we
examine if legal rulings could be a driver of these expectations.
1.5.2 Defining pragmatic legal rulings
The Fire Court judges were given the power to completely void existing contracts or alter the terms
of these contracts. Voiding the existing contract means that both the landlord and tenant surrender
their contracts. This allows both parties to negotiate a new contract with each other or other parties.
In addition, voiding the contract does away with the judging panels arbitrarily setting a new rent
and lease. By contrast, altering the terms of an existing contract means that the tenant remains
the same but the Fire Court decrees a new rent and/or length of lease. In addition, the Fire Court
would also decree that either the landlord or tenant rebuilds, or that both parties are to contribute
towards the rebuilding. In our paper, we define the voiding of existing contracts and the assigning of
the cost of rebuilding to the landlord as pragmatic legal rulings. 12.7% of cases fall into this category.
We define such rulings as pragmatic because they help to facilitate a higher number of hearths per
property. First, tenants are likely to be more credit-constrained compared to landlords and are hence
more likely to rebuild at a lower quality (i.e., fewer hearths per property). Second, assigning the
rebuilding to the landlord represents a clear assignment and alignment of property-rights. Third,
since the occupant is responsible for paying the hearth tax, if the tenant was assigned the rebuilding,
she is likely to rebuild with fewer hearths to reduce her tax burden. For these reasons, assigning the
rebuilding to the landlord rather than the tenant facilitates the rebuilding of London.
26
In theory, we could have expanded our definition of pragmatic rulings to also include cases where
the judges altered existing contracts (i.e., did not void the contract) but assigned the rebuilding
responsibility to the landlord. However, in such cases the Fire Court’s rulings were often multi-
dimensional. For example, it could be the case that although the rebuilding responsibility was
assigned to the landlord, the judges could have decreed a lower rent. In this instance, the landlord
may then choose to rebuild at a lower quality since the rent she is receiving is now lower. In order to
circumvent the issue of multi-dimensional rulings, we focus on the most extreme of case outcomes
– cases where the Fire Court voided existing contracts and assigned the rebuilding responsibility to
the landlord.13
1.5.3 Model: Legal rulings, expectations and investment
How exactly did legal rulings drive expectations and hence help to coordinate investment (i.e., the
number of hearths in each property)? We show this using a Nash (1950) bargaining game where
tenants and landlords bargained over the terms of rebuilding. The bargaining game consists of two
stages. In Stage 1, in each parish j, the landlord and tenant of each property i bargain over a contract
given their respective outside options. The outside options are based on the rulings established by
the Fire Court in its initial cases for each parish. Therefore, the outside options vary across parishes.
For simplicity, we suppress the subscripts j and i. We define the contract
{
r, t, I l
}
in terms of
the annual rent (r), the tenancy length (t), and the amount of contributions (investment) that the
landlord makes towards the rebuilding (I l).14 If the tenant and landlord reach an agreement, they
move to the second stage where the tenant decides on her amount of contributions (investment)
towards the rebuilding. The total amount of building investment (measured in terms of the number
13Finally, we could have also expanded our definition of pragmatic rulings to include cases where the judges voided
the existing contracts but decreed cost sharing in the rebuilding. However, the reason why we do not do this is because
we wanted our definition to reflect the complete burden of rebuilding falling on the landlord. This will be clearer when
we discuss the model in the next section.
14More accurately, the parties bargain over the split of the total surplus. In doing so, the parties are implicitly
choosing
{




of hearths in the property) is given by the sum of the landlord’s investment (determined in the
first stage) and the tenant’s investment (determined in the second stage). If they fail to reach an
agreement, they bring their case to the Fire Court. In this framework, the Fire Court’s rulings affect
the outside options and hence the bargaining dynamics between the landlords and tenants. The
model is solved by backward induction.
Solving the Nash bargaining game: Stage 2
The tenant’s problem in Stage 2 is to choose I t to maximize utility given the contract
{
r, t, I l
}
that
















u0 − pI t (1.2)
β is the discount factor. p is cost per unit of investment. u0 is the tenant’s utility after the tenancy
ends. We assume that h(I l, I t) is concave and that the amount of investments that the landlord and
tenant make towards the building are complements ( ∂h
∂Il∂It
> 0).
The first order condition is:
1− βt
1− β
h′(I l, I t) = p (1.3)
Equation 1.3 suggests that the tenant’s investment does not depend on the rent.
Proposition 1. The tenant’s investment is increasing in the tenancy length.
Proof: From equation 1.3, let ψ
(




′(I l, I t)− p. By the implicit function theorem
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Solving the Nash bargaining game: Stage 1
In this stage, the tenant and landlord bargain over the surplus given their respective outside options
πc and uc. Their outside options are based on the Fire Court’s rulings in the initial cases. We assume
that πc and uc vary across parishes. We represent the distribution of Fire Court decisions in the
initial cases as F (r, t, I l). λ is the bargaining weight which we assume to be exogenous. The Nash
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u0 − pg(y, z) dF (x, y, z)
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The Nash bargaining solution for the landlord is:
Π
(








r, t, I l
)
− πc − uc] + πc (1.6)
and that for the tenant is:
U
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r, t, I l
)
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(1.7)






0 (I(y)) + u0]− pI(y) dF (x, y, z)
Next, we assume that the judging panel’s preferences for the landlord’s contribution to the
rebuilding is orthogonal to r and t. In other words, F (x, y, z) ≡ FXY (x, y)FZ(z). Assuming
that F (x, y, z) ≡ FXY (x, y)FZ(z) has two implications. First, this assumption implies that the sum
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Second, while the sum of the outside options is not affected by the transfer of the burden to rebuild,
the outside option of the landlord still depends on FZ(z). Given these two implications, equation
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u0 − pg(I l, t)−Qc
]
Now suppose that there is a contract
{
r̄, t̄, Ī l
}
that satisfies the Nash bargaining game solution.
However, we switch from FZ(z) to F ′Z(z), where F
′
Z(z) first order stochastically dominates FZ(z).
Recall that F (r, t, I l) represents the distribution of Fire Court rulings in the initial cases. In our
empirical context, moving from FZ(z) to F ′Z(z) corresponds to the initial cases getting assigned
judging panels that have a greater probability of voiding the existing contracts and assigning the
cost of rebuilding to the landlord. As explained in the previous section, this is what we define as
pragmatic legal rulings.
Proposition 2. The landlord’s outside option (πc) falls when the initial cases are assigned judging
panels that have a greater preference for the landlord to contribute more to the rebuilding.
Proof: Since F ′Z(z) first order stochastically dominates FZ(z), this implies that the landlord’s
outside option under F ′Z(z) is now smaller:
F ′Z(z) ≤ FZ(z) ∀z and F ′Z(z) < FZ(z) for some z (1.8)
⇒ πc (F ′Z(z)) < πc (FZ(z))






0 (I(y)) dFXY (x, y)− p
∫
z dFZ(z). Since
F ′Z(z) < FZ(z), p
∫
z dF ′Z(z) > p
∫
z dFZ(z) and so πc (F ′Z(z)) < π
c (FZ(z)).
Since the landlord now has a smaller outside option, the contract
{
r̄, t̄, Ī l
}
no longer satisfies
the Nash bargaining game solution and equation 1.7 no longer holds with equality. Instead, the
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r0 (I(t̄))− pĪ l
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[h(I(t̄))− r̄] + β
t
1− β
u0 − pg(Ī l, t̄)− Q̄c
]
(1.9)
In order to achieve equality, changes in the Nash bargained contract should (1) lower the left-hand
side of the inequality and increase the right-hand side or (2) increase the right-hand side more than
the left-hand side.
Proposition 3. The Nash bargained rent (r̄) decreases when the judging panels have a greater
preference for the landlord to contribute more to the rebuilding.








1−β λ < 0,
in order for the left-hand side to equal to the right-hand side, r̄ has to decrease. A decrease in r̄
decreases the left-hand side and increases the right-hand side.
Proposition 4. The Nash bargained landlord investment to the rebuilding (Ī l) increases when
the judging panels have a greater preference for the landlord to contribute more to the rebuilding.
Proof: Referring to inequality 1.9, since ∂LHS
∂Īl







pλ > 0, in order for the left-hand side to equal to the right-hand side, Ī l has to increase. An increase
in Ī l decreases the left-hand side and increases the right-hand side.
Proposition 5. If the relative bargaining weight of the landlord is more than the relative marginal
benefit of increasing the tenancy length, then the Nash bargained tenancy length (t̄) increases when
the judging panels have a greater preference for the landlord to contribute more to the rebuilding.
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r̄, t̄, Ī l
) 
This gives us a necessary and sufficient condition for t̄ to increase. In other words, if the relative
bargaining weight of the landlord is more than the relative marginal benefit of increasing the tenancy
length, then t̄ increases. Given the historical context that tenants are obliged to repair or rebuild the
premises in the event of disasters or wars, this condition is likely to hold. In addition, in the Fire
Court data, we see that the judging panels decreed that the tenant had to rebuild 70.9% of the time.
Putting everything together, our model suggests that if the initial cases are assigned judging panels
that have a greater preference for the landlord to contribute more to the rebuilding, then this lowers
the landlord’s outside option (proposition 2). As a result of the lowering of the landlord’s outside
option, the Nash bargained annual rent (r) decreases (proposition 3), the amount of investment
that the landlord makes towards the rebuilding (I l) increases (proposition 4), and the effect on the
tenancy length (t) increases (proposition 5). Crucially, our model shows us that by changing outside
options, the rulings of the Fire Court affected all tenants and landlords even if they did not bring
their case to the Fire Court. This is how legal rulings affect expectations.
Empirical implication
In our empirical analysis, we estimate the change in the average number of hearths per property
in parish j as a result of the initial cases in the parish getting assigned judging panels that have a
greater propensity to void existing contracts and assign the rebuilding to the landlord (i.e., pragmatic
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>0 by prop. 5
(1.10)
The second line gives us the effect on the tenant’s investment and this effect is unambiguously









are ambiguous because the landlord can in principle trade off a higher amount
of investment to the building process with a lower rent or longer tenancy length. This happens
because there are three variables
{
r, t, I l
}
that are governed by a single Nash bargaining equation
(see equation 1.6). If the positive effect on the tenant’s investment (second line) dominates the
ambiguous effect on the landlord’s investment (third line) then pragmatic legal rulings can result in
a higher number of hearths per property.
To conclude this section, our model shows that even though landlords and tenants of different
properties are bargaining separately and do not bring their case to the Fire Court, they end up
choosing similar levels of hearths per property. This is because they have the same focal point and
hence expectations of what others will do. This focal point is how the Fire Court ruled in the initial
cases in their parish.
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1.5.4 Empirical strategy
To examine the effect of legal rulings, we continue to use a DiD empirical strategy:
ln (Hearthsijt) = αj +δPostF iret+βPragmaticRulingsj×PostF iret+γ′Xjt+ εijt (1.11)
ln (Hearthsijt) is the log number of hearths in property i in parish j in period t. The two periods
are before the Fire and after the Fire. PragmaticRulingsj denotes the share of initial cases in
parish j where the Fire Court judging panels’ rulings were pragmatic.15 Specifically, this is the
share of cases in parish j where the Fire Court judging panels voided the existing contracts and
assigned the rebuilding to the landlord. Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of the share of pragmatic
rulings across the parishes. PostF iret is an indicator variable for the period after the Fire. Xjt is a
vector of controls. Finally, αj are parish fixed effects. We cluster the standard errors at the parish
level.
Figure 1.2: Distribution of the share of pragmatic rulings across parishes
15As we only have data from the first four out of nine volumes of the Fire Court cases, these figures are calculated
based on the first four volumes.
35
It is important to note that we are not able to distinguish in the data properties that went to the
Fire Court and those that did not. The regression therefore includes all properties in the parish
– those that went to the Fire Court and those that did not. However, this should not affect our
results substantially since the proportion of properties in each parish that went to the Fire Court is
a relatively small number. Based on the initial cases, the average proportion of properties in each
parish that went to the Fire Court was 6%, the median was 4% and the maximum was 30%. In Table
A.6 we report the proportion of properties in each parish where the landlord and the tenant went to
the Fire Court (based on the data that we have). Therefore, in the regression, β also tells us whether
the rulings in a small share of properties in the parish that went to the Fire Court affected the quality
of other properties in the parish.
For those interested in the cross-sectional regressions in each time period, the results are reported
in Table A.14. In the pre-Fire period, the number of hearths per property in parishes where all
the legal rulings were pragmatic versus parishes with no pragmatic legal rulings was statistically
indistinguishable.
Recall that in the previous section, our DiD regression compares burned parishes to unburned
parishes. As a result, there could be concerns that any positive effect is purely mechanical since
rebuilt properties had to be built according to strict regulations that specified the size and materials
used. However, in this section, since our sample consists only of burned parishes, the DiD strategy
helps to net off these mechanical effects. This allows us to more cleanly attribute the effect that we
estimate to legal rulings.
1.5.5 Results and discussion
Higher quality structures. Table 1.10 reports whether the rulings in a small share of properties in the
parish that went to the Fire Court affected the quality of other properties in the parish (i.e., number
of hearths per property). The estimate in column 1 shows that controlling for parish and year fixed
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effects, parishes where all the initial cases saw pragmatic Fire Court rulings experienced a highly
statistically significant increase of around 144% more hearths compared to parishes where all the
initial cases saw unpragmatic rulings.
Importantly, the share of pragmatic rulings differs across parishes because of both exogenous
and endogenous reasons. Therefore, in our regression, we control for as many endogenous reasons
as we can. In column 2, we include a series of parish controls interacted with PostF iret. These
include the number of properties in the parish before the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking
military personnel and doctors living in the parish. This helps to address concerns that our results
could be driven by the politics and resources of the parishes. Reassuring, our results remain
extremely stable to the inclusion of these controls.
In column 3, we show that the results are stable to the inclusion of broader locations-by-post
fixed effects. Finally, in column 4, we include pre-Fire hearth terciles-by-post fixed effects. The
estimated effect continues to be robust to the inclusion of these controls. In particular, parishes where
all the initial cases saw pragmatic Fire Court rulings experienced a highly statistically significant
increase of around 98.1% more hearths compared to parishes where all the initial cases resulted
in unpragmatic rulings. Given that the average number of hearths before the Fire was 3.83, this
translates to an increase of 3.76 hearths. Expressed in a different way, what our result suggests is
that in terms of the share of pragmatic rulings, going from the 25th percentile parish (0% pragmatic
rulings) to the 75th percentile parish (20% pragmatic rulings) resulted in a 19.6% increase in the
number of hearths. In absolute terms, this corresponds to an increase of 0.75 hearths. Figure A.3
shows the binned scatter plot of the results in column 4.
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Table 1.10: Effect of legal rulings on the number of hearths per property
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Pragmatic X Post Fire 1.444*** 1.253*** 1.103*** 0.981***
(0.449) (0.393) (0.286) (0.246)
Observations 31,582 31,582 31,582 31,582
R-squared 0.014 0.024 0.026 0.031
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The results show us that while only a small share of properties in each parish went to the Fire
Court, the rulings of these few cases had an outsized effect on the quality of other buildings in the
parish. Why would this be the case? We argue that this is because the small share of cases was
enough to anchor expectations. This positive result is even more remarkable considering that the
hearth tax was introduced in 1662. Occupants of properties would have been incentivized to rebuild
with fewer hearths to avoid the tax. Despite this, we still see a positive effect due to legal rulings.
This suggests the possibility that even before the Fire, there was latent demand for structures with
more hearths. Consequently, the simultaneous building after the Fire led to greater cross-building
spillovers and helped to address this demand. Our results hence provide us with evidence that
pragmatic legal rulings can indeed anchor expectations of what others will do.
Finally, our regression uses parish-level variations in Fire Court rulings. A natural question
to ask is why do the Court rulings in your own parish matter? We take two approaches to address
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this. First, using the historical context. In early modern London, most interactions took place at
the parish-level. Individuals often worked, lived and worshiped in the same parish. Moreover,
parishes were given quite a bit of autonomy in civil matters. For example, the Highways Act
1555 made road maintenance the responsibility of the parish and Poor Relief Act 1601 (Poor Law)
outlined the responsibility of the parish to look after its own poor. Therefore, because of the context,
we argue that what is most salient to inhabitants of the parish is what happens within their own parish.
Second, we show statistical evidence that the rulings of previous cases in your own parish predicts
future rulings in your parish. To show this, we run the following regression using the Fire Court
cases of parishes that appear in the hearth tax data:
PragmaticRulingijp = θp + βPragmaticRulingF irstFewCasesj + λ
′X ijp + εijp
PragmaticRulingijp is a dummy variable that indicates whether the judging panel p for case i in
parish j decreed a pragmatic ruling. PragmaticRulingF irstFewCasesj is the share of pragmatic
rulings in the first few cases preceding the current case in parish j. When running the regressions,
we try different definitions of “first few cases”. For example, the first two cases, the first three cases,
etc. Taking the average across the first few cases accounts for the fact that the first case may not
be precedential and precedents may take some time to be firmly established. θp are judging panel
fixed effects. Xijp is a vector of controls. These include pre-Fire case characteristics such as the
degree of subletting in the property, the number of years left in the tenancy, the rent, the fine paid to
secure the contract and whether the tenant spent any money to improve the property. Importantly,
the vector of controls also includes the share of pragmatic rulings in other parishes before case i in
parish j. The standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Table 1.11 reports the results. In column 1, the definition of first few cases is the first case,
in column 2, the definition of the first few cases is the first two cases, and so on in the other columns.
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Across all columns, the coefficient estimate of β is positive. This suggests that past rulings in your
own parish predicts future rulings. In addition, the coefficient estimates increase as we move across
the columns. This reflects the fact that the first case may not be precedential and precedents may
take some time to be firmly established. Column 5 suggests that if the first five cases in your parish
had pragmatic rulings, the probability that the current case receives a pragmatic ruling increases by
40.5%-points. Therefore, the Court rulings in your own parish matter because they predict future
rulings in your parish.
Table 1.11: Effect of past rulings in your own parish on current ruling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Whether current case ruling is pragmatic
Share of pragmatic rulings (first few cases) 0.024 0.022 0.202* 0.327** 0.405*
(0.061) (0.075) (0.117) (0.144) (0.199)
Observations 303 246 195 163 139
R-squared 0.350 0.417 0.443 0.510 0.488
Judging panel FE X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
First few cases 1 2 3 4 5
Notes: Case controls include pre-Fire case characteristics such as the degree of subletting in the property, the
number of years left in the tenancy, the rent, the fine paid to secure the contract and whether the tenant spent
any money to improve the property. It also includes the share of pragmatic rulings in other parishes before
the current case. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level. Notation for statistical significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Effect holds when controlling for spillovers from neighboring parishes. Next, we check if our
results are sensitive to potential spatial spillovers. In particular, burned parishes with Fire Court
cases tend to be located near each other. Therefore, a burned parish with Fire Court cases not only
generated spillovers to other burned parishes but also received inward spillovers from these other
parishes. If these spillovers are large, our estimated effects of legal rulings within each parish could
be overstated. Therefore, we include as a control the weighted share of cases in neighboring burned
parishes where the Fire Court judging panels decreed pragmatic rulings. Table 1.12 shows that our
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results are robust to controlling for the legal outcomes in neighboring parishes.
Table 1.12: Effect of legal rulings on the number of hearths per property
(controlling for spillovers)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Pragmatic X Post Fire 1.485*** 1.149*** 1.119*** 0.963***
(0.478) (0.326) (0.278) (0.253)
Pragmatic Spillover X Post Fire -0.513 0.230 0.013 0.349
(0.635) (0.358) (0.315) (0.286)
Observations 31,582 31,582 31,582 31,582
R-squared 0.015 0.025 0.026 0.031
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. We also include the log number of cases in neighboring
parishes. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Adding in other dimensions of the rulings as controls. The Fire Court judges were given the
power to decree who rebuilds, the rent, as well as length of the new contract. Such multi-dimensional
rulings make it difficult to define what constitutes pragmatic rulings that helped to facilitate the
rebuilding of London. In order to circumvent the issue of multi-dimensional rulings, in our analysis,
we had focused on the most extreme of pragmatic case outcomes – cases where the Fire Court
voided existing contracts and assigned the rebuilding to the landlord. Nonetheless, it could well
be the case that the newly decreed rent or tenancy length could be playing a role in anchoring
expectations and consequently, the number of hearths per property in each parish.
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To address this concern, we include as controls the average change in rent and tenancy length
in each parish arising from the Fire Court rulings. For example, if there were five cases in parish A
that went to the Fire Court, and the judging panel increased the tenancy length for all five of the
cases by 10 years, then the average change in tenancy length arising from the Fire Court rulings
for parish A would be 10 years. Referring to Table A.15, the coefficient estimate on our treatment
variable PragmaticRulingsj × PostF iret remains stable to the inclusion of the other dimensions
of the Fire Court’s rulings. The coefficient estimates on the average change in the tenancy length
interacted with post are extremely close to zero and statistically insignificant. The coefficient
estimates on the average change in the rent interacted with post while significant, is relatively small
in magnitude. Taken together, the results across the columns provide evidence that it is indeed
pragmatic Fire Court rulings (as defined by the share of initial cases where the judging panels voided
the contracts and assigned the rebuilding to the landlord) that are affecting individuals’ expectations
and not the other dimensions of the Fire Court’s decisions.
1.5.6 Competing hypotheses/mechanisms
The results in Table 1.10 show us that while only a small share of properties in each parish went
to the Fire Court, the rulings of these few cases had an outsized effect on the quality of other
buildings in the parish. We argue that this is because the small share of cases was enough to anchor
expectations. Are we able to rule out competing hypotheses/mechanisms?
One competing hypothesis is that our results have nothing to do with the small share of cases
anchoring expectations. Instead, it is simply picking up the direct effect of the Fire Court rulings.
This is because we are not able to distinguish in the data properties that went to the Fire Court
and those that did not. The regression therefore includes all properties in the parish – those that
went to the Fire Court and those that did not. To see why this might be a problem, consider the
following example of a parish where there are 100 properties (see Table 1.13). Before the Fire, the
average number of hearths per property was 10. Now assume that of the 100 properties, 60 did
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not go to Court but 40 went to Court. Let us further assume that the average number of hearths
in the 60 properties was the same before and after the Fire (i.e., 10 hearths). However, in the 40
cases that went to the court, the average number of hearths increased by three per property to 13
hearths. Consequently, the overall average number of hearths per property increased by 1.2 to 11.2.
This stylized example shows us how the average number of hearths can increase even without any
anchoring of expectations of those that did not go to Court.
Table 1.13: Stylized example
Total Hearths Number of properties Avg. hearths per property
Before Fire 100*10=1,000 100 10
After Fire (60*10)+(40*13)=1,120 100 11.2
However, we think that this should not affect our results substantially since the proportion of
properties in each parish that went to the Fire Court is a relatively small number. Based on the
initial cases, the average percentage of properties in each parish that went to the Fire Court was 6%,
the median was 4% and the maximum was 30%. In addition, Table 1.14 shows the results when we
drop all parishes where more than 14.6% (column 2), 7.4% (column 3), 4.1% (column 4) and 2.3%
(column 5) of the properties went to the Fire Court. 14.6%, 7.4%, 4.1% and 2.3% correspond to the
95th, 75th, 50th and 25th percentiles respectively.
Column 1 shows the results using the full sample. Our results remain robust to dropping parishes
where a “large” proportion of properties went to the Fire Court. If anything, our results seem to get
bigger when we drop more parishes which is against what we should see if our results are purely
picking up the direct effect of the Fire Court rulings.
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Table 1.14: Effect of legal rulings on the number of hearths per property
(dropping parishes where a “large” proportion of properties went to Court)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ln(No. Hearths per Property)
Pragmatic X Post Fire 0.981*** 0.893*** 0.897*** 1.051*** 1.121*
(0.246) (0.241) (0.245) (0.232) (0.527)
Observations 31,582 30,993 29,210 26,289 21,953
R-squared 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.035 0.042
Parish FE X X X X X
Post FE X X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X X X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X X X X X
Number of clusters 46 43 34 24 12
Sample All < 95 pct < 75 pct < 50 pct < 25 pct
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before the Fire, the share of peers, high-
ranking military personnel and doctors living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Another competing hypothesis is that of the share of owner-occupied properties in the parish. In
parishes where there is a large share of owner-occupied properties, the share of properties that go
to Court must by definition be small since owners cannot sue themselves. Therefore, our results
may have nothing to do with the small share of cases anchoring expectations. Instead, they could
simply be reflecting the fact that these parishes have a greater share of owner-occupied properties.
Landowners are less likely to be credit constrained and can thus allocate more resources towards
building more hearths per property. In addition, if the owner occupies the property, then there is a
clear assignment/alignment of property-rights. Consequently, the owner builds at a higher quality
because the owner is able to accrue the full benefits of living in a higher quality property.
Unfortunately, the data do not tell us whether a property is owner occupied – they only tell
us who the main occupant of the property is. To overcome this limitation, we count the share
of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors living in the parish. To the extent that this
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group of individuals are more likely to own their own homes, this variable gives us a proxy for the
share of owner-occupied properties in the parish. We then include these three variables as controls
in our regression. Referring to Table 1.10 column 2, we can see that the coefficient estimate on
PragmaticRulingsj × PostF iret remains stable to the inclusion of these variables as controls.
This suggests that there are aspects of the rulings in the small share of properties that went to Court
that cannot be attributed to the share of owner-occupied properties in the parish. Therefore, our
results lend credence to our proposed mechanism that the small share of cases was enough to anchor
expectations for everyone in the parish.
1.5.7 Robustness checks
Dropping parishes which merged after the Fire. One concern could be that the Fire led to the
merging of some parishes and so our results could be driven by these enlarged parishes which might
have more resources. In Table A.16 we re-run regression 1.11 using only parishes that did not
merge after the Fire. Reassuringly, the coefficient estimates remain similar and even larger than our
baseline results, suggesting that our baseline results are conservative.
Accounting for zeros in the outcome variable. For burned parishes with Fire Court cases, there are
801 observations which are recorded as having zero hearths in the property. Taking logs results
in these observations dropping out of the regression. Therefore, to account for the zeros in the
outcome variables, we adopt two approaches. First, applying the inverse hyperbolic sine transform
to hearths. Second, using a Poisson pseudo-likelihood (PPML) regression. The results are reported
in Tables A.17 and A.18 respectively. The estimated effects are very similar to our baseline results.
Trimming extreme values of the outcome variable. Another robustness check that we run is to drop
the top and bottom 1 percentile of ln (Hearthsijt). The results of this robustness check is reported
in Table A.19 and are similar to our baseline results.
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1.5.8 Using an IV estimation strategy
As there could be concerns that there are time-varying parish-level omitted variables which we have
not controlled for, we augment our DiD strategy with an instrumental variable (IV) strategy. Our
IV strategy exploits the fact that Fire Court judging panels with different political alignments (i.e.,
whether they were predominantly Royalists or Parliamentarians) were assigned to the cases in the
parishes. The 1666 Great Fire took place in the midst of the Second Dutch War (1665-1667) and the
Great Plague which began in 1665. King Charles II was relying on taxes and loans from London
and its wealthiest citizens to finance the war. The destruction of the customs house, wharves and
more than 13,000 buildings caused a significant drop in royal revenue and thus the King had a
vested interest for London to be quickly rebuilt. Therefore, judging panels that were predominantly
Royalists (more aligned with the King) were more likely to decree pragmatic rulings so as to
facilitate the rebuilding of London. As a result, we can use the composition of the judging panels as
an instrument for the share of initial cases in the parish that had pragmatic rulings. This gives us
exogenous variations in legal rulings for each of the parishes. Of the 46 parishes in our regression
with Fire Court cases, 17 of them (37.0%) had the majority of their initial cases presided by judging
panels that consisted predominantly of Royalists.
Relevance of instrument
We estimate the first-stage relationship between the composition of the judging panels in the initial
cases and the share of initial cases in the parish that had pragmatic rulings:




Table 1.15 presents the first-stage results which suggest that if the majority of the initial cases in the
parish were heard by judging panels that were predominantly Royalists, then the share of initial
cases in the parish that had pragmatic rulings increased by 9.5%-pts.
Table 1.15: First-stage – Effect of Royalist on legal rulings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Pragmatic X Post
Majority royalist in judging panels X Post 0.119*** 0.087* 0.095*** 0.095***
(0.038) (0.045) (0.031) (0.029)
Observations 31,582 31,582 31,582 31,582
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46
KP F-stat 9.895 3.795 9.122 10.37
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before the Fire, the share of peers,
high-ranking military personnel and doctors living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the
parish level. Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The first-stage relationship is robust to the inclusion of a series of parish controls interacted with
PostF iret, broader locations-by-post fixed effects and pre-Fire hearth terciles-by-post fixed effects.
In addition, in most of the regressions, the first-stage has a KP F-statistic value of around 10. Figure
A.4 shows the binned scatter plot of the results in column 4.
Validity of instrument
Conditional Independence. The validity of our instrument depends crucially on whether there were
other parish-level factors involved in determining the composition of the judging panels in the initial
cases. We verify this by running a balancing test. This is similar to the type of statistical test that is
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used to verify random assignment in a randomized controlled trial.
Table 1.16: Testing for random assignment of judging panels to parishes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Majority royalist in judging panels
ln(No. properties before the Fire) -0.033 0.004 0.034 0.029
(0.064) (0.086) (0.095) (0.133)
Share of peers -2.071 -3.816 -6.501 -4.256
(9.929) (10.247) (11.106) (23.191)
Share of high-ranking military personnel -30.800 -7.468 -10.069 -21.936
(29.296) (42.349) (51.972) (81.006)
Share of doctors 1.689 7.120 2.283 -7.803
(17.258) (19.069) (19.263) (27.936)
Broader location 1 -0.097 -0.075 0.098
(0.324) (0.322) (0.494)
Broader location 2 0.161 0.169 0.220
(0.288) (0.300) (0.518)
Pre-Fire hearth tercile 1 -0.177 -0.315
(0.236) (0.292)
Pre-Fire hearth tercile 2 -0.049 -0.063
(0.210) (0.250)
ln(Average rent in 1638) -0.175
(0.289)
Observations 46 46 46 37
Adjusted R-squared -0.081 -0.109 -0.152 -0.259
F-stat for joint test 0.350 0.431 0.373 0.361
p-value for joint test 0.843 0.853 0.928 0.932
Notes: Robust standard errors. Notation for statistical significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.16 shows the result of this balancing test. The coefficients on the share of peers, high-
ranking military personnel and doctors seem sizable. However, this is because the mean values of
these variables are extremely small. For example, the mean value for the share of peers is 0.005,
that of high-ranking military personnel is 0.0004 and that for doctors is 0.003.
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Table 1.16 also shows that parish-level factors were not predictive of the composition of the
judging panels in the initial cases. In column 4, for parishes where data were available, we included
the average rent in the parish in 1638. The 1638 rental data comes from “The Inhabitants of
London in 1638”.16 Column 4 shows that historical rents were not predictive of the composition
of the judging panels. Importantly, across all of the columns, all of the estimates are statistically
insignificant at the 1% level and are not jointly significant with p-values ranging from 0.84 to 0.93.
Exclusion. This restriction requires that the composition of the judging panels in the initial cases
affected the quality of building investment in the parish only through its effect on legal rulings.
While it is not possible to formally test the exclusion condition, the fact that our instrument passes
the balancing test is reassuring.
However, there could still be concerns that the exclusion restriction could be violated since it
is possible that monarchist officials may had some influence in the assignment of judges to the cases.
For example, these officials could be expecting some parishes to grow more, and so they wanted to
make sure that the parliamentarian judges did not derail their plans. In addition, it could be the case
that some parishes had more monarchist landowners and so the officials assigned monarchist judges
to protect the interest of these landowners.
In order to address such concerns, we are in the process of collecting data to measure what is
the share of peers in each parish that was loyal to the King. From the hearth tax data, we are able
to identify the names of the peers (i.e., Duke, Duchess, Marquess, Marchioness, Earl, Countess,
Viscount, Viscountess, Baron, Baroness, Lord, Lady, Sir, Dame and Ambassador) living in each
parish. For the parishes in our regression, there are about 500 peers in total. We can then refer
16“The Inhabitants of London in 1638” was originally published by the Society of Genealogists in London in 1931
(see Dale (1931)) and can be accessed at the British History Online website. This publication was based on the
manuscript “Settlement of Tithes, 1638”, found in the Lambeth Palace Library. The manuscript contains a list of the
householders in 93 out of the 107 parishes in the City of London, as well as the rentals paid for the houses and the tithes
paid.
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to various historical sources (e.g., the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004)) to find
out what were the views of these peers on the 1660 restoration of the monarchy. Once we have
determined the share of monarchist peers in each parish, we can then include this variable as a
control in the regression. This would hopefully help to control for the possibility that monarchist
judges were being assigned to parishes where the monarchists wanted to have greater influence over
or benefit more from.
In any case, even if the exclusion restriction is violated, our reduced form estimates can still
be interpreted as the causal effect of the composition of the judging panels in the initial cases on the
number of hearths per property in the parish.
Monotonicity. The monotonicity assumption requires a monotonic relationship between the
instrument and the variable that is being instrumented. The monotonicity assumption ensures
that our IV estimate can be interpreted as a local average treatment effect (LATE). In our context,
this is the average causal effect among the subgroup of parishes that invested differently in their
buildings because of the composition of the judging panels in the initial cases.
If the monotonicity assumption is violated, then in the classical IV framework, our results can only
be interpreted as causal constant effects. However, in a heterogeneous treatment effects framework,
if the monotonicity assumption is violated, Angrist et al. (1996) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)
show that the IV estimates would still be a weighted average of marginal treatment effects. However,
because the weights do not sum to one, this leads to an ill-defined local average treatment effect.
One testable implication of the monotonicity assumption is that the first-stage estimates should
be non-negative for any subsample. To test this, we split the sample into various subsamples and
estimated the first-stage relationship for each of these subsamples. The results are reported in Table
A.20. In columns 1 and 2, we split the sample into whether the church in the parish was damaged
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by the Fire. In columns 3 to 5, we split the sample into three broader geographical locations (i.e.,
abutting the City of London walls, within the walls and outside the walls). In columns 6 to 8, we
split the sample based on terciles of the number of hearths in each parish before the Fire. In columns
9 to 11, we split the sample based on terciles of the number of properties in each parish before the
Fire. In columns 12 to 14, we split the sample based on terciles of the share of peers in the parishes.
In columns 15 and 16, we split the sample into two based on the share of doctors in the parishes.
Finally, in columns 17 and 18, we split the sample into two based on the share of high-ranking
military personnel in the parishes. Out of these 18 subsamples, there are only three subsamples
where the first-stage estimate is negative. In the other 15 subsamples, the first-stage estimates are
positive, consistent with the monotonicity assumption.
IV results and discussion
Table 1.17 reports the results from the IV regressions. In column 4, the results suggest that parishes
where all the initial cases saw pragmatic Fire Court rulings experienced a highly statistically
significant increase of around 200% more hearths compared to parishes where all the initial cases
saw unpragmatic rulings. In other words, going from the 25th percentile parish in terms of the share
of pragmatic rulings (0% pragmatic rulings) to the 75th percentile parish (20% pragmatic rulings)
resulted in a 40% increase in the number of hearths per property. In absolute terms, this corresponds
to an increase of 1.53 hearths. We also report the reduced form estimates in Table A.21 and show
the associated binned scatter plot of the residues (based on all the controls) in Figure A.5.
The IV results are around twice as large as the DiD results (1.53 hearths vs. 0.75 hearths). This
could suggest two things. First, the DiD regression suffers from omitted variables and thus fails
the parallel trend assumption. Second, even if the DiD estimate is unbiased, we should still expect
the IV estimate to be different from it. This is because the DiD estimate identifies the average
treatment effect whereas the IV estimate gives us the local average treatment effect for the compilers.
Nevertheless, the fact that the IV estimates are positive and highly statistically significant re-affirms
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our DiD results. This gives us greater confidence in concluding that pragmatic legal rulings affected
individuals’ expectations about how much other individuals in their parish would be investing. This
in turn resulted in a higher number of hearths per property in the parish.
Table 1.17: IV – Effect of legal rulings on the number of hearths per property
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Pragmatic X Post Fire 2.276*** 2.550*** 2.247*** 2.001**
(0.698) (0.917) (0.753) (0.789)
Observations 31,582 31,582 31,582 31,582
R-squared 0.010 0.016 0.020 0.026
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46
KP F-stat 9.895 3.795 9.122 10.37
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Adding in other dimensions of the rulings as controls. To address concerns that our definition of
pragmatic rulings fails to consider changes in rent and tenancy length, we include these as controls
in our regression. Table A.22 provides evidence that it is indeed pragmatic Fire Court rulings that
are affecting individuals’ expectations and not the other dimensions of the Fire Court’s decisions.
Robustness checks
Dropping parishes which merged after the Fire. Similar to the other sections, in Table A.23 we
re-run our IV analysis using only parishes that did not merge after the Fire. The coefficient estimates
remain very similar to our baseline results.
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Accounting for zeros in the outcome variable. To account for the zeros in the outcome variables, we
apply the inverse hyperbolic sine transform to hearths. The results are reported in Table A.24. The
estimated effects remain positive and continue to be highly statistically significant.
Trimming extreme values of the outcome variable. Table A.25 reports the results where we drop the
top and bottom 1 percentile of ln (Hearthsijt). The results are similar to our baseline results.
1.6 Conclusion
The development of cities often involves the rejuvenation and replacement of outdated buildings.
However, the sunk cost of existing durable structures often serves as an impediment. While disasters
are destructive, an unintended silver lining is that they may help to remove development frictions.
By lowering the opportunity cost of waiting to rebuild to zero, disasters could potentially spur the
development of neighborhoods and even cities. However, disasters do not necessarily guarantee
higher quality buildings. What ultimately matters is what each individual expects other individuals
to do. Our paper highlights this by providing causal evidence of how legal rulings can be a main
driver in the formation of these expectations. While there is a relatively large theoretical literature
on how legal institutions can affect expectations and hence the behavior of individuals, there is
relatively less empirical work on this. Our paper thus addresses this gap in the literature. Although
the setting of our paper is 17th century England, even today, legal rulings continue to be a key aspect
in society. This has policy implications as it suggests scope for laws to influence expectations and
in so doing, facilitate the continual development of cities.
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Chapter 2: Made by History: The Spatial Distribution of Manufacturing
Industries in the US
2.1 Introduction
There is an extensive literature that shows that the quirks of history shape present-day economic
outcomes either through path dependency and/or through altering long-run determinants of these
outcomes. One famous example is Bleakley and Lin (2012) where they show that even though
portage is now an obsolete technology, there is still greater population density today in areas near
portage sites. Recently, a ground-breaking paper by Bazzi et al. (2020) contributes to this literature
by showing how time spent on the American frontier has contemporaneous and persistent effects on
a location’s culture and institutions. Specifically, “rugged individualism” continues to persist in
counties that spent more time on the frontier. Residents of these counties exhibit more pervasive
individualism, prefer less redistribution, lower public spending and less social protection in terms of
minimum wages, gun control and environment protection.
In this paper, I build on this existing literature by examining the following research question
– how does this particular episode of history (time at the frontier) help to explain manufacturing
production patterns across American counties today? In other words, can time at the frontier explain
the present-day sorting pattern of specific industries to specific counties? Following Nunn (2007b)
and Alfaro et al. (2019), I define industries based on how susceptible they are to holdup (i.e., level
of “contractibility”).
I begin this paper with a simple conceptual framework to explain how time spent on the frontier
affects the spatial distribution of manufacturing industries across US counties. The model is adapted
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from Melitz (2003). Instead of selection into exporting, I adapt the model to show how firms and
industries sort into producing at different locations. In the model, there is a continuum of firms with
varying levels of “contractibility”. Higher “contractibility” means that the intermediate inputs used
by the firm are less relationship-specific and hence easier to specify in contracts. In other words,
these industries are less susceptible to holdup. This definition is based on Nunn (2007b) and Alfaro
et al. (2019). Given their level of “contractibility”, firms decide which counties to produce in. There
is a fixed cost associated with producing in each county. In particular, the more time that a county
spent on the frontier, the higher is the fixed cost that the firm needs to incur to produce there. There
are various interpretations for this higher cost. One could be that the time spent on the frontier
is associated with the culture and institutions of the county being more individualistic and these
translate to a higher cost. Such an interpretation is consistent with Bazzi et al. (2020).
This simple framework yields the following implications. First, the outcomes at the county level.
There are fewer firms in counties that spent a longer time on the frontier. However, this is ambiguous
for employment. The intuition is that producing in counties that spent a longer time on the frontier
is less profitable due to the high fixed cost associated with the location. Second, the outcomes at
the industry level. Under certain distributional assumptions, there are fewer firms in industries
that are more “contractible”. The intuition is that there is a lower probability of a firm drawing
a high “contractibility” parameter. Third, the sorting pattern of industries to counties. Firms in
high “contractibility” industries sort into producing at counties that spent a longer time on the
frontier. However, this is ambiguous for employment. The intuition for this is that “contractibility”
is somewhat akin to productivity – only the high “contractibility” firms are able to pay the high
fixed cost associated with producing in counties that spent a longer time on the frontier.
I begin my empirical analysis by first showing evidence of the first two implications of the model.
I show that there are indeed fewer establishments and lower employment in counties that spent a
longer time on the frontier. This result is robust to the inclusion of a rich set of geographical and
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historical controls. In addition, I show that there are fewer establishments and lower employment in
industries that are more “contractible”. However, the estimates are imprecisely estimated.
Next, I examine the present-day sorting pattern of specific industries to specific counties. This is
the main contribution of my paper. To do this, I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy
which exploits two cross-sectional variations. The first cross-sectional variation comes from the
fact that different counties spent different number of years on the American frontier. The second
cross-sectional variation arises because different industries have different levels of “contractibility”.
For example, industries that predominantly use inputs that are sold on an organized exchange (e.g.,
oil) are highly “contractible”. This means that the inputs are less relationship-specific and hence
easier to specify in contracts. Using this DiD strategy, I find that the time spent on the frontier does
indeed affect the present-day composition of manufacturing industries across US counties. Counties
that spent a longer time on the frontier have relatively more establishments and higher employment
in “contractible” industries today. The results are consistent with the mechanisms proposed in the
conceptual framework – only the high “contractibility” firms are able to pay the high fixed cost
associated with producing in counties that spent a longer time on the frontier. The results hold even
when a rich set of geographical, historical and industry controls, as well as extremely demanding
fixed effects are included. This rules out the role of geography, other historical events and other
industry characteristics as alternative explanations and hence confounders to the results. In addition,
the results continue to hold even when using the Herfindahl index of intermediate input use as an
alternative measure of holdup in each industry.
Having shown strong evidence of the sorting pattern of high “contractibility” industries to counties
that spent a longer time on the frontier, I next explore various mechanisms that could explain this
sorting pattern. The first mechanism that I explore is that of the first-mover advantage that persists
due to path dependency. Under this explanation, the present-day high “contractibility” industries
that sort to counties that spent a longer time on the frontier are the same industries that sort to
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these counties in the past. Due to path dependency, this sorting pattern continues to persist till
today even if the initial reasons for why these industries locate in these counties are no longer
relevant. I show evidence that while the high “contractibility” industries of the past did sort to
counties that spent a longer time on the frontier, these industries are different from the present-
day high “contractibility” industries. Since the set of industries that sort to the frontier counties
are different in the two time periods, this allows me to rule out the first-mover advantage mechanism.
The second mechanism that I explore is whether the present-day sorting pattern can be explained
by the culture and institutions of frontier counties. The idea behind this mechanism stems from
the finding in Bazzi et al. (2020) that the time spent on the frontier has both contemporaneous and
persistent effects on the counties’ culture and institutions. This suggests that the individualistic
culture and institutions that developed in the early days became fundamental to a place over time
and hence persist till today. Relying on the arguments in Bazzi et al. (2020), I argue that the “rugged
individualism” of a county affects the sorting of industries. Since counties that spent a longer time
on the frontier have more individualistic culture and institutions, individuals in these counties are
less likely to trust other people. Therefore, anything that is not “contractible” becomes harder and
more costly to enforce. Consequently, only the more “contractible” industries locate in counties
that spent a longer time on the frontier.
This paper is related to the burgeoning literature on the persistence of history. Many of these
papers are related to the literature on the effect of institutions on economic outcomes which I briefly
cover in the paragraphs to come. Besides those papers, other examples include Nunn (2007a, 2008),
Bleakley and Lin (2012), Hornbeck and Naidu (2014), Jedwab and Moradi (2016), Sequeira et al.
(2020), Allen and Donaldson (2020), Bazzi et al. (2020) and Ottinger (2020). Related to the literature
on the persistence of history are papers that examine whether major shocks are able to break this
persistence. These shocks include wars and bombing (Davis and Weinstein (2002) and Miguel and
Roland (2011)), natural or man-made disasters (Siodla (2015) and Hornbeck and Keniston (2017)),
57
political events (Redding et al. (2011) and Michaels and Rauch (2018)), technology (Bleakley and
Lin (2012)) and even diseases (Jedwab et al. (2019)). This paper builds on Bazzi et al. (2020) and
shows how time spent at the frontier has persistence consequences on how industries sort to counties.
In addition, this paper is related to the literature on what explains the spatial distribution of economic
activities. Economic geography theories suggest that this is determined by what Fujita and Thisse
(2002) describe as the “fundamental trade-off of urban economics” involving agglomeration versus
dispersion forces. The existing literature has mainly studied these forces in terms of the externalities
described in Marshall (1890) (i.e., labor-market interactions, linkages between firms and knowledge
spillovers),1 transportation infrastructure, endogenous amenities and government policies.2 There
have also been papers that examine the role of location fundamentals (i.e., geography and factor
endowments) in explaining the spatial distribution of economic activities. These papers include
Fuchs (1962), Kim (1995), Ellison and Glaeser (1999), Hanson and Slaughter (2002) and Davis and
Weinstein (2002).
In examining the sorting patterns of industries to counties, this paper is related to the literature on
the sources of comparative advantage. Nunn and Trefler (2014) document that there has been a
growing literature that explores whether institutions are a source of comparative advantage. These
include contracting institutions in the product market (Nunn (2007b), Levchenko (2007), Boehm
and Oberfield (2020) and Boehm (2020)), labor market related institutions (Costinot (2009) and
Cunat and Melitz (2012)) and financial institutions (Beck (2003) and Manova (2008, 2013)). A
recent paper by Chor (2010) simultaneously tests all of these different institutions by including all
1These Marshallian externalities are similar to what Duranton and Puga (2004) describe as sharing, matching and
learning.
2Examples of papers examining Marshallian externalities are Holmes (1999), Costa and Kahn (2000), Henderson
(2003), Moretti (2004), Ellison et al. (2010), Greenstone et al. (2010), Dauth et al. (2018) and Atkin et al. (2019).
Examples of papers examining transportation infrastructure are Baum-Snow (2007), Michaels (2008), Duranton and
Puga (2012), Faber (2014), Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016), Donaldson (2018) and Heblich et al. (2020). As for
endogenous amenities, examples are Diamond (2016), Davis et al. (2019) and Couture et al. (2020). An example of a
paper studying the role of government policies is Kline and Moretti (2013).
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of them in a single regression. Finally, there has been a recent literature that looks specifically at the
comparative advantage of more granular geography such as cities. Examples include Gaubert (2018),
Tian (2019) and Davis and Dingel (2020). This paper contributes to this literature by showing how
high “contractibility” industries sort to counties that spent a longer time on the frontier.
By arguing that the time spent on the frontier affects a county’s culture and institutions, and
this consequently affects the sorting of industries to counties, this paper is related to the literature
on the effect of institutions on economic outcomes. North and Thomas (1973) argue that the
commonly studied determinants of growth such as innovation, economies of scale, education and
capital accumulation “are not causes of growth; they are growth”. In their view, the “fundamental”
determinant of growth is institutions. This has led to a burgeoning literature which include Engerman
and Sokoloff (1997), La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2005), Banerjee and
Iyer (2005), Dell (2010), Michalopoulos and Pappaioannou (2016), Dell and Olken (2020) and
Mendez-Chacon and Patten (2020).3
While this paper shows that history clearly matters, a lingering question remains. “Does history
matters only when it matters little” (Rauch (1993))? A ground-breaking paper by Allen and
Donaldson (2020) provides compelling evidence that this seems to be the case. Their paper shows
that while history determines where economic activities take place, it plays a very limited role
in determining overall welfare in the long run. However, if we consider that history also affects
the “fundamental” determinants of welfare such as culture and institutions (a channel which is not
modelled in Allen and Donaldson (2020)), then it might be the case that history actually plays a
bigger role in affecting welfare. Examining this is left to future work.
3There is also a distinct literature that examines the effect of culture on economic outcomes. Examples of these
include Weber (1930), Fischer (1989), Greif (1994), Zerbe and Anderson (2001), Guiso et al. (2016), Tabellini (2010),
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Alesina et al. (2013) and Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017).
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents a simple conceptual framework which
shows how time spent on the frontier affects the spatial distribution of economic activities. Section
2.3 presents the historical background as well as the data used in the main analysis. Section 2.4
examines the first two implications of the model – the number of establishments and employment
at the county level, as well as at the industry level. Section 2.5 examines the sorting pattern of
industries to counties. In particular, whether high “contractibility” industries sort to counties that
spent a longer time on the frontier. Section 2.6 explores potential explanations behind this sorting
pattern. Finally, I conclude in Section 2.7.
2.2 Conceptual framework
2.2.1 Overview
In this section, I present a simple conceptual framework to explain how time spent on the frontier
affects the spatial distribution of manufacturing industries. This model is adapted from Melitz
(2003). Instead of selection into exporting, I adapt the model to show how firms and industries
sort into producing at different locations. In the model, there is a continuum of firms with varying
levels of “contractibility” (i.e., susceptibility to holdup). Higher “contractibility” means that the
intermediate inputs used by the firm are less relationship-specific and hence easier to specify in
contracts. This definition is based on Nunn (2007b) and Alfaro et al. (2019). Given their level of
“contractibility”, firms decide which counties to produce in. There is a fixed cost associated with
producing in each county. The fixed cost varies with the amount of time that the county spent on the
frontier. In particular, the longer the county spent on the frontier, the higher is the fixed cost that the
firm needs to incur to produce there. There are various interpretations for this higher cost. One could
be that the time spent on the frontier is associated with the culture and institutions of the county
being more individualistic and these translate to a higher cost when it comes to negotiating with
suppliers. In Appendix B.1.1, I show how this can be microfounded using a model of sequential
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production.4 In addition, I further examine this interpretation in Section 6 where I explore potential
mechanisms.
2.2.2 Consumers
Consumers are homogeneous and have CES preferences over varieties. A representative consumer
in county c gets utility Uc from the consumption of goods produced in his/her own county, as well
as goods shipped by other firms in other counties. Ω denotes the continuum of possible goods that
can be produced. Each good ω ∈ Ω is defined by the firm and its location. For example, a firm
that produces at two different locations is considered to be producing two different goods. Let the
income of county c be denoted by Yc, the price of a good from county r consumed in county c
be prc and the quantity of a good from county r consumed in county c be qrc. The representative
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is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index.
4In this microfoundation, the production of final goods entails a continuum of intermediate stages. In each stage,
final good producers bargain with suppliers of intermediate inputs. However, due to incomplete contracts, holdup
occurs. In counties with more individualistic culture and institutions, this holdup is more severe, leading to a higher
fixed cost of production.
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2.2.3 Firms
The timing of decisions for the firm is as follows. First, the firm decides whether to pay a fixed entry
cost (fe) which entitles it to obtain a “contractibility” draw (ψ). I denote the probability density
function that ψ is drawn from as g(ψ) and the cumulative distribution function as G(ψ). Second,
the value of ψ that was drawn determines the industry of the firm. Third, having observed ψ, the
firm decides whether or not to produce in each of the counties. Finally, the firm decides on the
quantity to produce. The problem is solved by backward induction. Going forward, I index firms by
ψ.
Deciding on the quantity to produce
There are C̄ counties with varying levels of time spent on the frontier (φc). Counties are indexed
1 to C̄ with, 1 reflecting the county that spent the shortest amount of time on the frontier and C̄
denoting the county that spent the longest amount of time on the frontier. Let τrc ≥ 1 denote the












subject to the demand for each good qrc(ω) = prc(ω)−σYcP σ−1c and the goods market clearing
condition yrc(ψ) = qrc(ψ). wc is the wage in county c and f(φc) is the fixed cost associated with
producing in county c. I assume that the longer the county spent on the frontier, the higher is the
fixed cost that the firm needs to incur to produce there. Therefore, ∂f(φc)
∂φc
> 0 . The amount of labor











The profits of the firm in county c is thus:
πc(ψ) = Bcψ
σ−1 − f(φc)









Deciding whether or not to produce in each of the counties




be the value of ψ where πc(ψ) ≥ 0. This gives us the zero cutoff “contractibility”


















In addition, any firm that draws ψ < ψ
1
will not produce at all.
Determining the industry of the firm
There are J industries with varying levels of “contractibility” (ψ̃j). Industries are indexed 1 to J
with, 1 reflecting the industry which is the least “contractible” and J denoting the industry which is
the most “contractible”. To recap, higher “contractibility” means that the intermediate inputs used
by the firm are less relationship-specific and hence easier to specify in contracts.
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The firm’s industry is determined exogenously based on the “contractibility” value (ψ) that it
drew. In particular, a firm will be in industry j if:
ψ̃j ≤ ψ < ψ̃j+1
Deciding whether to pay a fixed entry cost to obtain a “contractibility” draw
In order to obtain a “contractibility” draw, the firm needs to pay a fixed entry cost fe. This entry
cost is paid in terms of labor and once paid, allows the firm to enter in all locations. The firm will














This gives us the free-entry condition.













































The full derivation of this equation can be found in Appendix B.1.2. Note that M is decreasing in



















































Now, consider the case where the “contractibility” of any two industries j and j + 1, lie between
the zero cutoff “contractibility” of two counties c and c+ 1:
ψ
c
≤ ψ̃j < ψ̃j+1 ≤ ψc+1
This condition ensures that a county produces goods from at least two different industries. In
addition, the condition is fairly innocuous since we can always define industries more finely such
that this condition holds.




















































Outcomes at the county level: There are fewer firms in counties that spent a longer time on the





















































The sign for ∂Mcj
∂φc







> 0. The intuition for ∂Mcj
∂φc
< 0 is that
producing in counties that spent a longer time on the frontier is less profitable due to the high
fixed cost associated with producing there. Therefore, less firms choose to produce in these counties.
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However, the sign for ∂Lcj
∂φc
is ambiguous.5 This is because when the time spent by the county











< 0 and the second line of ∂Jc
∂φc
in Appendix B.1.3). Since there
are fewer firms, employment is also lower. However, there is a second opposing effect. The reduced
number of firms that are producing are now hiring more labor (the third line of ∂Jc
∂φc
in Appendix
B.1.3). This is because with a longer time spent on the frontier, the fixed cost associated with
producing in the county increases and so more labor needs to be hired to pay this increased fixed cost.
Outcomes at the industry level: Under certain distributional assumptions, there are fewer firms in

























Assume that due to an exogenous shock, all industries increase in their “contractibility” by a fixed











negative. This condition is satisfied for distributions where ∂g(ψ)
∂ψ
< 0. In other words, the tail of the
distribution becomes monotonically thinner for larger values of ψ. Examples of such distributions
include the Pareto distribution and a truncated normal distribution. Figure B1 plots the relationship
between the number of firms in each industry against the “contractibility” of industries and shows
that this a fairly reasonable assumption. Therefore, ∂Mcj
∂ψ̃k
< 0 and ∂Lcj
∂ψ̃k
< 0 because there is a lower
probability of a firm drawing a high “contractibility” parameter.
5The derivation of ∂Jc∂φc can be found in Appendix B.1.3.
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The sorting of industries to counties: Firms in high “contractibility” industries sort into producing










































































The intuition for ∂Mcj
∂ψ̃k∂φc
< 0 is that “contractibility” is somewhat akin to productivity – only the
high “contractibility” firms are able to pay the high fixed cost associated with producing in counties
that spent a longer time on the frontier.
However, the sign for ∂Lcj
∂φc
is ambiguous even if we were to make certain distributional assumptions
about ψ. This is because of the two opposing effects that were explained in the first comparative
static – there are less firms but the remaining firms are hiring more workers to cover the fixed cost.
2.2.5 Graphical example
Figure 2.1 shows a simple graphical example to explain the model. A firm that draws ψ̌ such
that ψ̃j ≤ ψ̌ < ψ̃j+1 belongs to industry j. County c + 1 spent a longer amount of time on
the frontier than county c. As a result, the fixed cost associated with producing there is higher
(f(ψc+1) > f(ψc)). The graph shows that there are fewer firms producing in counties that spent a
longer time on the frontier. All firms that draw ψ̌ ≥ ψ
c
produce in county c. However, all firms
that draw ψ̌ < ψ
c+1
do not produce in county c+ 1. Consequently, firms in high “contractibility”
industries sort into producing at locations that spent a longer time on the frontier.
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Figure 2.1: Simple example of model
2.2.6 Empirical implications
Strictly speaking, the empirical analysis does not map perfectly to the conceptual framework. First,
in the empirical analysis, I log transform the outcome variables to account for the skewness in their
distributions. However, taking logs in the conceptual framework would result in the cross-derivatives
becoming zero. Second, the conceptual framework makes a distinction between the number of firms
locating in a county versus the number of firms producing in a county. In the empirical analysis,
I do not make such a distinction. Nevertheless, the purpose of the conceptual framework is to
demonstrate the sorting mechanism behind why certain firms and industries produce in certain
counties.
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2.3 Background and data
2.3.1 History: The amount of time that the county spent on the frontier
The idea of the “frontier” originated in the Census Bureau report “Progress of the Nation from
1890” by Porter et al. (1890). The report details the decade-by-decade westward migration and
includes vivid maps of population density. In addition, the authors of the report argue that the
frontier closed by 1890. Inspired by this report, Turner (1893) argue that the westward-moving
frontier of settlement shaped early US history since it fostered a culture of “rugged individualism” –
a term subsequently popularized by Hebert Hoover in his 1928 presidential campaign.
It is important to note that Turner’s writings contain “departures from the historical record,
overblown statements, and ethnocentric biases” (Bazzi et al. (2020)). In fact, Bazzi et al. (2020) cite
writings to caution that the westward expansion involved land being violently taken from Native
Americans. Far from the romantic notions of the frontier espoused by Turner, the frontier is actually
associated with much violence.
I follow the definition used by Bazzi et al. (2020) to define frontier counties as those that (1)
are in close proximity to the frontier line (100 km) and (2) have a population density below six
people per square mile. Based on the replication data provided by Bazzi et al. (2020), the average
time spent on the frontier is 14 years while the median is 13 years. The 25th percentile is 3 years
and the 75th percentile is 21 years. The time spent on the frontier maps to φc in the conceptual
framework.
2.3.2 Industries: Define industries based on how “contractible” inputs are
The measure of “contractibility” is based on the data from Nunn (2007b). The measure of how
“contractible” an industry’s inputs are is constructed in two steps. In the first step, inputs are
classified based on the classification of goods by Rauch (1999): (1) goods that are sold on an
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organized exchange (e.g., oil), (2) goods that have a reference price (i.e., appear in catalogs) and
(3) differentiated goods (i.e., goods that are not in the first two categories). Inputs in the first two
categories have multiple buyers for the input. Therefore, Nunn (2007b) argues that the investments
made by the suppliers of these inputs are not relationship-specific. If the buyer were to renegotiate a
lower price ex post, the supplier could simply sell the input to another buyer.
In the second step, using the 1997 US Input-Output tables, for each output, the share of its
inputs that are in the first two categories is calculated. This gives me the measure of “contractibility”
that I use in this paper. Higher “contractibility” means that the inputs are less relationship-specific
and are hence easier to specify in contracts. This measure of “contractible” is similar to Alfaro
et al. (2019) and corresponds to one minus the measure in Nunn (2007b). Note that “contractibility”
maps to ψj in the conceptual framework. Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 show the top twenty most and
least “contractible” industries respectively.
2.3.3 Concordance and suppression of data
The outcome variables in this paper – the number of establishments and employment – come from
the County Business Patterns (CBP) dataset. The data before 1998 are in terms of SIC while the
data from 1998 onward are in terms of NAICS. There are substantial differences between SIC and
NAICS. Therefore, to prevent concordance issues, I examine only years from 1998 onward. In
addition, from 1998 to 2016, the NAICS changed its classification system three times so I map
all industries to NAICS 1997.6 When the mapping is not one-to-one, I apportion the number of
establishments and employment equally across the multiple industries (simple average).
Finally, in the CBP data, employment for many county-industry cells is suppressed to preserve the
confidentiality of the firm. For these cells, the CBP data reports employment as zero along with
an “employment suppression flag”. These flags take on 12 mutually exclusive ranges that contain
6In particular, from 2003-2007, I map NAICS 2002 to NAICS 1997. From 2008-2011, I map NAICS 2007 to
NAICS 1997. Finally, from 2012-2016, I map NAICS 2012 to NAICS 1997.
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the cell’s true level of employment. To circumvent this issue, for the suppressed cells, I impute
their employment as the midpoint of the range. For example, if a suppressed cell is listed as having
employment being in the range of 500 to 999, I impute employment as 749.5. Finally, the last range
(100,000 or more) has no upper bound. Therefore, for cells listed with this range, I set employment
to 100,000.
Importantly, the CBP does not suppress the number of establishments in each county-industry
cell. Therefore, while regressions involving employment as the outcome variable would suffer from
measurement error, the regressions involving the number of establishments will not have this issue.
Table 2.1: Top twenty most “contractible” industries
NAICS97 Industry Contractibility
311211 Flour Milling 0.968
324110 Petroleum Refineries 0.963
311221 Wet Corn Milling 0.960
311213 Malt Manufacturing 0.959
331315 Aluminum Sheet, Plate, And Foil Manufacturing 0.932
331312 Primary Aluminum Production 0.926
331316 Aluminum Extruded Product Manufacturing 0.912
325311 Nitrogenous Fertilizer Manufacturing 0.910
331319 Other Aluminum Rolling And Drawing 0.904
311212 Rice Milling 0.897
311615 Poultry Processing 0.891
324199 All Other Petroleum And Coal Products Manufacturing 0.868
331314 Secondary Smelting And Alloying Of Aluminum 0.868
327320 Ready-Mix Concrete Manufacturing 0.868
312210 Tobacco Stemming And Redrying 0.867
331419 Primary Smelting And Refining Of Nonferrous Metal
(Except Copper And Aluminum) 0.859
311223 Other Oilseed Processing 0.855
325314 Fertilizer (Mixing Only) Manufacturing 0.854
325120 Industrial Gas Manufacturing 0.848
331492 Secondary Smelting, Refining, And Alloying Of Nonferrous Metal
(Except Copper And Aluminum) 0.828
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Table 2.2: Top twenty least “contractible” industries
NAICS97 Industry Contractibility
336111 Automobile Manufacturing 0.014
336112 Light Truck And Utility Vehicle Manufacturing 0.014
334111 Electronic Computer Manufacturing 0.014
336120 Heavy Duty Truck Manufacturing 0.016
334515 Instrument Manufacturing For Measuring And Testing Electricity
And Electrical Signals 0.037
334119 Other Computer Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing 0.043
334112 Computer Storage Device Manufacturing 0.043
334220 Radio, Television Broadcasting And Wireless Communications Eq. Mfg 0.044
334113 Computer Terminal Manufacturing 0.045
334511 Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical, And Nautical
System And Instrument Manufacturing 0.046
334210 Telephone Apparatus Manufacturing 0.047
334517 Irradiation Apparatus Manufacturing 0.054
336411 Aircraft Manufacturing 0.059
334310 Audio And Video Equipment Manufacturing 0.063
336415 Guided Missile, Space Vehicle Propulsion Unit And Propulsion Unit Parts Mfg 0.082
336419 Other Guided Missile, Space Vehicle Parts And Auxiliary Equipment Mfg 0.082
336414 Guided Missile And Space Vehicle Manufacturing 0.086
339992 Musical Instrument Manufacturing 0.089
335314 Relay And Industrial Control Manufacturing 0.090
334510 Electromedical And Electrotherapeutic Apparatus Manufacturing 0.091
2.4 Outcomes at the county level and the industry level
I begin the empirical section of the paper by showing evidence of the first two comparative statics
highlighted in the model.
2.4.1 Outcomes at the county level
To examine whether there are fewer establishments and lower employment in counties that spent a
longer time on the frontier, I run the following regression:
Outcomeict = αi + δt + βFrontierc + γ
′Xc + εict
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The outcome variables are the number of establishments and employment in industry i in county
c in year t. There are a total of 3,104 counties and 19 years from 1998 to 2016. As a substantial
number of these observations involve zeros in the outcome variable, I apply the inverse hyperbolic
sine transform to the outcome variables. Frontierc is the number of decades that a county spent on
the frontier and the data are from Bazzi et al. (2020).
Table 2.3: Relationship between time spent on the frontier and
the number of establishments, as well as employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Outcome: Establishments (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Frontier -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.024***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R-squared 0.128 0.159 0.195 0.205
B. Outcome: Employment (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Frontier -0.070*** -0.049*** -0.063*** -0.068***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
R-squared 0.088 0.115 0.149 0.158
Observations 27,895,648 27,895,648 27,895,648 27,895,648
Geographical Controls X X X
Historical Controls X X
State FE X
Notes: All columns include industry and year fixed effects. Geographical controls include latitude, longitude,
potential agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest coast, river, lake
and mineral deposit. Historical controls include number of years that the county was connected to the
railroad by 1890, distance to the nearest conflict with Native Americans, the prevalence of slavery as
measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share of immigrants in 1910.
Standard errors clustered at county level. Notation for statistical significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Xc is a vector of geographical and historical controls. The geographical controls are latitude,
longitude, potential agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest
coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Historical controls include the number of years that the county
was connected to the railroad by 1890, distance to the nearest conflict with Native Americans, the
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prevalence of slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share
of immigrants in 1910. αi are industry fixed effects and δt are year fixed effects.7 I cluster the
standard errors at the county level.
Table 2.3 summarizes the relationship between time spent on the frontier and the number of
establishments and employment in each county. Panel A shows the results for establishments while
panel B shows the results for employment. In-line with the predictions of the model, the results
suggest that there is a negative correlation between time spent on the frontier and the number
of establishments, as well as employment in each county. In particular, every additional decade
that a county spent on the frontier resulted in a 2.4% decrease in the (transformed) number of
establishments and 6.8% decrease in the (transformed) number of workers.
2.4.2 Outcomes at the industry level
To examine if there are fewer establishments and lower employment in industries that are more
“contractible”, I run the following regression:
Outcomeict = κc + δt + βContractibilityi + γ
′X i + εict
Contractibilityi measures how “contractible” industry’s i inputs are. This measure of “contractibility”
is based on the 1997 US Input-Output Use tables. Higher “contractibility” means that the inputs are
less relationship-specific and hence easier to specify in contracts. κc denotes county fixed effects.
Xi consists of industry controls such as the log value add of the industry in 1990 and its TFP in
1990. I cluster the standard errors at the industry level.
7These variables are from the replication data set provided by Bazzi et al. (2020). More details on the various data
sources can be found in Appendix K of their paper.
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Table 2.4: Relationship between “contractibility” and
the number of establishments, as well as employment
(1) (2) (3)
A. Outcome: Establishments (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility -0.026 -0.010 -0.009
(0.024) (0.023) (0.052)
R-squared 0.236 0.251 0.275
B. Outcome: Employment (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility -0.064 -0.012 -0.017
(0.066) (0.065) (0.138)
R-squared 0.190 0.203 0.220
Observations 27,895,648 27,659,744 27,659,744
Industry Controls X X
3-digit Industry FE X
Notes: All columns include county and year fixed effects. Industry controls include the log
value add of the industry in 1990 and its TFP in 1990. Standard errors clustered at industry
level. Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.4 summarizes the relationship between “contractibility” and the number of establishments
and employment in each industry. Panel A shows the results for establishments while panel B shows
the results for employment. In-line with the predictions of the model, the results suggest that there
is a negative correlation between “contractibility” and the number of establishments, as well as
employment in each industry. However, the results are imprecisely estimated. One thing to note is
that the number of observations falls from 27,895,648 in column 1 to 27,659,744 in column 2. This
is because the NBER-CES data, which is where I obtained the data for the industry controls, do not
have data for four industries in 1990.8
8These industries along with their NAICS 1997 codes are “Tire retreading” (326212), “Retail bakeries” (311811),
“Software reproducing” (334611) and “Dental laboratories” (339116).
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2.5 Sorting of industries to counties
Next, using a difference-in-differences (DiD) empirical strategy, I examine whether high “contractibility”
industries sort to counties that spent a longer time on the frontier:
Outcomeict = αi + κc + δt + βContractibilityi × Frontierc + γ′X ic + εict (2.2)
The variables are the same as what was previously defined. As a substantial number of these
observations involve zeros in the outcome variable, I apply the inverse hyperbolic sine transform to
the outcome variables. I cluster the standard errors at the county level. A positive effect (i.e., β > 0)
would suggest that high “contractibility” industries sort to counties that spent a longer time on the
frontier. This maps to the third comparative statics of the model.
This DiD strategy exploits two cross-sectional variations. The first cross-sectional variation comes
from the fact that different counties spent different number of years on the American frontier.
The second cross-sectional variation arises because different industries have different levels of
“contractibility”. For example, industries that predominantly use inputs that are sold on an organized
exchange (e.g., oil) are highly “contractible”. This is because the inputs that they use are less
relationship-specific and hence easier to specify in contracts.
2.5.1 Results and discussion
Table 2.5 reports the results as to whether time spent on the frontier affects the present-day
distribution of manufacturing industries. Panel A reports the results for the number of establishments
while panel B reports the results for employment.
In column 1 which controls for industry, county and year fixed effects, the estimated coefficient for
Contractibilityi × Frontierc is positive and statistically significant for both the establishments
and employment regressions. This suggests that high “contractibility” industries sort to counties
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that spent a longer time on the frontier.
Table 2.5: Effect of time spent on the frontier on the present-day composition of manufacturing
industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Outcome: Establishments (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
R-squared 0.358 0.358 0.359 0.358 0.422 0.490
B. Outcome: Employment (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.036*** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.043***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
R-squared 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.272 0.318 0.370
Observations 27,895,648 27,895,648 27,895,648 27,659,744 27,659,744 27,659,744
Contractibility X Geography X X X X X
Contractibility X History X X X X
Industry Controls X Frontier X X X
State X Industy FE X X
County X 3-digit Industry FE X
Notes: All columns include county, industry and year fixed effects. Geographical controls include latitude, longitude, potential
agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Historical
controls include number of years that the county was connected to the railroad by 1890, distance to the nearest conflict with
Native Americans, the prevalence of slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share of
immigrants in 1910. Industry controls include the log value add of the industry in 1990 and its TFP in 1990. Standard errors
clustered at county level. Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Nonetheless, there could be concerns that there are omitted variables at the industry-county level
that are correlated with Contractibilityi × Frontierc and the outcome variables. For example,
geography could determine the amount of time that a county spent on the frontier. A county that
is surrounded by water bodies and mountains tend to spend more time on the frontier as these
geographical constraints make it difficult for settlers to explore beyond the county. At the same
time, these geographical features also determine the location of industries. For example, industries
that mainly use natural resources are more “contractible” and tend to be located in areas where there
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is an abundance of these resources. Therefore, to address these concerns, in column 2, I include
a series of predetermined county-level geographical controls interacted with Contractibilityi.
These include latitude, longitude, potential agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk,
distance to the nearest coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Reassuringly, the estimated effect
remains robust to the inclusion of these controls.
However, there could be concerns that there are other historical events that affect the sorting
of industries to counties. To address this potential issue, in column 3, I augment the geographical
controls with a series of predetermined county-level historical controls and interact them with
Contractibilityi. The historical controls include the number of years that the county was connected
to the railroad by 1890, distance to the nearest conflict with Native Americans, the prevalence of
slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share of immigrants
in 1910. Column 3 shows that the estimated coefficient remains stable to these controls.
In column 4, to address concerns that other industry characteristics might be driving the sorting
pattern, I include industry controls interacted with Frontierc. These industry controls are the log
value add of the industry in 1990 and its TFP in 1990. Finally, I subject the results to extremely
demanding interacted fixed effects that leave very limited identifying variation. In column 5, I
include state-by-industry fixed effects which means that the identifying variation comes from
industries within each state. In column 6, I add county-by-3-digit industry fixed effects. Doing
so restricts the identifying variation to within each 3-digit industry at the county level. These
interacted fixed effects would also help to control for some of the measurement error that arises in
the mapping of NAICS industries across the different years, as well as from using the midpoint to
impute employment in the suppressed cells.
Despite the inclusion of these extremely demanding fixed effects, the estimated coefficient remains
remarkably stable and highly significant, suggesting that high “contractibility” industries do indeed
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sort to counties that spent a longer time on the frontier. In particular, every additional decade
that a county spent on the frontier resulted in a 1.4% increase in the (transformed) number of
establishments in the highest “contractible” industry (0.968) as compared to the lowest “contractible”
industry (0.014) in that county. As for employment, every additional decade that a county spent on
the frontier resulted in a 4.1% increase in the (transformed) number of workers employed in the
highest “contractible” industry (0.968) as compared to the lowest “contractible” industry (0.014) in
that county. The results in Table 2.5 are consistent with the mechanisms proposed in the conceptual
framework – only the high “contractibility” firms are able to pay the high fixed cost associated with
producing in counties that spent a longer time on the frontier.
To check that the results are not driven by particular outliers, I plot a binned scatter plot of
the residues of the outcome variables against the residues of Contractibilityi × Frontierc based
on the results in column 6. Figure 2.2 presents the scatter plots and shows that the estimated effects
would be larger if the outliers are excluded.
Figure 2.2: Binned scatter plot of the residues
A: Establishments B: Employment
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Instead of “contractibility”, Levchenko (2007) uses an alternative measure of holdup – the
Herfindahl index of intermediate input use. The Herfindahl index of intermediate input use increases
with concentration. Levchenko (2007) argues that industries that rely on a large number of suppliers
to provide small quantities of many inputs are more vulnerable to holdup problems. Therefore, a
larger Herfindahl index implies less holdup.
Table 2.6 shows the results where instead of “contractibility”, I use the Herfindahl index of
intermediate input use based on the 1997 Input-Output Use tables. The results using this alternative
measure of holdup are slightly larger compared to the baseline results.
Table 2.6: Using Herfindahl index of intermediate input use instead of “contractibility”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Outcome: Establishments (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Herfindahl X Frontier 0.054*** 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.026***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
R-squared 0.358 0.359 0.360 0.358 0.422 0.490
B. Outcome: Employment (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Herfindahl X Frontier 0.120*** 0.053*** 0.083*** 0.064*** 0.084*** 0.049***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014)
R-squared 0.274 0.274 0.275 0.273 0.318 0.370
Observations 27,895,648 27,895,648 27,895,648 27,659,744 27,659,744 27,659,744
Contractibility X Geography X X X X X
Contractibility X History X X X X
Industry Controls X Frontier X X X
State X Industy FE X X
County X 3-digit Industry FE X
Notes: All columns include county, industry and year fixed effects. Geographical controls include latitude, longitude, potential
agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Historical
controls include number of years that the county was connected to the railroad by 1890, distance to the nearest conflict with
Native Americans, the prevalence of slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share of
immigrants in 1910. Industry controls include the log value add of the industry in 1990 and its TFP in 1990. Standard errors
clustered at county level. Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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2.5.2 Robustness checks
Next, I subject the results to a series of robustness checks. The robustness checks can be broadly
classified into three categories. First, subjecting the results to different sub-samples or adding more
controls. Second, checking that the results are similar even when accounting for the zeros in the
outcome variable. Finally, accounting for spatial correlations.
Doing the analysis separately for coastal and non-coastal counties. There could be concerns
that the sorting pattern could be due to geography and not “contractibility”. This is unlikely to be the
case since the regressions already control for geographical factors interacted with “contractibility”.
These geographical controls include latitude, longitude, potential agricultural productivity, area,
ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Nevertheless,
I take further steps to rule out the role of geography by splitting the sample into coastal and
non-coastal counties. This is important because Rappaport and Sachs (2003) argue that economic
activities are overwhelmingly concentrated at coastal areas. If we see the sorting pattern only in
the coastal sample but not in the non-coastal sample, then we would worry that it is the effect of
being a coastal county that is driving this sorting pattern. However, if we continue to see the same
sorting pattern in the non-coastal counties, then it is unlikely that geography is the main driver of
the result. Tables B1 and B2 report the results for non-coastal and coastal counties respectively.
Reassuringly, in the non-coastal sample, the coefficient estimates continue to be positive and
highly significant. However, in the coastal sample, the coefficient estimates while positive, become
imprecisely estimated once state-by-industry fixed effects are added. This suggests that being a
coastal county actually acts against the pattern of high “contractibility” industries sorting to counties
that spent a longer time on the frontier.
Including controls for population density. Since the definition of the frontier is based on population
density, there could be worries that the sorting pattern is just picking up the effects of density and
not the time spent on the frontier. To address this concern, I include population density variables
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as controls. These controls are the county’s population density in 1910 and the number of years
between 1790 and 1890 where the county had a low population density (defined as less than six
people per square mile). The results in Table B3 show that the coefficient estimates are statistically
and economically important even after controlling for population density. This suggests that there
are aspects of time spent on the frontier that cannot be attributed to density, supporting the argument
that time spent on the frontier affects the present-day sorting pattern of industries to counties.
Dropping observations with zeros in the outcome variable. The baseline regression uses a total
of 27,895,648 observations. Of these, around 25,288,000 observations have zeros in the outcome
variables. This could lead to concerns that the results are being overwhelmingly driven by
observations with zeros in the outcome variables. To address this concern, I drop all the observations
with zeros in the outcome variables and re-run the regressions. Table B4 shows that when these
observations are dropped, in all the columns, the estimated coefficient remains positive and
statistically significant but are now larger. This suggests that the 25,288,000 observations that
have zeros in the outcome variables are causing the estimated coefficients to be attenuated towards
zero.
Using Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) regression to account for the zeros in the
outcome variable. Instead of dropping observations or applying the inverse hyperbolic sine
transform, another method to account for zeros in the outcome variable is to use a PPML regression.
This approach is consistent with the extensive literature – for example, Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006) and Head and Mayer (2013) – that shows that PPML is a consistent and relatively efficient
estimator for specifications featuring a large number of zeros in the data. Table B5 contains the
results using the PPML regression. Compared to the baseline DiD results, the magnitudes of the
estimated coefficients are now six to ten times larger. This suggests that the baseline results are a
lower bound.
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Dropping counties that changed names or FIPS codes, as well as counties that had substantial
boundary changes between 1980 and 2016. County boundaries often change over time due to
name changes, annexations and incorporations. Therefore, when calculating the total time that
each county spent on the frontier, Bazzi et al. (2020) maintain consistent units of observations
over time by harmonizing boundaries to 2010 county boundaries.9 This is the same approach that
is used in Hornbeck (2010). While total time spent on the frontier has been harmonized to 2010
county boundaries, the outcome variables (number of establishments and employment) from the
CBP datasets have not been harmonized to time consistent boundaries. According to the Census
Bureau website, between 1980 and 2016, there were a total of 67 counties that changed names or
FIPS codes and/or had substantial boundary changes.10 This means that these 67 counties do not
have consistent boundaries as the 2010 boundaries used by Bazzi et al. (2020) in their calculation of
total time spent on the frontier. Therefore, to check if the results are sensitive to boundary changes,
I drop these 67 counties and re-run regression 2.2. Table B6 shows that the estimated coefficients
remain robust to dropping these 67 counties.
Dropping counties which spent zero years on the frontier. Bazzi et al. (2020) code 608 counties
as having spent zero years on the frontier. These counties fall into two categories. First, since
the Census only began in 1790, counties within 100 km of the frontier line and already have a
population density above six people per square mile in the 1790 Census are coded as having spent
zero years on the frontier. Second, since the end-point of the frontier is 1890, counties beyond the
frontier but have low population density in 1890 are nevertheless coded as spending zero years on
the frontier. To check if the results are sensitive to these measurement errors, I re-run regression 2.2
without these 608 counties. Table B7 shows that the results remain robust to this check.
9Bazzi et al. (2020) show that the location of the frontier is very similar when using contemporaneous historical
boundaries.
10The US Census Bureau defines substantial county boundary changes as those affecting an estimated population of
200 or more; changes of at least one square mile where an estimated population number was not available, but research
indicated that 200 or more people may have been affected; and annexations of unpopulated territory of at least 10 square
miles.
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Dropping industries which did not have unique mapping when industry classifications changed
across the years. Between 1998 and 2016 (the period of my study), the industry classification
system changed three times – 2002, 2007 and 2012. When the mapping between the different
editions of the NAICS is not one-to-one, I apportion the number of establishments and employment
equally across the multiple industries (i.e., simple average). Therefore, there could be concerns that
the results are driven by this particular method of dealing with mappings that are not one-to-one. To
address this concern, I drop all industries where the mapping across the different NAICS years is
not one-to-one. Out of the 474 NAICS 1997 industries in the original regression, only 298 of them
have a one-to-one mapping across all the different NAICS years. Table B8 shows that the results
remain robust even when using only these 298 industries.
Accounting for spatial correlation by clustering standard errors based on 60-square mile grid
cells. Table B9 shows that the results remain robust even when using this method of clustering the
standard errors to account for spatial correlations.
2.6 Potential mechanisms behind the sorting pattern
In this section, I explore various potential mechanisms that could explain why high “contractibility”
industries sort to counties that spent a longer time on the frontier.
2.6.1 First-mover advantage of industries
One potential explanation behind the sorting pattern is that of first-mover advantage that persists
due to path dependency. Under this explanation, the present-day high “contractibility” industries
that sort to counties that spent a longer time on the frontier are the same industries that sort to these
counties in the past. Due to path dependency, this sorting pattern continues to persist till today even
if the initial reasons for why these industries locate in these counties are no longer relevant. In other
words, if a different set of industries had sorted themselves to these counties, then that would be the
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set of industries that we see today.11
To test the first-mover advantage mechanism, I do two things. First, I examine whether high
“contractibility” industries of the past sort to counties that spent a longer time on the frontier.
Second, I check if the high “contractibility” industries of the past are the same high “contractibility”
industries today.
Historical data and defining “contractible” industries of the past
The present-day measures of “contractibility” are based on the 1997 US Input-Output tables.
However, IO tables do not exist for the time period 1790 to 1890 (period when the country was
expanding westward). Therefore, to proxy for the “contractibility” of industries, I turn to the data
from the Census of Manufacturing (1860 to 1880) which were recently digitized by Hornbeck and
Rotemberg (2019). The data contain information at the county-industry level for the number of
establishments, employment, value of capital invested, labor cost, material cost and production
value. Over 1,000 industries are listed in the raw data but Hornbeck and Rotemberg (2019) group
these into 159 categories.
To construct a proxy measure for the “contractibility” of industries, I use the share of capital
in the total cost of production (i.e., value of capital invested divided by the sum of the value of
capital invested, labor cost and material cost). The idea behind this simple proxy of “contractibility”
is that labor and material inputs are more susceptible to holdup whereas the capital stock is not.
This is because the capital stock accumulates over time and is sunk. Therefore, since the capital
stock is sunk, in industries where the share of the capital stock is higher, there is less scope for
holdup. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this simple measure of holdup is more likely to
hold historically than in present times as inputs were relatively more homogeneous and production
processes were less complex in the past – the more processed the good, the harder it is to specify it
11This explanation assumes the presence of multiple equilibria.
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in contracts.
Examining if the sorting pattern also happened in the past when the country was expanding
To examine this, I run the same regression as regression 2.2: Outcomeict = αi + κc + δt +
βContractibilityi × Frontierc + γ′X ic + εict. The two differences are that first, instead of the
treatment variable being Contractibilityi × Frontierc, I use the capital share in the total cost
of production in 1860 as the proxy for historical “contractibility”. To avoid the issue of reverse
causality, I use the 1860 data to construct the share of capital in the total cost of production and use
data from 1870 and 1880 for the outcome variables (number of establishment and employment).
The second difference is that the controls are now based on 1860 data. For example, the number of
years that the county was connected to the railroad by 1860, distance to the nearest conflict with
Native Americans, the prevalence of slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county
in 1860 and the share of immigrants in 1860.
The westward expansion of the country meant that county boundaries were often evolving. Therefore,
to ensure that counties are comparable across time, I do three things. First, I use the crosswalk
from Eckert et al. (2020) to aggregate all historical variables in terms of county boundaries in 2010.
Second, I use only counties that appeared in both 1870 and 1880. Finally, I use only counties that
exited the frontier by 1870. Table 2.7 presents the results and suggests that the high “contractibility”
industries of the past did indeed sort to counties that spent a longer time on the frontier. However,
when county-by-broad industry fixed effects are added, the coefficient estimates while positive are
now imprecisely estimated.
Examining if the high “contractibility” industries of the past are the same high “contractibility”
industries today
While the previous subsection showed that the high “contractibility” industries of the past did indeed
sort to counties that spent a longer time on the frontier, it could be the case that these industries are
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not the same as the high “contractibility” industries today. To test this, I first map the 159 industries
from the Census of Manufactures (1860 to 1880) to the IND1950 industry classifications used in
the IPUMS complete count Census microdata. There is no publicly available crosswalk for this so I
constructed my own. Next, I map the 474 industries from the CBP data (which uses NAICS) to
the IND1950 industry classifications. The crosswalk for this is based on information provided by
IPUMS. As a result of these two steps, I am able to map the industries of the past and the present to
a common set of industries based on the IND1950 classifications.
Table 2.7: Effect of time spent on the frontier on the historical composition of manufacturing
industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Outcome: Establishments (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Share of capital in 1860 X Frontier 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
R-squared 0.326 0.326 0.326 0.497 0.669
B. Outcome: Employment (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Share of capital in 1860 X Frontier 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.006
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
R-squared 0.299 0.299 0.299 0.436 0.587
Observations 583,702 583,702 582,664 582,664 582,664
Contractibility X Geographical Controls X X X X
Contractibility X Historical Controls X X X
State X Industy FE X X
County X Broad Industry FE X
Notes: All columns include county, industry and year fixed effects. Geographical controls include latitude, longitude, potential
agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Historical
controls include number of years that the county was connected to the railroad by 1860, distance to the nearest conflict with
Native Americans, the prevalence of slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share of
immigrants in 1860. Standard errors clustered at county level. Notation for statistical significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Following this, I plot the industry’s “contractibility” in 1997 against its share of capital in
the total cost of production in 1860. Table 2.3 presents this scatter plot and it shows a negative
relationship. This suggests that the high “contractibility” industries of the past are different from
the high “contractibility” industries today.
Figure 2.3: Relationship between past and present “contractibility”
In fact, there is evidence to suggest that in present times, the high “contractibility” industries of
the past actually sort away from counties that spent a longer time on the frontier. To see this, I map
all present-day NAICS industries from the CBP data to IND1950 and re-run regression 2.2 using
the historical measure of “contractibility”. Table 2.8 shows the results of this regression. In panel A
which presents the results for the number of establishments, across all the columns, the estimated
effects are negative. This suggests that the high “contractibility” industries of the past actually sort
away from counties that spent a longer time on the frontier. The results for employment in panel
B are less conclusive as the coefficient estimates although negative in the columns with the most
stringent controls, are imprecisely estimated.
The results using historical data (1880 to 1890) in Table 2.7 being positive while the results
using modern data (1998 to 2016) Table 2.8 being negative suggests two things. First, it shows
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that in historical times, the high “contractibility” industries of the past sort to counties that spent
a longer time on the frontier. However, in present times, these high “contractibility” industries
of the past actually sort away from counties that spent a longer time on the frontier. Second, the
industries of the past that sort to counties that spent a longer time on the frontier are different from
the present-day industries that sort to these counties.
Table 2.8: Effect of time spent on the frontier on the present-day
composition of manufacturing industries (historical measure of “contractibility”)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Outcome: Establishments (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Capital Share 1860 X Frontier -0.039*** -0.038** -0.066*** -0.075***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
R-squared 0.602 0.603 0.604 0.663
B. Outcome: Employment (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Capital Share 1860 X Frontier 0.004 0.018 -0.012 -0.022
(0.037) (0.043) (0.043) (0.046)
R-squared 0.498 0.499 0.500 0.546
Observations 2,830,848 2,830,848 2,830,848 2,830,848
Contractibility X Geographical Controls X X X
Contractibility X Historical Controls X X
State X Industy FE X
Notes: All columns include county, industry and year fixed effects. Geographical controls include latitude, longitude, potential
agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Historical
controls include number of years that the county was connected to the railroad by 1890, distance to the nearest conflict with
Native Americans, the prevalence of slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share of
immigrants in 1910. Standard errors clustered at county level. Notation for statistical significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2.6.2 Culture and institutions
Another explanation could be that the time spent on the frontier has both contemporaneous and
persistent effects on the counties’ culture and institutions. Consequently, this affects the type of
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industries that sort to the various counties. In a ground-breaking paper, Bazzi et al. (2020) provide
evidence that the frontier attracted individualistic people. In addition, the uncharted physical
environment at the frontier with little social infrastructure to turn to made its residents even more
individualistic over time.
Remarkably, they also show that the culture of “rugged individualism” continues to persist even
after the frontier had closed. For example, in the mid-20th century, infrequent names given to
children continued to be more pervasive in counties that spent a longer time on the frontier. In
addition, they show that even in the late 20th century, residents of these counties exhibit more
pervasive individualism, prefer less redistribution, lower public spending and less social protection
in terms of minimum wages, gun control and environment protection. What their results show us is
that the individualistic culture and institutions that developed in the early days became fundamental
to a place over time and hence persist till today.
How then does the “rugged individualism” of a county affect the sorting of industries? The
intuition behind this is that in counties with more individualistic culture and institutions, individuals
are less likely to trust other people. Therefore, anything that is not “contractible” becomes harder
and more costly to enforce – consistent with the assumption in the model that there is a higher cost
when producing at counties that spent a longer time on the frontier. Consequently, only the more
“contractible” industries locate in counties that spent a longer time on the frontier. This argument is
consistent with why we observe the high “contractibility” industries of the past and present sorting
to counties that spent a longer time on the frontier – although the high “contractibility” industries of
the past are different from the present-day high “contractibility” industries.
2.7 Conclusion
What explains the spatial distribution of economic activities? In this paper, I go beyond the
commonly studied factors and instead examine the role that a particular episode of history – time
91
spent on the frontier – plays in explaining the spatial distribution of manufacturing industries in the
US. First, I find that there are fewer establishments and lower employment in counties that spent a
longer time on the frontier. The same results hold for industries that are more “contractible” (i.e.,
easier to specify in contracts and hence less susceptible to holdup). Second, using a difference-
in-differences strategy, I find that firms in high “contractibility” industries sort into producing at
counties that spent a longer time on the frontier. Relying on the arguments in Bazzi et al. (2020),
I hypothesize that due to “rugged individualism”, individuals in counties that spent a longer time
on the frontier are less likely to trust other people. Therefore, anything that is not “contractible”
becomes harder and more costly to enforce. Consequently, only the more “contractible” industries
locate in counties that spent a longer time on the frontier.
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Chapter 3: The Inspector Calls: The Effect of Local Land Use Regulations
and NIMBY-ism on Housing Prices (with Di Song Tan)
3.1 Introduction
“In the past 25 years, construction has come to face enormous challenges from any local opposition.
In some areas it feels as if every neighbor has veto rights over every project...To most residents, a
new project is nothing but a bother. They don’t care about the welfare received by the new resident,
or the benefits earned by the builders or by the employers who have to pay lower wages when
housing costs are lower.” - Glaeser (2014)1
Land use regulations set guidelines and rules that control the supply of land that can be used
for housing, retail, commerce and industry. These regulations often take the form of restrictions on
land use (e.g., zoning law), the density of development (e.g., building-height limits and minimum
lot size requirements) and the volume of development (e.g., urban growth boundaries and caps on
building permits). Today, with more than half of the world’s population living in urban areas, land
use regulations have become common-place.
Traditionally, in most countries, land use regulations are determined by national planning agencies.
The US is one of the few exceptions where land use regulations are mainly controlled by local
governments.2 Gyourko and Molloy (2015) note that the initial land use regulation in the United
States (US) began with the intention of separating different types of land use so as to limit negative
1https://www.cato.org/publications/cato-online-forum/land-use-restrictions-other-barriers-growth
2Gyourko and Molloy (2015) note that this is because the US Constitution did not grant the federal government
authority to regulate land. As a result, states have generally vested this power with local governments.
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externalities. However, Cheshire et al. (2014) note that in recent times, countries such as the United
Kingdom (UK) are increasingly moving towards localism. This has led to increasing concerns that
land use regulations are being used by locals to engage in NIMBY (“not in my back yard”) behavior.
Against the backdrop of these developments, this paper examines how land use regulations and
NIMBY-ism affect housing prices in the UK. For the purpose of our paper, we define NIMBY-ism as
local power. In particular, it is the actions taken by individuals to object to the siting of developments
that are perceived as unpleasant in their own neighborhood, while raising no such objections to
similar developments elsewhere.3 Studying the UK’s experience is important because increasingly,
many countries are adopting restrictions that are similar to the UK’s containment policies. Our
analysis consists of the following steps.
First, we model the application and approval process as a multi-stage sequential game between the
developers, local planning authorities and the inspectors. In the UK, individuals and developers
have to apply to the local planning authority to seek development permission (ownership alone does
not confer the right to develop the land). Applicants who have their plans rejected can appeal to
the Secretary of State, via the Planning Inspectorate. The Planning Inspectorate then assigns an
inspector to decide whether to overturn the local authority’s decision. We follow the institutional
context closely in our model. In particular, in our model, the developer chooses the intensity of
residential development. The local authority then accepts or rejects the project based on the level
of NIMBY-ism in the area. Our model yields two key propositions – (i) there is negative selection
into appeals because the developments that are appealed are the ones which have a greater negative
impact on amenities. In addition, (ii) local power exacerbates selection into appeals. In locations
with high levels of NIMBY-ism, even relatively benign projects end up being appealed. This is
because developers have to give up too much of their profits to counter NIMBY-ism and so they are
better off getting their plans rejected by the local authority and gambling on drawing an inspector
3We adapt this definition from the Oxford English Dictionary.
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who is less sympathetic towards locals’ NIMBY behavior.
This analysis suggests that we can understand the prevalence of NIMBY-ism from the selection of
projects into our appeals sample. If only the worst projects, which have a deleterious impact on
the neighborhood, select into appeals, then NIMBY-ism is not so serious; the planning process is
working as intended as bad apples are rejected by the planners. On the other hand, if fairly benign
projects select into appeals, then NIMBYs may be prevailing.
Second, we embark on our reduced form analysis as informed by our model. We begin by examining
the effect of a successful appeal (overturning the local authority’s decision) on housing prices. To
establish causality, we employ two research designs: (i) an OLS using a difference-in-differences
(DiD) approach; and (ii) an instrumental variables (IV) approach. The latter exploits the fact
that inspectors who are assigned to the appeals have different preferences and are quasi-randomly
assigned to the cases. This means that we can use the leniency of the inspectors as an instrument
for whether an appeal is successful.4 We find that overturning the local authority’s decision does
not lead to a large fall in housing prices. In fact, our IV estimates suggest a positive impact of
overturning decisions. This suggests that NIMBY-ism may be fairly prevalent across the UK.
Our paper contributes to the burgeoning literature on the effects of land use regulations in two ways.
First, the impact of land use regulations on housing prices have been documented in many empirical
studies such as Albouy and Ehrlich (2018), Shertzer et al. (2018), Hilber and Vermeulen (2016),
Turner et al. (2014), Libecap and Lueck (2011), Saiz (2010), Glaeser et al. (2005), Quigley and
Raphael (2005) and Cheshire and Sheppard (2002). In addition, with the exception of Hilber and
4The use of expert leniency as an instrumental variable has been used widely in the economics literature. For
example, the leniency of judges has been used to estimate the impact of eviction on poverty (Humphries et al. (2018)),
incarceration on economic and family outcomes (Aizer and Doyle Jr (2015); Bhuller et al. (2020)), the effect of pretrial
detention on legal and economic outcomes (Dobbie et al. (2018)), the effect of foster care on child outcomes (Doyle
(2008)), the effect of disability on labor supply (Dahl et al. (2014); Kostøl et al. (2019)), and even the effect of patents
on innovation (Galasso and Schankerman (2015)).
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Vermeulen (2016) and Cheshire and Sheppard (2002), most of these studies are in the context of the
US and not the UK. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is one of the first few to provide causal
estimates of the effect of land use regulations in the UK. Our paper is also related to the literature
on the effect of land use regulations on welfare. For example, Turner et al. (2014) and Hsieh and
Moretti (2019) show that land use regulations lead to large decreases in welfare.
Second, and more importantly, our paper demonstrates why it is not correct to view land use
regulations as simply being a supply shock.5 Before Turner et al. (2014), the literature often took
contradictory positions as to whether increases in housing prices indicate welfare increases or
decreases. One position was that price increases reflected welfare improvements. This view is
predicated on viewing land use regulations as improving the amenities of an area and hence a
demand shock. The other position was that price increases reflected welfare lost. In this framework,
land use regulations are viewed as a supply shock. Following Turner et al. (2014), we model land
use regulations as being both a demand and supply shock. We then show how land use regulations
being both a demand and supply shock have political economy implications.
In terms of the political economy literature, to the best of our knowledge, we contribute by being
one of the first to empirically quantify how NIMBY-ism affects housing prices. In recent times,
there has been a growing number of papers such as Parkhomenko (2020) and Ortalo-Magné and
Prat (2014) that formalize Fischel’s homevoter hypothesis by modelling land use regulations as
a function of political competition between renters and owners. Besides the role of homeowners
in the local political process, Calabrese et al. (2007), Epple et al. (1988) and Hamilton (1975)
argue that land use regulations are ways to prevent certain types of households from entering a
community. Similar to these papers, our paper models land use regulations as a political economy
5Gyourko and Molloy (2015) note that the predicted effects of regulations become less obvious if households can
move freely among cities. This is because under spatial equilibrium, utility must be equal across cities. Therefore,
population flows can erode away price differences across locations. The price differences across areas thus reflect the
amenity value of growth controls and not the lower elasticity of housing supply.
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mechanism to protect the interest of particular local groups (“insiders”) at the expense of other
groups (“outsiders”). In addition, just like Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013) and Glaeser et al.
(2005), we also show how developers react to the local political process. Most of these political
economy papers are mainly theoretical papers or calibration exercises which do not quantify the
effect of NIMBY-ism. Our paper therefore contributes to this literature by providing an empirical
estimate of how NIMBY-ism affects housing prices.
More broadly, our paper is related to the literature which examines the effects of housing policies.
Examples of housing policies other than land use regulations include, urban revitalization (Greenstone
and Gallagher (2008), Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2010)), direct provision of housing (Collins and Shester
(2013)), price controls (Autor et al. (2014), Diamond et al. (2019)), and taxes and subsidies (Baum-
Snow and Marion (2009), Collinson and Ganong (2018), Diamond and McQuade (2018)). Since
land use regulations are a form of place-based policies, our paper relates to the literature on the
use of place-based polices to rectify regional disparities. Kline and Moretti (2014) provide a good
overview on the economics of place-based policies. In addition, because land use regulations limit
the size of cities, our paper is also related to the literature on optimal city size. Au and Henderson
(2006) find that migration restrictions have resulted in many undersized cities in China. To the
extent that there are huge benefits from urban agglomeration, the costs of being undersized due to
land use regulations are potentially high.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the economic effects of the decentralization of
policy responsibilities to local governments. A review by Pike et al. (2012) suggests that there is
no clear relationship between decentralization and economic outcomes. For example, Zhang and
Zou (1998) find that decentralization is associated with lower economic growth at the provincial
level in China. However, Akai and Sakata (2002) and Stansel (2005) find a positive relationship
between decentralization and economic growth in the US. Yet another group of studies such as
Davoodi and Zou (1998), Xie et al. (1999) and Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire (2004) find that there is
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no link between decentralization and economic outcomes. This literature is somewhat dated and
does not establish causality. By examining how the decisions of local governments are exogenously
overturned, our paper presents an attempt at reviving this literature.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides the background to land use
regulations in the UK and the rise of local power. Section 3.3 develops the theoretical model which
we use to interpret our reduced form regressions. Section 3.4 describes the data sources which we
use for our analysis. Section 3.5 explains our empirical strategy and Section 3.6 presents the results.
Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Background to Land Use Regulations in the UK
3.2.1 Overview
Land use regulation in the UK has a long and storied history – Corkindale (1999) notes that as
early as 1540, Queen Elizabeth I forbade any new buildings within three miles of the City gates
of London. The present-day land use regulations in the UK has its roots in the Town and Country
Planning Act which came into law in 1947. The purpose of the 1947 act was to contain urban areas
and stop them from spilling out into the surrounding countryside as well as preserve amenities
of various kinds. The act also separated land uses which might be incompatible (e.g., industry
from residential). At the same time, the act also aimed to provide lower density and greener living
conditions in the new towns.
In order to do so, the act sets out the principle of “development control” which means that planning
permission is required for land development – ownership alone no longer conferred the right to
develop the land. As a result, owners have to apply and seek permission from their local planning
authorities whenever they wanted to develop their land. The local planning authorities would only
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approve the development if it is consistent with the local development plan.6 The UK system
therefore controls the amount of land available not just for housing but for all urban uses of land
including offices, retail and commercial.
There have been many modifications since 1947.7 For example, in the 1950s, the restrictions
were tightened as “Greenbelt” boundaries were established. This resulted in increasing amount of
land around towns and cities being taken out of the effective land supply. Later revisions of the
act were legislated in 1962, 1971 and 1990. While the 1990 act is the current legislation, the act
has been substantially amended and added to, for example, through the use of legislative orders.
Nonetheless, the 1947 act established an approach and framework that has not been superseded.
Today, the main planning acts that are in force in England are the Town and Country Planning Act
(1990), Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act (2004), Planning Act (2008) and Localism Act
(2011). These acts are also read alongside a series of planning policy documents and guidelines such
as the National Planning Policy Framework which was published in March 2012. Other national
policies and restrictions such as “Greenbelts”, “Sites of Special Scientific Interest” and “Areas
of Outstanding Natural Beauty” also form part of the planning regulations. Many of the recent
reforms such as the Localism Act (2011) was aimed at giving locals more power in deciding land
use in their neighborhood. For example, neighborhood plans were introduced by the Localism Act
(2011). These gave communities the direct power to develop a shared vision for their neighborhood
and shape the development and growth of their local area. The neighborhood plans are extremely
powerful. This is because when considering whether to grant planning permission, the local
authorities have to ensure that the proposed development is consistent with the neighborhood plans.
6Today, many parts of England have three tiers of local government – (i) county council, (ii) district, borough or
city councils and (iii) parish or town councils. The district councils are the ones that are typically responsible for most
planning matters including preparing local development plans and approving planning applications.
7Each country within the UK has its own variations in their planning system. Since the English system is the
dominant one, the details which we provide here are based on the system in England.
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A planning application needs to be submitted to the local authorities if an individual or developer
wants to (i) build something new, (ii) make a major change to the building (e.g., building an
extension), or (iii) change the use of the building. In determining whether to grant planning
permission, the local authority has to assess whether the proposed development is consistent with
(i) national policies, (ii) the local plan and (iii) the neighborhood plans (if any exists). Since
most developments put a strain on existing infrastructure such as roads, schools and open spaces,
the local planning authorities can impose a Community Infrastructure Levy (a charge which new
developments pay, based on the size and type of development) to mitigate the impact of the proposed
development. The Levy collected is then used to fund a wide range of infrastructure needed to
support the development of the area. Alternatively, under Section 106 of the Town and Country
Planning Act (1990), the local planning authority can also grant permission in return for some
specified gain to the community. For example, the local planning authority may require that the
developer provides a certain amount of affordable housing. This gives rise to a negotiation process
between the local planning authority and the developer.
Applicants who have their plans rejected can appeal to the Secretary of State, via the Planning
Inspectorate. The Planning Inspectorate then assigns one inspector to the case who decides whether
to overturn the local planning authority’s decision.8
In order to understand how inspectors are assigned to cases, we spoke to a representative from the
Planning Inspectorate. The representative shared with us that the Planning Inspectorate uses an
algorithm as well as human judgment to decide on the assignment of inspectors to cases. First, the
algorithm uses the (i) complexity of the case (e.g., size of the development, whether the proposed
development is in a “Greenbelt”, agricultural area, “Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty”, “Sites
8The Secretary of State has the power to take over the decision making from the Planning Inspectorate if the case
raises particular issues that justify a Ministerial decision. In such cases, a planning inspector will submit a report and
recommendation to the Secretary of State. Taking into account the inspector’s assessment of the proposals, the Secretary
of State will then make a decision.
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of Special Scientific Interest”, etc.) and (ii) how far away each inspector lives from the location
of the proposed development to identify a list of suitable inspectors.9 Second, a case worker then
manually goes through the list and excludes inspectors who (i) already have a heavy case load, (ii)
recently had a case in the area where the development is being proposed, (iii) live in the area of the
proposed development, (iv) previously worked for a consultancy firm that is involved in the appeal,
and/or (v) have personal difficulties such as illness. This means that conditional on these variables,
the assignment of inspectors to cases is as good as random. This forms the basis of our empirical
strategy to identify the causal effects of having a successful appeal.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Overview
The aim of our model is to help interpret our results from the empirical analysis. We study
developments in the UK that went through the appeals process. These projects are self-selected and
would not be similar to projects that that did not appeal. Hence, we use the model to analyze this
selection effect and how it changes with NIMBY-ism. The model is a sequential game between the
developer (D), local planning authority (L) and inspector (N ) played out in four stages:
Table 3.1: Stages of the game
Stage Player Action set Consequence of action
0 Nature Draws κ and η All players observe κ, only N observes η
1 D Propose a development plan s Move to stage 2
2 L
Accept s implemented




4 Housing market clears
9The Planning Inspectorate maintains a list of inspectors which they classify based on the inspectors’ suitability to
assess cases according to the different levels of case complexity.
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There is monopolist developer deciding how to develop a plot of land in a location. If developed,
this land adds an exogenous amenity value of κ ∈ (−∞,∞) to the location. The destruction
of green spaces can be represented as a negative κ, while the removal of an abandoned building
as a positive κ. A development plan is defined as the intensity of residential development (s),
where s ∈ [0,∞]. A higher s means more residents in the location which creates congestion.
This is represented by an amenity value of −δs.10 If the development is accepted, D’s profits are
π = P1(s, κ)s− 12as
2. P1(s, κ) is the market clearing price of the development and a captures the
cost per unit intensity of a development.
We proceed to analyze the game backwards from stage 4:
3.3.2 Stage 4: Household behavior and market clearing
Prior to nature choosing κ: state of the location before new development





s.t. P + C ≤ W
W is wealth, C is composite consumption, and x and P are the stock of amenities and price
of housing in the location. We assume ψ′(x) > 0 and ψ′′(x) < 0. Potential residents have
homogeneous utility from residing but heterogeneous outside utility. The mass of potential residents
with an outside utility of u is h(u) and we define g(u) =
∫ u
u
h(z)dz. Market clearing requires that
demand for housing equals supply (s), or that there is a mass s of potential residents with utility of
10One way to think about congestion is that of more residents competing for scarce local services like schools and
transport.
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residing weakly better than their outside utility:
s = g0(u0) =⇒ u0 = g−10 (s)
Where u0 is the outside utility of the marginal resident who is indifferent between residing or taking
her outside option. u0 also pins down the utility of residing for all residents, so we can rewrite the
budget constraint to get the clearing price:
P0 = W − C0 = W − g−10 (s) + ψ(x)
This says that housing prices are increasing in wealth and amenities but decreasing in supply of
housing.
After development is built
After the development is built, θ proportion of residents are stuck and cannot move. We make this
assumption to ensure that there are some residents that may be hurt by the development. If everyone
can move away, then everyone will be better off after the development and the LPA will never
reject developments.11 In future versions of the paper we will allow residents to choose to leave by
introducing wealth effects: movers will have to sell their properties at lower prices which reduces
their wealth and hence, their outside utility. Now the problem for potential residents is:
max
{resident,outside option}
C + ψ(x− δs+ κ)
s.t. P + C ≤ W
11If all residents are free to move, or choose their outside options, market clearing implies s+ s = g0(u1). Since
s ≥ 0 we must have u1 ≥ u0, so the utility of all residents must be greater than before.
103
The only difference is that, after the development, the stock of amenities has changed by −δs+ κ.
Market clearing would imply
s+ (1− θ)s+ s = (2− θ)s+ s = g1(u1) =⇒ u1 = g−11 ((2− θ)s+ s)
where g1(u) is the cumulative mass of potential resident with outside options less than u, after
excluding the stuck residents. Again, we can rewrite the budget constraint to get:
P1(s, κ) = W − C1 = W − g−11 ((2− θ) s+ s) + ψ(x− δs+ κ)
Notice that P1s(s, κ) < 0 because of the supply effect and disamenity effect.
3.3.3 Stage 3: Inspector decides whether to overturn the local planning authority’s decision
The inspector (N ) compares the social utility of accepting the project versus rejecting it. She
observes η, which is the weight of current residents relative to the weight of new residents. So the
social utility of accepting is:
ηθs[C0 + ψ(x− δs+ κ)] + (s+ (1− θ)s) [C1 + ψ(x− δs+ κ)]
Current residents, who are stuck, are weighted η, get their initial level of consumption (C0) and
enjoy the net stock of amenities. New residents, who are weighted 1, enjoy the same stock of
amenities but get a higher level of consumption (C1) because of the lower price of housing.
The social utility of rejecting is simply:
ηs[C0 + ψ(x)]
That is all residents stay and enjoy the initial level of utility.
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D and L do not observe the value of η but know its distribution (cdf of F (η)). Given a value
of s we can rewrite the condition for accepting as the range of values of η for which N will accept:12
η ≤ (s+ (1− θ)s) g
−1
1 ((2− θ) s+ s)
θs [ψ(x)− ψ(x− δs+ κ)] + (1− θ)sg−10 (s)
≡ I(s, κ)
Hence, the probability of a successful appeal is F (I(s, κ)).
3.3.4 Stage 2: Local planning authority decides whether to accept or reject the developer’s
proposed plan
The local planning authority (L) knows that it can accept a development and it will be built. But if
it rejects, N may still accept it. The social utility of L is similar to N but instead of η, she weighs
current residents with a value of ω relative to new residents. She does not know the exact η but she
knows the distribution of η. Assuming L is risk neutral, she will accept a development if and only if
ωθs[C0 + ψ(x− δs+ κ)] + (s+ (1− θ)s) [C1 + ψ(x− δs+ κ)] ≥ ωs[C0 + ψ(x)]
We can highlight some considerations of the developer using this inequality. When the
development raises s there are three effects:
1. Disamenity effect, ∂ψ(x−δs+κ)
∂s
: lowers the value of amenities in the location and makes stuck
residents worst off. This makes L less likely to accept.
2. Weighting effect, ∂(s+(1−θ)s̄)
∂s
: raises the number of new residents who benefit from staying in
the location and makes L more likely to accept.
3. Price effect, ∂C1
∂s
: lowers the price of vacant and new housing, which raises the consumption
and welfare of new residents. This makes L more likely to accept.
12Note that this expression is true if the denominator is positive. It must be positive if D sets s to be selected into
appeals.
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Which effect dominates will depend on the parameter values. For locations with a high δ, the
disamenity effect should dominate, and a higher s would lower the social benefit. We can substitute
the expressions from the market clearing equation to rewrite the acceptance condition:
(s+ (1− θ)s) g−11 ((2− θ) s+ s) ≥ ωθs [ψ(x)− ψ(x− δs+ κ)] + ω(1− θ)sg−10 (s)
3.3.5 Stage 1: Developer proposes a development plan






Notice that D can choose s to: (i) maximize profits subject to L accepting (honest); or (ii) maximize
expected profits subject to L rejecting and D appealing (gaming). In our setup D always appeals
after a rejection. This is reasonable because 83% of projects rejected by local authorities are
appealed.13
Proposing an honest development











as2 ≥ 0 (PC)
P1(s, κ) = W − C1 = W − g−11 ((2− θ) s+ s) + ψ(x− δs+ κ) (MarketClearing)
The Incentive Constrain (IC) ensures L accepts the development, and the Participation Constraint
(PC) ensures it is profitable to propose it. The IC may not bind if the unconstrained optimal s also
13This is estimated based on proposed major development from 4Q2012 to 4Q2017. Reasons for restricting our
sample to major developments are in the data section.
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satisfies the IC. Assuming that the PC is satisfied, the optimal profits can be written as
πh (s∗, κ) = P1(s






(s∗ + (1− θ)s) g−11 ((2− θ) s+ s∗)− ωθs [ψ(x)− ψ(x− δs∗ + κ)]− ω(1− θ)sg−10 (s)
]
where s∗ is the optimally chosen development for the honest developer’s problem.
Gaming the process



















P1(s, κ) = W − C1 = W − g−11 ((2− θ) s+ s) + ψ(x− δs+ κ) (MarketClearing)
The IC in this case ensures L rejects the development. We have spoken to planning consultants
in the UK and they do advise clients to propose developments, which will be rejected by the local
authority. This tactic is employed when local planners are intransigent about compromising. Again
the optimal profits can be written as









ωθs̃ [ψ(x)− ψ(x− δs̃+ κ)] + ω(1− θ)sg−10 (s)− (s̃+ (1− θ)s) g−11 ((2− θ) s+ s̃)
]
where s̃ is the optimally chosen development for the gaming developer’s problem.
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3.3.6 Selection into appeals
Developments that select into appeals are such that the profits from gaming are more than the profits
from being honest, i.e., πg ≥ πh. We hope to understand the range of κ that will result in appeals.
To make some progress we make the following assumptions:
1. Define g0(u) = αu and g0(0) = 0. This assumes a demand elasticity of −αP0(s)s . A constant
demand elascitiy is reasonable if the developments are not very large, or s s.
2. We consider two cases: (i) δ = 0; and (ii) α → ∞. Case (i) is one where congestion is
negligible, which would be the case if a location has excess capacity to absorb new residents.
Case (ii) is one where demand is very elastic and so housing prices are not affected by supply.
Case (i) shuts down the disamenity effect, and case (ii) shuts down the price effect. Having all
three effects complicates the analysis by introducing discontinuous jumps in the constrained
optimal profits. We will generalize these results in future versions of the paper.
Proposition 1 (Negative selection into appeals) Given assumptions 1 and 2, in a subgame perfect
Nash Equilibrium ∃κ∗ : κ = κ∗ ⇒ πg = πh and κ < κ∗ ⇒ πg > πh and κ ≥ κ∗ ⇒ πg ≤ πh
Proof: See Appendix C.1.1. 
Appeals take place only when κ < κ∗. This says that the developments we observe in appeals
are likely to be the ones with a more negative impact on amenities. For a honest development,
large negative plot disamenities require intense residential developments to convince L to accept
via the weighting and price effects. Given the convexity of costs, such developments quickly
become unprofitable and the alternative of rolling a dice with a gaming development becomes more
appealing.
Proposition 2 (Local power exacerbates selection into appeals) In a subgame perfect Nash
Equilibrium ω′ ≥ ω ⇒ κ∗(ω′) ≥ κ∗(ω)
Proof: See Appendix C.1.2 
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An increase in ω makes the IC for the honest developer more binding because she has to give
up more profits to placate the local planning authority. This increase, however, makes the IC for
the gaming developer less binding because she wants the local planning authority to not accept.
Therefore, local power encourages more developers to game. Intuitively, in locations with high
levels of NIMBY-ism, even relatively benign projects end up being appealed. This is because
developers have to give up too much of their profits to counter NIMBY-ism and so they are better
off getting their plans rejected by the local authority and gambling on drawing an inspector who is
less sympathetic towards locals’ NIMBY behaviour.
3.3.7 Implications of selection on price regressions
Given propositions 1 and 2, we can now work out what our regressions are estimating. We consider
two regressions: the first is an OLS regression ln(pi) = β0 + β1.Successful Appeali + ei, where
the variation in successful appeals is generated by the random assignment of inspectors (or the
random variable η). Here our coefficient of interest is β. The second is an 2SLS regression, where
we run the regressions ln(pi) = γ0 + γ1ηi + ui and 1.Successful Appeali = π0 + π1ηi + vi, and our
coefficient of interest is γ1
π1
.
OLS versus IV regressions
The price change when we randomly assign η is: ∆P = E [P1(s̃, κ)− P0|κ < κ∗].









[s̃+ (2− θ)s] + [ψ(x− δs̃+ κ)− ψ(x)]
]
dG(κ)




, κgpc is where the PC for the gaming problem binds and G(κ)





[s̃+ (2− θ)s] is a supply effect, or a move along the demand curve, and is always negative.
2. ψ(x − δs̃ + κ) − ψ(x) is a demand shifter, and depends on whether −δs̃ + κ is greater or
less than 0.
We can also work out that γ1
π1









[s̃+ (2− θ)s] + [ψ(x− δs̃+ κ)− ψ(x)]
]
dG(κ)





. With no endogeneity issues, the difference between
the OLS and IV estimates are the weights (1 versus F̃ (.)). The OLS estimates the Average
Treatment Effect (ATE), while the IV estimates a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), which
skews towards developments that have a high increase in the probability of success from being





= 1 and the OLS and IV estimates are the same. This forms the basis of our regression
analysis in Section 3.5.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Description of datasets
The data we use are from four sources: (i) the Planning Inspectorate’s Appeals Casework Portal
(ACP); (ii) the UK Land Registry’s Price Paid Database (PPD); (iii) the Domestic Energy Performance
of Buildings Registers; and (iv) the Royal Mail Postal Address File (PAF).
Planning Inspectorate’s Appeals Casework Portal (ACP). The ACP is the same database that
the Planning Inspectorate caseworkers use to assign cases to inspectors and to manage cases. The
ACP dataset contains decisions on appeals starting from October 1, 2012 to December, 28, 2018. It
contains the following key variables:
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Table 3.2: Summary of ACP dataset
Fields Description
Local Planning Authority (LPA)
details
Name of local planning authority (LPA), LPA code, LPA’s case ID (the
case ID allows us to search for documents related to appeal, e.g., site
maps)
Key dates Date when the appeal was received, started and decided
Inspector Names of the inspectors
Development details Residential or commercial, address, floor space, site area, number of
residences whether the proposed development is in a “Greenbelt”, “Area
of Natural Beauty”, “Sites of Special Scientific Interest”, or agricultural
area; whether it involves a conservation area or historical building
Others Type of appeal, whether a planning consultant was hired, whether a
bespoke timeline was agreed between the parties, whether the inspector
ordered the local planning authority to foot the cost of the developer’s
appeal
Since the ACP data is also used by the Planning Inspectorate for casework management, most
fields are accurate.14 There is, however, one key field that is subjective because it is filled in by the
developer – development type. Therefore, we do not use this variable to construct our sample.
UK Land Registry’s Price Paid Database (PPD). For tax purposes, the PPD contains the registered
price of all residential property transactions. The version of the dataset that we are using runs from
January, 1, 2010 to January, 31, 2020. It includes the address of the property, the property type
(i.e., detached, semi-detached, terrace or flat), whether the property is a new built and whether the
property is freehold or leasehold. Crucially, the PPD does not include specific characteristics of the
property such as the floor area or the number of rooms. Therefore, to obtain these variables, we use
the Domestic Energy Performance of Buildings Registers.
Domestic Energy Performance of Buildings Registers. By law, Energy Performance Certificates
(EPCs) are needed whenever a property is built, sold or rented. Besides the address of the property
14At the very least, they are consistent with the information the inspectorate had in deciding the appeal.
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and its energy rating, this dataset also includes specific characteristics of the property like property
type, floor area and number of rooms.
Royal Mail Postal Address File. This database contains all addresses and location of residential
units in the UK. We use it to construct estimates of housing stock near the appeal site.
3.4.2 Sample for regression
We are interested in estimating the effect of a successful appeal on housing prices. To obtain the
sample for our regression, we apply a number of sample restrictions.
Selection of appeals sample
Include only appeals involving residential developments that add 10 or more dwellings. There are
a number of reasons why we apply this sample restriction. First, as noted in our background to
land use regulations in the UK, almost any substantial changes one makes to a property requires
planning permission – this includes, for instance, a loft conversion. This means that the ACP
database includes appeals for a myriad of issues such as displaying advertisement on a building,
house rear extensions and changes to commercial store front. Therefore, for this paper, we focus
specifically on major residential developments, defined in the UK legislation as any development
that adds 10 or more dwelling units.15 We focus on housing because the debate on NIMBY-ism is
generally about the restrictions in housing supply. Second, appeals involving smaller developments
(less than 10) tend to comprise mainly of homeowners who are seeking to divide their house into
two apartments to maximize rental yield or adding units to house family members. Such extensions
and modifications are likely to be very different from a developer seeking to build residential units
15Town and Country Planning Order (2010) available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/2184/made. Note
that this definition would include mixed use or primarily commercial developments that also add 10 or more residential
units. In addition, there are certain requirements that “major developments” have to adhere to and these requirements
make it easier for locals to exercise their power to influence the local planning authority. For example, the developer
is required to give notice of the planned development at the development site, serve the notice to adjoining occupiers
and publish the notice in a local newspaper. These requirements mean that locals are more likely to be aware of such
developments, enabling them to voice their opinions and hold the members of the local planning authority accountable
if they approve the development.
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for sale. Third, there is a long tail of very small developments. For instance, more than 50 percent
of residential developments add only one dwelling unit, and more than 75 percent of developments
add two units. Since minor developments tend to have smaller externalities, we would be skewing
our results towards finding zero effect if we include them in our sample.
Exclude variation in conditions and caravan parks. Variation in conditions are appeals that seek to
amend the original plan approved by the local authority. For instance, a developer who planned for
extensive landscaping, but now find it prohibitively costly, may appeal to the inspectorate to remove
that part from the agreed plan. These appeals typically involve minor amendments and, if successful,
barely change the development. We also exclude caravan parks because it is not clear whether they
are residential in nature. Some may serve as long term lots for families living in caravans but others
may serve as winter parking or tourist lots.
Choose earliest appeal if several are near each other. This reduces the need to account for
cross-appeal effects in our regressions. We can also think of the number of subsequent appeals
in the area as an outcome variable that is influenced by the earliest appeal. This may introduce
endogeneity into our regressions.
Location plans available online. We had to geocode the planned development manually because
many were developed on greenfield sites without existing addresses.
Include appeals for which inspector leniency is estimable. To construct the instrument for our IV
regressions (see Section 3.5.3), we need a decent sample of cases per inspector to ensure estimates of
inspector leniency converge to the true leniency. Thus we excluded appeals for which the inspector
did not have many cases. The sample counts following the various restrictions are summarized here
and Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics of the appeals data after applying these restrictions.
1. Major residential appeals 2012-2018 (i.e., ≥ 10 dwellings)→ 4,324 appeals
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2. Exclude variation in conditions, caravan parks, choose earliest appeal→ 4,211 appeals
3. Able to manually geocode→ 3,513 appeals
4. Can estimate inspector leniency→ 3,121 appeals
Table 3.3: Summary statistics (appeals data)
Mean SD Min Max N
Year appeal started 2015.42 1.65 2012 2018 3121
Year appeal decided 2015.86 1.61 2012 2018 3121
No. of dwellings 56.19 100.93 10 4022 3121
Site area (hectres) 6.88 141.55 0 6780 2987
East Midlands 0.11 0.31 0 1 3121
East of England 0.14 0.35 0 1 3121
London 0.09 0.28 0 1 3121
North East 0.03 0.16 0 1 3121
North West 0.09 0.29 0 1 3121
South East 0.24 0.43 0 1 3121
South West 0.15 0.36 0 1 3121
West Midlands 0.09 0.29 0 1 3121
Yorkshire and The Humber 0.05 0.23 0 1 3121
Appeal successful 0.43 0.50 0 1 3121
Selection of price paid sample
Include only resale transactions of residential properties that are ever within 1km of any appeal.
The reason for including only resale transactions is because we want to see how the appeals affect
existing properties and not the new properties that are being built. As for the 1km restriction, we
apply this because if we were to increase the radius beyond 1km, we end up having many properties
that are linked to multiple appeals. In addition, the effect of having an appeal near-by is likely to
decay with distance. If we define too big a radius, we would be skewing our results towards finding
zero effect. In future work, we will be checking if our results are robust to using different distance
thresholds.
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Exclude “others” category of residential transactions. The dataset includes residential-related
transactions such as garages and parking spaces that we exclude.
Include only resale transactions that took place within 3 years before or after an appeal. Since the
appeals dataset only starts on October 1, 2012, we have fewer and fewer resale transactions beyond 3
years of an appeal. Statistical inference might become unreliable if the number of resale transactions
in certain years before or after an appeal becomes too small. We will show as a robustness check
that our results are stable to the choice of year bandwidths.
Trimmed top and bottom 1% in prices. Regressions may be sensitive to outliers and we trimmed
extreme prices to reduce that sensitivity. Our results hold with an untrimmed or a Winsorised sample.
Table 3.4 shows us the summary statistics of the resale transactions data.
Table 3.4: Summary statistics (resale transactions data)
Mean SD Min Max N
Year of transaction 2015.88 2.07 2010 2020 1238407
Transacted price 297463.88 209187.77 54950 1504000 1238407
Terrace 0.29 0.45 0 1 1238407
Flat 0.27 0.45 0 1 1238407
Semi-detached 0.24 0.42 0 1 1238407
Detached 0.20 0.40 0 1 1238407
Freehold 0.70 0.46 0 1 1238407
Distance from first appeal 631.36 246.15 1 1000 1238407
3.4.3 What happens after a successful appeal?
So far we have assumed that successful appeals lead to new residential developments at the appeal
site. Concretely, what it does lead to is an option to develop the appeal site. Developers may choose
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not to develop at all if property markets are poor.16 Figure 3.1 plots the number of new dwellings,
within 200m of the center of appeal sites, before and after an appeal decision, and indicates that
options do translate to new housing. Controlling for location and year fixed-effects, this translates
to a 0.42% increase in housing supply near the appeal site.
Figure 3.2 plots the average log real price by appeal decision. We see that successful appeals
tend to be in neighborhoods with lower house prices. This suggests neighborhood characteristics,
which determine market prices, may affect appeal decisions. For instance, properties near a green
belt are priced higher, due to the supply restrictions; and the bar for an appeal there would also
be higher. However, we see that the price trends prior to appeal decisions are similar across both
groups.
Figure 3.1: Comparison of new dwellings in appeal sites, by success of appeal
16What they can do, however, is to sell the option to other developers. Regardless of market conditions, developers
who have gone through the appeals process would have sunk in a lot of money (e.g., purchasing the land, drafting plans,
hiring architects and consultants) and would usually develop the site except in exceptional circumstances.
116
Figure 3.2: Unconditional mean log price by appeal decision
3.5 Empirical strategy
3.5.1 Overview
To estimate the causal effect of overturning the local authority’s decision on housing prices, we can
run the following DiD regression:
ln(priceijt) = αj + δt + βSuccessi × Postappealt + γ′X ijt + εijt (3.1)
ln (priceijt) is the log price of property i within 1km of appeal j in year-month t. Successi is
an indicator variable that denotes whether property i is ever within 1km of a successful appeal.
Postappealt is an indicator variable for the period that the appeal takes place and periods after
the appeal. Xijt is a vector of individual property characteristics such as property type, whether
the property is leasehold or freehold, the number of rooms, floor area, the property’s current and
potential energy efficiency, whether the property was built before 2012 and the supply trend in the
1km vicinity of the appeal prior to the appeal decision. αj are fixed-effects for properties around
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appeal j. Finally, δt are time fixed effects. These consists of calendar year-month fixed-effects and
relative year fixed-effects. For example, the relative year fixed-effect takes on the value of 1 if the
sale of the property is within 1 year after the appeal. We cluster the standard errors at the outward
code level. Using the example of the postcode SE16 7BB, Table 3.5 shows how the varying levels
of postcode granularity are defined in the UK. The outward code thus corresponds to a district in
the UK (roughly the size of a town or part of a large town).
Table 3.5: Postcode format in the UK
Postcode
Outward code Inward code
Area District Sector Unit
SE 16 7 BB
3.5.2 Limitations to difference-in-differences
Figure 3.3 graphs the coefficients (with the 95% confidence intervals) from a dynamic DiD
regression (with controls) that compares the prices, relative to three years before the appeal
decisions, between properties near successful versus unsuccessful appeal sites.17 There is no
significant difference in price trends between the two groups, suggesting that a DiD specification
may give a consistent estimate of the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of having a successful appeal
development nearby. The values of the coefficients used to plot Figure 3.3 are reported in Appendix
Table C1.
However, even if equation 3.1 exhibits parallel pre-trends, we might still worry about unobserved
time-varying neighborhood characteristics that vary after the appeal and also affect housing prices.
For example, after an appeal (regardless of whether it was successful or not), residents in high
NIMBY areas might take the opportunity to quickly come up with a neighborhood plan so as to
17This regression includes the standard controls we use in our main specifications, as outlined in equation 3.1.
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make it difficult for other developers to develop new housing in their neighborhood in the future.
Therefore, to address such potential selection bias that happens after an appeal, we adopt an IV
approach. We exploit the fact that appeals are randomly assigned to inspectors (conditional on the
assignment criteria used by the Planning Inspectorate which we elaborated on in Section 3.2). In
addition, some inspectors are systematically more lenient that others. Taken together, these lead to
random variations in the probability that an appeal will be successful based on which inspector the
appeal is assigned to. Since there is no evidence of pre-trends in our DiD regression, when reporting
our empirical results, we report both the DiD and IV results.
Figure 3.3: Difference in prices relative to 3 years before appeal decision
3.5.3 Instrumental variable calculation
We measure the average leniency of an inspector based on the appeal success rate for all the
other randomly assigned cases that the inspector handled.18 These cases include both past and
future appeals but not the existing appeal. This leave-out measure is important because it avoids
introducing mechanical reverse causality. To construct the instrument, we follow the existing
18Although our regression sample involves only major dwellings, we also use the success rate for appeals involving
non-major dwellings to construct the instrument. The purpose of doing this is to improve the power of the instrument.
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literature on expert leniency and regress whether the appeal is successful on the variables which
we know that the Planning Inspectorate uses to assign the inspectors to cases. The residual from
this leave-one out regression is our leniency measure. The assignment criteria variables include the
workload of the inspectors, characteristics of the area around the appeal site and the complexity
of the case.19 Controlling for the assignment criteria is important because it accounts for the fact
that randomization by the Planning Inspectorate occurs within the pool of available and suitable
inspectors.
While we use all the available data to estimate the leniency of the inspectors, after applying
our sample restrictions, for our regression sample, we have 412 inspectors who were assigned to
appeals involving major dwellings. Each of these inspectors presided over an average of around
65 appeals. The highest number of appeals presided over by an inspector is 313 and the smallest
number of appeals presided over by an inspector is 1. Essentially, we estimate the leniency of
inspectors using her mean residualized probability of approving an appeal. This estimate would be
very noisy for inspectors with only a few appeals. For instance, the leniency would be estimated off
1 appeal if an inspector only judged 2 appeals in total.20 Therefore, we did not use inspectors, in our
regressions, who presided over <30 appeals. This excludes 31.6% of inspectors from our sample.21
Figure 3.4 shows the identifying variation in our data. Controlling for the vector of assignment
variables used by the Planning Inspectorate, the inspector leniency measure ranges from -0.25 to
0.30 with a standard deviation of 0.09. The histogram suggests that there is a wide variation in
whether an inspector is likely to allow an appeal to be successful.
19To proxy for the complexity of the case, we use variables such as the size of the development that is being appealed,
whether the appeal relates to other cases, whether a bespoke timeline was agreed between the parties, the total number
of days that it took for the inspector to come to a decision, and key words used to describe the appeal (e.g., demolition,
commercial, facilities).
20Indeed, the predictive power of leniency on approval, without dropping inspectors, is very poor.
21Our results are robust to using various arbitrary cut-offs.
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Finally, we interact the leniency measure with the post appeal dummy. Leniencyi × Postappealt
is thus our instrument for Successi × Postappealt.
Figure 3.4: Distribution of inspector leniency (regression sample)
3.5.4 Validating the IV strategy
Relevance of Instrument
We estimate the following linear probability model to examine the first-stage relationship between
inspector leniency and whether an appeal is successful:
Successi × Postappealt = αj + δt + ρLeniencyi × Postappealt + θ′X ijt + υijt (3.2)
where Xijt is a vector of control variables that is the same as in equation 3.1.
Table 3.6 presents the first-stage results. The estimates are highly significant, suggesting that
being assigned to an inspector who is 10 percentage points more lenient increases the probability of
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the appeal being successful by around 6.6 percentage points. Furthermore, the first-stage has a KP
F-statistic value of 24, suggesting that we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments.22






Year-by-Month FE X X
Appeal FE X
Appeal X Postcode Sector FE X
Controls X X
KP F-stat 24.04 24.07
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Validity of Instrument
Conditional Independence. In order for inspector leniency to be a valid instrument, the assignment
of appeals to inspectors must not be correlated with variables which also affect the outcome variable
(housing prices). We aggregate the data by properties for all the past transactions that are within
1km of future appeals and run a balancing test.
Table 3.7 shows that past transaction characteristics of properties within 1km of an appeal are not
predictive of inspector leniency. All of the estimates are close to zero and all of them are statistically
insignificant at the 5% level. More importantly, the variables are not jointly significant with a
p-value of 0.246. This provides empirical support that conditional on the Planning Inspectorate’s
assignment rules, inspectors are randomly assigned to cases. The random assignment of inspectors
22The results presented in Table 3.6 include all controls. In Table C2, we show how the coefficient estimate changes
when we move from a specification with just the basic fixed effects to one where controls are added.
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(conditional on the Planning Inspectorate’s assignment criteria) gives us consistent estimates of the
reduced form effect of inspector leniency on housing prices. However, interpreting the IV estimates
as the causal effects of a successful appeal on housing prices requires two further assumptions.
Table 3.7: Balancing test
(1)
VARIABLES Inspector Leniency VARIABLES Inspector Leniency
ln(price) 0.002 Potential energy D -0.003
(0.003) (0.002)
ln(floor area) -0.001 Potential energy E -0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
3 rooms 0.000 Potential energy F -0.005
(0.001) (0.003)
4 rooms -0.000 Potential energy G -0.002
(0.002) (0.004)
5 rooms 0.001 Detached house -0.000
(0.002) (0.003)
6 rooms or more -0.000 Semi-detached house -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Current energy B -0.025 Flat 0.009
(0.025) (0.005)
Current energy C -0.029 Leasehold property -0.007
(0.025) (0.005)
Current energy D -0.029 Built before 2012 -0.002
(0.025) (0.004)
Current energy E -0.028 Neighbourhood density trend -0.000
(0.025) (0.000)
Current energy F -0.027
(0.025)
Current energy G -0.027 Observations 594,211
(0.025) Adjusted R-squared 0.004
Potential energy B -0.004* Time FE X
(0.002)
Potential energy C -0.005* F-stat for joint test 1.186
(0.002) p-value for joint test 0.246
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Exclusion. This restriction requires that inspector leniency affects housing prices (outcome
variable) only through its effect on whether an appeal is successful. Although there is no direct way
to test the exclusion restriction, the fact that inspectors are randomly assigned to cases lends support
to the exclusion restriction.
Monotonicity. If the causal effect of a successful appeal is constant across all cases, then the
instrument only needs to satisfy the exclusion assumption. However, with heterogeneous effects,
monotonicity must also be assumed. Monotonicity gives the IV estimate a local average treatment
effect interpretation – the average causal effect among the subgroup of cases that would have
received a different appeal decision had the case been assigned to a different inspector. In our
setting, the monotonicity assumption requires that appeals that are ruled successful by a strict
inspector would also be ruled successful by a lenient inspector.
One testable implication of the monotonicity assumption is that the first-stage estimates should
be non-negative for any subsample. To test this, we split the sample into subsamples based on (i)
geographic regions; (ii) year of appeal decision; and (iii) number of dwellings in the development.
Table 3.8 shows that for all of these subsamples bar one, the first-stage estimates are positive. For
the region, West Midlands (region 11 in Table 3.8), which accounts for 9% of appeals, the coefficient
is negative but not statistically significant. Excluding this region does not change our main results,
so we do not think this is strong evidence that the monotonicity assumption is violated.
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Table 3.8: Testing monotonicity assumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Success*Postappeal
Leniency*Postappeal 1.098*** 0.390 1.147*** 1.448** 0.966** 0.399 0.804**
(0.418) (0.416) (0.291) (0.673) (0.492) (0.273) (0.340)
Observations 102,782 136,421 236,083 21,726 99,084 268,379 156,215
KP F-stat 6.878 0.878 15.49 4.635 3.856 2.135 5.583
Region 1 2 3 4 5 8 9
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
VARIABLES Success*Postappeal
Leniency*Postappeal -0.660 0.528 1.049*** 0.368* 1.001*** 0.379**
(0.446) (0.447) (0.191) (0.189) (0.201) (0.184)
Observations 81,220 74,007 474,035 702,307 578,132 598,210
KP F-stat 2.188 1.394 30.14 3.793 24.75 4.250
Region 11 12
Decision year 2012-2015 2016-2018
No. of dwellings 10-25 >25
Notes: All regressions include time and appeal fixed effects as well as controls. Standard errors
clustered at outward code level. Notation for statistical significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.6 Results
Before presenting the DiD (OLS) and IV estimates formally, we show in Figure 3.5 top panel, the
conditional mean of the probability of a successful appeal by inspector leniency, and in the bottom
panel the conditional mean log price by inspector leniency. This allows us to visually inspect the
underlying variation in our data. The top panel is akin to a dynamic first-stage regression with
controls. The only difference is that for presentation purposes, we plot inspector leniency in terms
of being above or below the median. Similarly, the bottom panel is akin to a dynamic reduced-form
regression with controls. The top panel reveals that inspector leniency has a high predictive power as
to whether an appeal will be successful. The bottom panel shows us that prices of resale transactions
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do indeed diverge based on whether a lenient or strict inspector is assigned to a nearby appeal.
Figure 3.5: Conditional dynamic first-stage and reduced form by inspector leniency
Table 3.9 formally presents the DiD (OLS) and IV estimates of the effect of overturning the
local authority’s decision on housing prices. Columns 1 to 2 report OLS estimates with all the
controls. In the latter columns we also include appeal-by-postcode sector FE instead of appeals FE.
The OLS estimates suggest that a successful appeal has a small negative effect of around 1% on
housing prices (compared to an unsuccessful appeal). The 95% confidence interval is able to rule
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out an impact more negative than -1.8%. The rejection rate, of major developments, for all local
authorities in the UK was about 20% from 2012 to 2017. This suggests that local authorities were
rejecting only the most egregious developments. Hence, it is surprising that we can rule out a large
negative impact on prices in the neighborhood.
The IV estimates are presented in columns 3 and 4. They suggest that, instead of depressing
prices, overturning the local authorities’ decision actually increased the value of properties in the
neighborhood by around 6%. The coefficient is significant at the 10% level, and its 95% confidence
interval is able to reject an impact more negative than -0.5%. Similar to the OLS, we are not finding
that developments that are rejected have a large detrimental impact on the neighborhood.23
Table 3.9: Effect of overturning the Local Authority’s decision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV
VARIABLES ln(price)
Success*Postappeal -0.010** -0.010** 0.060* 0.062*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.033) (0.033)
Observations 1,177,861 1,177,683 1,176,342 1,176,164
R-squared 0.843 0.856 0.623 0.623
Time FE X X X X
Appeal FE X X
Appeal X Postcode sector FE X X
Controls X X X X
KP F-stat 24.04 24.07
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The 95% confidence intervals of the OLS and IV estimates overlap, so we cannot reject the null
that the IV and OLS are different. This is mostly because the IV estimates are not estimated very
23The results presented in Table 3.9 include all controls. In Tables C3 (OLS) and C4 (IV), we show how the coefficient
estimate changes when we move from a specification with just the basic fixed effects to one where controls are added.
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precisely. However, the direction of the estimates is different and the magnitude of the IV estimate
is a substantial positive number. We think this is due to the IV estimating a LATE instead of the
ATE. The OLS estimates tell us that the ATE of overturning local authorities’ decision is a small
negative impact on the neighborhood. But for a subsample of these projects, those that are quite
marginal and hence are very susceptible to the leniency of inspectors, the impact may be positive.
We interpret these results as suggestive of NIMBY-ism. First, the most egregious development in the
UK have, at most, a small negative impact if allowed. Second, a subsample of these projects may
actually benefit the local neighborhood, which suggests NIMBY-ers may be blocking any project
that would change their neighborhood.
To further support this interpretation, we look at comments lodged by residents close to the projects.
We randomly sample 68 projects in our sample (rejected projects) from London. For each project,
we randomly select a project near to it (within 1 to 2km) as a comparison that was accepted by the
local authority.24 The mean number of comments lodged for rejected projects is 3.07 as compared to
0.72 for accepted projects (p-value of 0.0375). To the extent that comments are used to discourage
projects, this is evidence for NIMBY-ism.
3.6.1 Heterogeneous effects
We attempt to decompose the impact by distance from the appeal site. Columns 1 and 3 of Table
3.10 show the estimated impact when we restrict the sample to properties within 500m of the
appeal site, while Columns 2 and 4 of Table 3.10 show the estimated impact when we restrict the
sample to properties 500m to 1km from the appeal site. Both the OLS and IV results suggest little
heterogeneity in the impact by distance from the appeal site.25
24We did not look at projects within 1km of an appeal site because it may be affected by the appeal.
25The results presented in Table 3.10 include all controls. In Tables C5 (500m sample) and C6 (500m to 1km sample),
we show how the coefficient estimate changes when we move from a specification with just the basic fixed effects to
one where controls are added.
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Table 3.10: Effect by distance from appeal site
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV
VARIABLES ln(price)
Success*Postappeal -0.009** -0.010** 0.051 0.073*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.031) (0.038)
Observations 360,933 816,622 360,563 815,474
R-squared 0.857 0.861 0.615 0.619
Time FE X X X X
Appeal X Postcode sector FE X X X X
Controls X X X X
Sample <500m 500m to 1km <500m 500m to 1km
KP F-stat 28.96 19.85
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.11 explores heterogeneity by the supply shock from a successful appeal. We define the
supply shock as the number of new dwellings that would be introduced by the appeal, divided by
the total number of dwellings within 1km of the appeal site, in the year prior to the appeal decision.
Small and large shocks are categorized based on whether they were below or above the median
magnitude of supply shocks. For the OLS, there was no significant heterogeneity by the size of
the supply shocks. For the IV, small supply shocks have a greater positive impact on prices in the
neighborhood than larger supply shocks. This is consistent with a simple demand and supply model,
as a smaller supply shock suggests a small movement along the demand curve. However, a positive
impact also suggests a shift in the demand curve. This could be because the new developments also
bring in new or better amenities to the neighborhood. In the case of developments with a small
supply shock, the demand shifters overwhelmed the supply shock; while for larger developments
the two seem to cancel out. This interpretation is for the IV and hence applies only to marginal
developments (LATE). Also, the 95% confidence intervals of the two samples overlap, so we cannot
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reject the null of no differences.26
Table 3.11: Effect by supply shock
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV
VARIABLES ln(price)
Success*Postappeal -0.009* -0.007 0.070** -0.011
(0.005) (0.005) (0.035) (0.083)
Observations 913,192 264,491 912,619 263,545
R-squared 0.860 0.831 0.618 0.646
Time FE X X X X
Appeal X Postcode sector FE X X X X
Controls X X X X
Sample Small shock Large shock Small shock Large shock
KP F-stat 24.70 1.838
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.6.2 Mechanisms
One limitation of the data is that we only observe transaction prices. However, the outcome of
an appeal may affect the choice to buy or sell a nearby property (selection into transaction). For
instance, richer households in the neighborhood, who have the finances to move quickly, may
choose to sell after a successful appeal as they anticipate that the new supply would depress the
value of their housing asset. If these properties are also more valuable (e.g., bigger and more
luxurious), then our IV result of a price increase from a successful appeal might be due to this
selection into transaction.27 We check if this is an issue by regressing some characteristics of the
26The results presented in Table 3.11 include all controls. In Tables C7 (small shock) and C8 (large shock), we show
how the coefficient estimate changes when we move from a specification with just the basic fixed effects to one where
controls are added.
27We do control for factors related to the characteristics of transacted properties in all our regressions. However,
if characteristics are endogenous to appeal decisions then they should be outcome variables instead of controls (bad
controls problem).
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transacted properties on the treatment variable (Successi ∗ Postappealt). If there is selection into
transaction, then we should expect the types of properties being transacted to be different between
neighborhoods with successful and unsuccessful appeals.
Table 3.12 summarizes our findings on three property characteristics: (i) floor area; (ii) number of
rooms; and (iii) energy rating (a higher rating is more energy efficient). The first two measures
size and the third is a proxy for the type of materials used in the property.28 Both the OLS and
the IV regressions cannot reject the null that there are no differences in transacted properties near
successful versus unsuccessful appeals. We interpret this as evidence that selection into transaction
is not a major driver of our main results above.
Table 3.12: Possible mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV
VARIABLES ln(Area) No. rooms Energy rating ln(Area) No. rooms Energy rating
Success*Postappeal 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.012 -0.032 0.029
(0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.013) (0.059) (0.032)
Observations 1,213,468 1,177,683 1,177,683 1,211,946 1,176,164 1,176,164
R-squared 0.417 0.395 0.479 0.287 0.261 0.400
Time FE X X X X X X
Appeal X Post sect. FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
KP F-stat 24.19 24.07 24.07
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Is there evidence of demand shifters? To answer this, we collect annual point-of-interest (POI)
data by location and test if successful appeals led to higher counts of these points. We categorize
28This is an imperfect measure of “quality” because there may be luxurious building materials that are not energy
efficient, and rich households may be willing to pay higher heating costs to maintain them. We recognize this and are
simply interested to test if the materials used are different as opposed to better.
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POIs into 3 categories, summarized in Table 3.13. These categories reflect the possible amenities
that major developments could introduce: (i) integrated developments often include commercial
spaces for local businesses; (ii) population growth in an area may attract more businesses; and (iii)
developers may be asked to contribute to local infrastructure by building them or via a tax.
Table 3.13: POI Categories
Category POIs included
Local services Accommodation, Eating and Drinking, Retail
Local economy Commercial services, Manufacturing and Production
Local infrastructure Education and Health, Public Infrastructure, Transport
We use the count of POIs in each category as an outcome variable and study if there were more
POIs within 1km of a successful appeal site (Table 3.14). Our results are noisy and we cannot
make strong conclusions.29 However, there is suggestive evidence that the count of local services
increased after successful appeals (IV regression significant at 10% level).
Table 3.14: Possible demand shifters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV
VARIABLES Local serv. Local econ. Local infra. Local serv. Local econ. Local infra.
Success*Postappeal -0.399 1.537 0.220 11.419* 6.340 -0.639
(0.643) (1.104) (0.871) (6.743) (7.113) (9.057)
Observations 18,654 18,654 18,654 18,624 18,624 18,624
R-squared 0.995 0.994 0.991 -0.046 -0.002 -0.000
Time FE X X X X X X
Appeal FE X X X X X X
KP F-stat 27.76 27.76 27.76
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
If we disaggregate local services (Table 3.15), we see that the increase is coming from retail
shops. This is evidence that the positive impact from marginal appeals (LATE), may be driven by
29This is due to the high annual turnover in POIs: businesses open and shut down, bus stops are added etc.
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an improvement in local amenities which increased demand for the neighborhood.
Table 3.15: Demand shifters within local services
(1) (2)
IV





Time FE X X
Appeal FE X X
KP F-stat 27.76 27.76
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robustness Checks
Next, we subject our results to a series of robustness checks. First, we show that our results are
robust to controlling for location specific linear year trends as well as clustering our standard errors
at the appeal and distance level. Table 3.16 shows the results for three levels of clustering: (i)
appeal-by-postcode sector neighborhood; (ii) postcode sector; (i) 1km grids. The 1km grids are
arbitrarily created grids of 1km by 1km across the whole of the UK. Inference on the OLS does not
change much across these different clusters. The standard errors for the IV are noisier under the
appeals neighborhood cluster (column 4), and we can no longer reject a null of zero effect at the
10% level. However, the 95% confidence interval still allows us to reject an impact more negative
than -1.7%. Therefore, our original inference of no big negative impact still stands. Other methods
of clustering help improve precision and allow us to reject a null of zero impact.
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Table 3.16: Robustness to different clustering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV
VARIABLES ln(price)
Success*Postappeal -0.010** -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.062 0.062** 0.062***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.039) (0.025) (0.022)
Observations 1,177,683 1,177,683 1,177,683 1,176,164 1,176,164 1,176,164
R-squared 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.623 0.623 0.623
Time FE X X X X X X
Appeal X Post sect. FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Clusters Appeal-Post sect. Post sect. 1km grids Appeal-Post sect. Post sect. 1km grids
KP F-stat 18.65 42.77 60.39
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In Table 3.17 we check whether our results are robust to different appeal neighborhood and
appeal-by-postcode sector specific time trends. The trends we include are estimated off a similar
variation as our treatment variable Successi ∗ Postappealt and we should hence expect our
coefficients of interests to attenuate towards zero. This is indeed what happens and none of
the estimates can reject a null of zero impact. However, the 95% confidence intervals allow us to
reject a null of an impact more negative than -1% (OLS) and -1.9% (IV).
Finally, we trim off the top and bottom values in our instrument (inspector leniency), to check if our
IV results are sensitive to outlier values (Table 3.18). After trimming 1% of extreme values (column
1), the IV estimates remain positive, at 7.2%, and are now significantly different from zero at the 5%
level. Trimming 5% of extreme values causes the estimate to remain positive but attenuate towards
zero.
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Table 3.17: Robustness to different trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV
VARIABLES ln(price)
Success*Postappeal -0.004 -0.004 0.026 0.028
(0.003) (0.003) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 1,177,861 1,177,683 1,176,342 1,176,164
R-squared 0.846 0.860 0.629 0.631
Time FE X X X X
Appeal FE X X
Appeal trends X X
Appeal X Postcode sector FE X X
Appeal X Postcode sector trends X X
Controls X X X X
KP F-stat 26.66 26.58
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1







Time FE X X
Appeal X Sector code FE X X
Trim 1% 5%
KP F-stat 25.21 17.93
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the impact of overturning local authorities’ rejection of major residential
developments in the UK. Only 20% of developments are rejected, so we understand this sample of
projects to be the ones with the most deleterious impact on local neighborhoods. Using property
transaction prices as a measure of property value, we are able to rule out a large negative impact
of these projects. For some projects, the impact may in fact be positive because they also add to
local amenities such as retail shops. This suggests a prevalence of NIMBY-ism, as locals pressure
authorities to reject even relatively benign projects. We show that there are more resident comments
on rejected projects viz-a-viz accepted projects, which is evidence of NIMBY-ism.
136
References
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. A. (2001). The Colonial Origins of Comparative
Development: An Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review, 91(5):1369–1401.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. A. (2005). The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade,
Institutional Change and Economic Growth. American Economic Review, 95(3):546–579.
Aizer, A. and Doyle Jr, J. J. (2015). Juvenile incarceration, human capital, and future crime:
Evidence from randomly assigned judges. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(2):759–803.
Akai, N. and Sakata, M. (2002). Fiscal decentralization contributes to economic growth: evidence
from state-level cross-section data for the united states. Journal of Urban Economics, 52(1):93–
108.
Albouy, D. and Ehrlich, G. (2018). Housing productivity and the social cost of land-use restrictions.
Journal of Urban Economics, 107:101–120.
Alesina, A., Giuliano, P., and Nunn, N. (2013). On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women and the
Plough. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(2):155–194.
Alfaro, L., Antras, P., Chor, D., and Conconi, P. (2019). Internalizing Global Value Chains: A
Firm-Level Analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 127(2):508–559.
Allen, T. and Donaldson, D. (2020). Persistence and Path Dependence in the Spatial Economy.
Working Paper.
Angelucci, C., Meraglia, S., and Voigtländer., N. (2020). How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments:
137
From the Norman Conquest of England to the Great Reform Act. Working Paper.
Angrist, J., Imbens, G., and Rubin, D. (1996). Identification of Causal Effects Using Instrumental
Variables. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 91(434):444–455.
Antras, P. and Chor, D. (2013). Organizing the Global Value Chain. Econometrica, 81(6):2127–
2204.
Atkin, D., Chen, K., and Popov, A. (2019). The Returns to Face-to-Face Interactions: Knowledge
Spillovers in Silicon Valley. Working Paper.
Au, C.-C. and Henderson, J. V. (2006). Are Chinese cities too small? The Review of Economic
Studies, 73(3):549–576.
Autor, D. H., Palmer, C. J., and Pathak, P. A. (2014). Housing market spillovers: Evidence from the
end of rent control in cambridge, massachusetts. Journal of Political Economy, 122(3):661–717.
Banerjee, A. and Iyer, L. (2005). History, Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of
Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India. American Economic Review, 95(4):1190–1213.
Basu, K. (2000). Prelude to Political Economy: A Study of the Social and Political Foundations of
Economics. Oxford University Press: New York:.
Baum-Snow, N. (2007). Did highways cause suburbanization? Quarterly Journal of Economics,
122(2):775–805.
Baum-Snow, N. and Marion, J. (2009). The effects of low income housing tax credit developments
on neighborhoods. Journal of Public Economics, 93(5-6):654–666.
Bazzi, S., Fiszbein, M., and Gebresilasse, M. (2020). Frontier Culture: The Roots and Persistence
138
of “Rugged Individualism. Econometrica, 88(6):2329–2368.
Beck, T. (2003). Financial dependence and international trade. Review of International Economics,
11:296–316.
Bhuller, M., Dahl, G. B., Løken, K. V., and Mogstad, M. (2020). Incarceration, recidivism, and
employment. Journal of Political Economy, 128(4):1269–1324.
Bleakley, H. and Lin, J. (2012). Portage and path dependence. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
127(2):587–644.
Boehm, J. (2020). The Impact of Contract Enforcement Costs on Value Chains and Aggregate
Productivity. Review of Economics and Statistics.
Boehm, J. and Oberfield, E. (2020). Misallocation in the Market for Inputs: Enforcement and the
Organization of Production. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135(4):2007–2058.
Calabrese, S., Epple, D., and Romano, R. (2007). On the political economy of zoning. Journal of
Public Economics, 91(1-2):25–49.
Cheshire, P., Nathan, M., and Overman, H. (2014). Urban Economics and Urban Policy.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Cheshire, P. and Sheppard, S. (2002). The welfare economics of land use planning. Journal of
Urban Economics, 52(2):242–269.
Chor, D. (2010). Unpacking sources of comparative advantage: a quantitative approach. Journal of
International Economics, 82(2):152–167.
Collins, W. J. and Shester, K. L. (2013). Slum clearance and urban renewal in the United States.
139
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(1):239–73.
Collinson, R. and Ganong, P. (2018). How do changes in housing voucher design affect rent and
neighborhood quality? American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 10(2):62–89.
Cooter, R. D. (1998). Expressive Law and Economics. Journal of Legal Studies, 27(S2):585–608.
Corkindale, J. (1999). Land Development in the United Kingdom: Private Property Rights and
Public Policy Objectives. Environment and Planning A, 31:2053–2070.
Costa, D. L. and Kahn, M. E. (2000). Power Couples: Changes in the Locational Choice of the
College Educated, 1940–1990. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4):1287–1315.
Costinot, A. (2009). On the origins of comparative advantage. Journal of International Economics,
77(2):255–264.
Couture, V., Gaubert, C., Handbury, J., and Hurst, E. (2020). Income Growth and the Distributional
Effects of Urban Spatial Sorting. Working Paper.
Cunat, A. and Melitz, M. J. (2012). Volatility, labor market flexibility, and the pattern of comparative
advantage. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(2):225–254.
Dahl, G. B., Kostøl, A. R., and Mogstad, M. (2014). Family welfare cultures. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 129(4):1711–1752.
Dale, T. C. (1931). The Inhabitants of London in 1638. Society of Genealogists: London.
Dauth, W., Findeisen, S., Moretti, E., and Suedekum, J. (2018). Matching in Cities. NBER Working
Paper No. 25227.
140
Davis, D. R. and Dingel, J. I. (2020). The comparative advantage of cities. Journal of International
Economics, 123:1–27.
Davis, D. R., Dingel, J. I., Monras, J., and Morales, E. (2019). How Segregated Is Urban
Consumption? Journal of Political Economy, 127(4):1684–1738.
Davis, D. R. and Weinstein, D. E. (2002). Bones, Bombs, and Break Points: The Geography of
Economic Activity. American Economic Review, 95(2):1269–1289.
Davoodi, H. and Zou, H.-f. (1998). Fiscal decentralization and economic growth: A cross-country
study. Journal of Urban economics, 43(2):244–257.
Dell, M. (2010). The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining MITA. Econometrica, 78(6):1863–1903.
Dell, M. and Olken, B. A. (2020). The Development Effects of the Extractive Colonial Economy:
The Dutch Cultivation System in Java. Review of Economic Studies, 87(1):164–203.
Diamond, R. (2016). The Determinants and Welfare Implications of US Workers’ Diverging
Location Choices by Skill: 1980-2000. American Economic Review, 106(3):479–524.
Diamond, R. and McQuade, T. (2018). Who Wants Affordable Housing in their Backyard? An
Equilibrium Analysis of Low Income Property Development. Journal of Political Economy.
Diamond, R., Mcquade, T., and Qian, F. (2019). The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on
Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco. American Economic Review,
109(9):3365–3394.
Djankov, S., Porta, R. L., Lopezde-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (2003). Courts. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 118(2):453–517.
141
Dobbie, W., Goldin, J., and Yang, C. (2018). The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction,
Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges. American
Economic Review, 108(2):201–240.
Donaldson, D. (2018). Railroads of the Raj: Estimating the Impact of Transportation Infrastructure.
American Economic Review, 108(4-5):899–934.
Donaldson, D. and Hornbeck, R. (2016). Railroads and American Economic Growth: A Market
Access Approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(2):799–858.
Doyle, J. J. J. (2008). Child protection and adult crime: Using investigator assignment to estimate
causal effects of foster care. Journal of political Economy, 116(4):746–770.
Duranton, G. and Puga, D. (2004). Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Vol 4, chapter
Micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies, pages 2063–2117. North-Holland:
Amsterdam.
Duranton, G. and Puga, D. (2012). Urban Growth and Transportation. Review of Economic Studies,
79(4):1407–1440.
Eckert, F., Gvirtz, A., Liang, J., and Peters, M. (2020). A Method to Construct Geographical
Crosswalks with an Application to US Counties since 1790. NBER Working Paper 26770.
Ellison, G. and Glaeser, E. L. (1999). The geographic concentration of industry: Does natural
advantage explain agglomeration? American Economic Review, 89(2):311–316.
Ellison, G., Glaeser, E. L., and Kerr, W. R. (2010). What Causes Industry Agglomeration? Evidence
from Coagglomeration Patterns. American Economic Review, 100(3):1195–1213.
Engerman, S. L. and Sokoloff, K. L. (1997). How Latin America Fell Behind, chapter Factor
142
Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World. Stanford
University Press: Stanford.
Epple, D., Romer, T., and Filimon, R. (1988). Community development with endogenous land use
controls. Journal of Public Economics, 35(2):133–162.
Faber, B. (2014). Integration and the Periphery: The Unintended Effects of New Highways in a
Developing Country. Review of Economic Studies, 81(3):1046–1070.
Field, J. (2008). Reactions and responses to the Great Fire: London and England in the later
seventeenth century. PhD thesis, School of Historical Studies, Newcastle University.
Field, J. (2018). London, Londoners and the Great Fire of 1666 – Disaster and Recovery.
Routledge: New Jersey.
Fischer, D. H. (1989). Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America. Oxford University Press:
New York.
Fuchs, V. (1962). Changes in the Location of Manufacturing in the U.S. Since 1929. Yale
University Press: New Haven.
Fujita, M. and Thisse, J.-F. (2002). Economics of Agglomeration: Cities, Industrial Location, and
Regional Growth. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Galasso, A. and Schankerman, M. (2015). Patents and cumulative innovation: Causal evidence
from the courts. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(1):317–369.
Garrioch, D. (2016). 1666 and London’s Fire History: A Re-Evaluation. The Historical Journal,
59(2):319–338.
143
Gaubert, C. (2018). Firm Sorting and Agglomeration. American Economic Review, 108(11):3117–
3153.
Glaeser, E. L., Gyourko, J., and Saks, R. E. (2005). Why have housing prices gone up? American
Economic Review, 95(2):329–333.
Gorodnichenko, Y. and Roland, G. (2017). Culture, Institutions, and the Wealth of Nations. Review
of Economics and Statistics, 99(3):402–416.
Greenstone, M. and Gallagher, J. (2008). Does hazardous waste matter? Evidence from the housing
market and the superfund program. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(3):951–1003.
Greenstone, M., Hornbeck, R., and Moretti, E. (2010). Identifying Agglomeration Spillovers:
Evidence from Winners and Losers of Large Plant Openings. Journal of Political Economy,
118(3):536–598.
Greif, A. (1994). Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical
Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies. Journal of Political Economy, 102(5):912–
950.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L. (2016). Long-Term Persistence. Journal of the European
Economic Association, 14(6):1401–1436.
Gyourko, J. and Molloy, R. (2015). Regulation and Housing Supply, volume 5. Elsevier B.V., 1
edition.
Hadfield, G. K. and Weingast, B. R. (2012). What Is Law? A Coordination Model of the
Characteristics of Legal Order. Journal of Legal Analysis, 4(2):471–514.
Hamilton, B. W. (1975). Zoning and property taxation in a system of local governments. Urban
144
studies, 12(2):205–211.
Hanson, G. and Slaughter, M. J. (2002). Labor-market adjustment in open economies: Evidence
from U.S. states. Journal of International Economics, 57(1):3–29.
Head, K. and Mayer, T. (2013). Handbook of International Economics. Vol. 4, chapter Gravity
equations: Workhorse, toolkit, and cookbook, pages 131–195. North-Holland: Amsterdam.
Heblich, S., Redding, S. J., and Sturm, D. M. (2020). The Making of the Modern Metropolis:
Evidence from London. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135(4):2059–2133.
Heckman, J. and Vytlacil, E. (2005). Structural Equations, Treatment Effects, and Econometric
Policy Evaluation. Econometrica, 73(3):669–738.
Henderson, J. V. (2003). Marshall’s scale economies. Journal of Urban Economics, 53(1):1–28.
Hilber, C. A. and Robert-Nicoud, F. (2013). On the origins of land use regulations: Theory and
evidence from US metro areas. Journal of Urban Economics, 75(1):29–43.
Hilber, C. A. and Vermeulen, W. (2016). The Impact of Supply Constraints on House Prices in
England. Economic Journal, 126(591):358–405.
Holmes, T. J. (1999). Localization of industry and vertical disintegration. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 81(2):314–325.
Hornbeck, R. (2010). Barbed wire: Property rights and agricultural development. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 125(2):767–810.
Hornbeck, R. and Keniston, D. (2017). Creative Destruction: Barriers to Urban Growth and the
Great Boston Fire of 1872. American Economic Review, 107(6):1365–1398.
145
Hornbeck, R. and Naidu, S. (2014). When the Levee Breaks: Black Migration and Economic
Development in the American South. American Economic Review, 104(3):963–990.
Hornbeck, R. and Rotemberg, M. (2019). Railroads, Reallocation, and the Rise of American
Manufacturing. Working Paper.
Hsieh, C. T. and Moretti, E. (2019). Housing constraints and spatial misallocation. American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 11(2):1–39.
Humphries, J. E., Mader, N., Tannenbaum, D., and Dijk, W. V. (2018). Does eviction cause poverty?
Quasi-experimental evidence from Cook County , IL. Working Paper.
Jedwab, R., Johnson, N. D., and Koyama, M. (2019). Pandemics, Places, and Populations: Evidence
from the Black Death. Working Paper.
Jedwab, R. and Moradi, A. (2016). The Permanent Effects of Transportation Revolutions in Poor
Countries: Evidence from Africa. Review of Economics and Statistics, 98(2):268–284.
Jha, S. (2015). Financial Asset Holdings and Political Attitudes: Evidence from Revolutionary
England. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(3):1485–1545.
Jones, P. E. (1966). The Fire Court: Calendar to the Judgments and Decrees of the Court of
Judicature Appointed to Determine Differences between Landlords and Tenants as to Rebuilding
after the Great Fire, Volume I. The Corporation of London: London.
Jones, P. E. (1970). The Fire Court: Calendar to the Judgments and Decrees of the Court of
Judicature Appointed to Determine Differences between Landlords and Tenants as to Rebuilding
after the Great Fire, Volume II. The Corporation of London: London.
Kim, S. (1995). Expansion of markets and the geographic distribution of economic activities: The
146
trends in U.S. regional manufacturing structure, 1860–1987. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
110:881–908.
Kline, P. and Moretti, E. (2013). Local Economic Development, Agglomeration Economies, and
the Big Push: 100 Years of Evidence from the Tennessee Valley Authority. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 129(1):275–331.
Kline, P. and Moretti, E. (2014). People, Places, and Public Policy: Some Simple Welfare Economics
of Local Economic Development Programs. Annual Review of Economics, 6:629–662.
Kostøl, A., Mogstad, M., Setzler, B., et al. (2019). Disability benefits, consumption insurance, and
household labor supply. American Economic Review, 109(7):2613–54.
Krugman, P. (1991). History Versus Expectations. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2):651–
667.
La Porta, R., de Silanes, F. L., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1997). Legal Determinants of External
Finance. Journal of Finance, 52:1131–1150.
La Porta, R., de Silanes, F. L., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1998). Law and Finance. Journal of
Political Economy, 106:1113–1155.
Levchenko, A. A. (2007). Institutional quality and international trade. Review of Economic Studies,
74(3):791–819.
Libecap, G. D. and Lueck, D. (2011). The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating
Institutions. Journal of Political Economy, 119(3):426–467.
Manova, K. (2008). Credit constraints, equity market liberalizations and international trade. Journal
of International Economics, 76(1):33–47.
147
Manova, K. (2013). Credit constraints, heterogeneous firms, and international trade. Review of
Economic Studies, 80(2):711–744.
Marshall, A. (1890). Principles of Economics. Macmillan: London.
McAdams, R. H. (2000). A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law. Virginia Law Review, 86:1649–
1729.
McAdams, R. H. (2005). The Expressive Power of Adjudication. University of Illinois Law Review,
5:1043–1121.
Melitz, M. J. (2003). The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry
Productivity. Econometrica, 71(6):1695–1725.
Mendez-Chacon, E. and Patten, D. V. (2020). Multinationals, Monopsony and Local Development:
Evidence from the United Fruit Company. Working Paper.
Michaels, G. (2008). The Effect of Trade on the Demand for Skill: Evidence from the Interstate
Highway System. Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(4):683–701.
Michaels, G. and Rauch, F. (2018). Resetting the Urban Network: 117-2012. Economic Journal,
128:378–412.
Michalopoulos, S. and Pappaioannou, E. (2016). The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa.
American Economic Review, 106(7):1802–1848.
Miguel, E. and Roland, G. (2011). The Long–Run Impact of Bombing Vietnam. Journal of
Development Economics, 96(1):1–15.
Moretti, E. (2004). Workers’ Education, Spillovers, and Productivity: Evidence from Plant-Level
148
Production Functions. American Economic Review, 94(3):656–690.
Myerson, R. B. (2004). Justice, Institutions, and Multiple Equilibria. Chicago Journal of
International Law, 5(1):91–107.
Nash, J. F. J. (1950). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 18(2):155–162.
North, D. C. and Thomas, R. P. (1973). The Rise of the Western World. Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge.
North, D. C. and Weingast, B. R. (1989). Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England. The Journal of Economic
History, 49(4):803–832.
Nunn, N. (2007a). Historical Legacies: A Model Linking Africa’s Past to its Current
Underdevelopment. Journal of Development Economics, 83(1):157–175.
Nunn, N. (2007b). Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts and the Pattern of Trade.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2):569–600.
Nunn, N. (2008). The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
123(1):139–176.
Nunn, N. and Trefler, D. (2014). Handbook of International Economics Vol. 4., chapter Domestic
Institutions as a Source of Comparative Advantage, pages 263–315. North-Holland: Amsterdam.
Nunn, N. and Wantchekon, L. (2011). The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa.
American Economic Review, 101(7):3221–3252.
Ortalo-Magné, F. and Prat, A. (2014). On the political economy of urban growth: Homeownership
149
versus affordability. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(1 D):154–181.
Ottinger, S. (2020). Immigrants, Industries and Path Dependence. Working Paper.
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004).
Parkhomenko, A. (2020). Local Causes and Aggregate Implications of Land Use Regulation.
Working Paper.
Pike, A., Rodríguez-Pose, A., Tomaney, J., Torrisi, G., and Tselios, V. (2012). In search
of the ‘economic dividend’ of devolution: spatial disparities, spatial economic policy, and
decentralisation in the uk. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 30(1):10–28.
Porter, R., Gannett, H., and Hunt, W. (1890). Progress of the Nation, including the Map of the
Population of 1870. Report on Population of the United States at the Eleventh Census, pages
13–30.
Porter, S. (1996). The Great Fire of London. Sutton Publishing: Gloucestershire.
Quigley, J. M. and Raphael, S. (2005). Regulation and the high cost of housing in California.
American Economic Review, 95(2):323–328.
Rappaport, J. and Sachs, J. D. (2003). The United States as a Coastal Nation. Journal of Economic
Growth, 8(1):5–46.
Rauch, J. E. (1993). Does History Matter Only When It Matters Little? The Case of City-Industry
Location. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3):843–867.
Rauch, J. E. (1999). Networks versus Markets in International Trade. Journal of International
Economics, 48(1):7–35.
150
Reddaway, T. F. (1940). The Rebuilding of London after the Great Fire. Jonathan Cape: London.
Redding, S., Sturm, D., and Wolf, N. (2011). History and Industry Location: Evidence from German
Airports. Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(3):814–831.
Richardson, J. (2001). The Annals of London: A Year-by-year Record of a Thousand Years of
History. Cassell: London.
Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Bwire, A. (2004). The economic (in) efficiency of devolution. Environment
and Planning A, 36(11):1907–1928.
Rossi-Hansberg, E., Sarte, P.-D., and Owens III, R. (2010). Housing Externalities Pierre-Daniel
Sarte and Raymond Owens III. The Journal of Poitical Economy, 118(3):1–8.
Sainty, J. (1993). The Judges of England 1272-1990: A List of Judges of the Superior Courts. The
Selden Society: London.
Saiz, A. (2010). The Geographic Determinants of Housing Supply. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
125(3):1253–1296.
Santos Silva, J. and Tenreyro, S. (2006). The log of gravity. Review of Economics and Statistics,
88(4):641–658.
Satchell, M., Kitson, P., Newton, G., Shaw-Taylor, L., and Wrigley., T. (2018).
1851 England and Wales census parishes, townships and places [Data Collection]. UK Data
Archive: Colchester, Essex.
Sequeira, S., Nunn, N., and Qian, N. (2020). Immigrants and the Making of America. Review of
Economic Studies, 87(1):382–419.
151
Shertzer, A., Twinam, T., and Walsh, R. P. (2018). Zoning and the economic geography of cities.
Journal of Urban Economics, 105:20–39.
Siodla, J. (2015). Razing San Francisco: The 1906 Disaster as a Natural Experiment in Urban
Redevelopment. Journal of Urban Economics, 89:48–61.
Stansel, D. (2005). Local decentralization and local economic growth: A cross-sectional examination
of US metropolitan areas. Journal of Urban Economics, 57(1):55–72.
Tabellini, G. (2010). Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe.
Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(4):677–716.
The London Gazette (1666). https://www.bl.uk/learning/timeline/item103652.html.
Tian, L. (2019). Division of Labor and Productivity Advantage of Cities: Theory and Evidence
from Brazil. Working Paper.
Tidmarsh, J. (2016). The English Fire Courts and the American Right to Civil Jury Trial. University
of Chicago Law Review, 83(4):1893–1941.
Turner, F. J. (1893). The Significance of the Frontier in American History. Proceedings of the State
Historical Society of Wisconsin.
Turner, M., Haughwout, A., and van der Klaauw, W. (2014). Land Use Regulation and Welfare.
Econometrica, 82(4):1341–1403.
Weber, M. (1930). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Routledge: London.
Xie, D., Zou, H.-f., and Davoodi, H. (1999). Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in the
United States. Journal of Urban economics, 45(2):228–239.
152
Zerbe, R. O. and Anderson, C. L. (2001). Culture and Fairness in the Development of Institutions
in the California Gold Fields. Journal of Economic History, 61(1):114–143.
Zhang, T. and Zou, H.-f. (1998). Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and economic growth in
China. Journal of public economics, 67(2):221–240.
153
Appendix A: Appendix to Great Expectations: Urban Development in 17th
Century London
A.1 The effect of the Fire on quantity
First, did the Fire result in fewer properties being rebuilt? To answer this, we run a difference-in-
differences regression where we collapse the data to the parish-level:
ln (Propertiesjt) = αj + δPostF iret + βBurnedj × PostF iret + γ′Xjt + εjt
ln (Propertiesjt) is the log number of properties in parish j in period t. The two periods are
before the Fire and after the Fire. Burnedj is an indicator variable that denotes whether the parish
experienced damage from the Fire. PostF iret is an indicator variable for the period after the Fire.
Xjt is a vector of controls. These include the number of properties in the parish before the Fire, the
share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors living in the parish. These variables are
interacted with post-Fire. Broader locations-by-post fixed effects are also included to control for
geographical characteristics. Finally, αj are parish fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at
the parish-level.
Table A.1 presents the results of this regression. The coefficient estimates of β are negative.
This is expected as the plague wiped out about a quarter of London’s population so we should
expect fewer properties to be rebuilt in the immediate aftermath since there are now fewer people to
house. The results in column 4 suggest that burned parishes saw a highly statistically significant
decrease of around 67.6% properties as compared to unburned parishes. In addition, the reduction
in the number of properties is consistent with post-Fire regulations that stipulated that properties
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needed to be of a certain minimum size.
Table A.1: Effect of Fire on the number of properties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. Properties)
Parish Burned X Post Fire -1.059*** -1.256*** -0.790*** -0.676**
(0.240) (0.267) (0.283) (0.258)
Observations 140 140 140 140
R-squared 0.205 0.354 0.429 0.460
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 70 70 70 70
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Second, did the total number of hearths in the parishes decline after the rebuilding? To answer
this, we again run a difference-in-differences regression where we collapse the data to the parish-
level:
ln (Hearthsjt) = αj + δPostF iret + βBurnedj × PostF iret + γ′Xjt + εjt
ln (Hearthsjt) is the log number of hearths in parish j in period t. The other variables are the same
as previously defined and the standard errors are clustered at the parish-level. Table A.2 presents the
results from this regression. The results are similar to what happens to the total number of properties
being rebuilt after the Fire (Table A.1). In particular, the coefficient estimates are negative.
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Table A.2: Effect of Fire on the number of hearths
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. Hearths)
Parish Burned X Post Fire -0.866*** -1.043*** -0.643** -0.518*
(0.232) (0.251) (0.293) (0.271)
Observations 140 140 140 140
R-squared 0.147 0.324 0.387 0.427
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 70 70 70 70
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
A.2 Discussion about Jensen’s inequality
Running a regression with a log transformed dependent variable could result in an opposite treatment
effect as compared to if we were to run the regression without taking logs. To see this, consider
the following stylized example in Table A.3. In this example, the average number of hearths per
property and the total number of hearths are higher in parish 2 than in parish 1. However, if we ran
a regression using the log of each property’s hearths on a parish dummy, we will find that parish 2
on average has fewer log hearths per property.1
1We would like to thank David Weinstein for providing us with this stylized example.
156










Parish Average 18 2.51
This stylized example shows the possibility that this could happen but it does not mean that this
would definitely happen for other values. Therefore, what we do is to replicate this stylized example
using the actual data that we have. In particular, we collapse the data into two groups – burned
and unburned parishes. We then compare the differences of the averages (in both logs and without
logs) across the burned and unburned groups in the pre- and post-Fire periods. Table A.4 reports
the averages from this exercise. It shows us that both a regression without logs and a regression
with logs will give us a positive effect. In particular, for the regression without logs we will get a
difference-in-differences effect of: (6.07− 4.70)− (4.74− 4.41) = 1.04. In the regression with
logs we get: (1.80− 1.55)− (1.56− 1.48) = 0.17. Fortunately, the reversal of signs issue does not
happen when we use the actual data.
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Table A.4: Stylized example using actual data
Unburned




Post-Fire Parish Average: Hearths Parish Average: ln(Hearths)
0 4.70 1.55
1 6.07 1.80
The second approach would be to directly run the quality regression without taking logs on the
left hand-side variable. This guarantees that the regression will not suffer from Jensen’s inequality
issues but it comes at the expense of failing the parallel trends assumption and the results being
potentially driven by the skewed data. Nevertheless, Table A.5 shows that the estimated coefficient
from this regression is positive. Since both the regressions in logs and without logs give us positive
coefficient estimates, this should allay the worry that the estimated effect could have different signs
when we take logs versus when we do not take logs.
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Table A.5: Effect of Fire on the number of hearths per property (no logs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES No. Hearths per Property
Parish Burned X Post Fire 0.614 0.569 0.407 0.524
(0.371) (0.399) (0.497) (0.468)
Observations 79,730 79,730 79,730 79,730
R-squared 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 70 70 70 70
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.3 Additional figures and tables
Figure A.1: Case characteristics over time
Figure A1.1: Years left in tenancy Figure A1.2: Pre-Fire rent
Figure A1.3: Pre-Fire fine Figure A1.4: Pre-Fire improvements
Figure A1.5: Degrees from owner Figure A1.6: Number of parishes
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Figure A.2: Binscatter – Effect of Fire on the number of hearths per property (All controls)
Figure A.3: Binscatter – Effect of legal rulings on the number of hearths per property (All controls)
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Figure A.4: Binscatter of the first-stage (All controls)
Figure A.5: Binscatter of the reduced-form (All controls)
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Table A.6: Share of properties in each parish that went to the Fire Court
Parish Cases No. properties before Fire Share
St Botolph Aldersgate 1 3969 0.000
St Giles Cripplegate 1 4967 0.000
St Andrew Holborn 4 1757 .002
All Hallows Staining 1 158 .006
St Antholin Budge Row & St John Walbrook 3 204 .015
St Bartholomew The Less 2 124 .016
St Mary Somerset & St Mary Mounthaw 4 223 .018
St Sepulchre Without Newgate 19 999 .019
All Hallows Barking 9 455 .02
Whitefriars Precinct 4 204 .02
St Bride Fleet Street 34 1614 .021
St Alphage London Wall 4 174 .023
St Martin Ludgate 6 241 .025
Holy Trinity The Less & St Michael Queenhithe 6 226 .027
St Andrew Hubbard & St Mary At Hill 7 255 .027
St Benet Pauls Wharf & St Peter Pauls Wharf 8 298 .027
St Mary Staining & St Michael Wood Street 3 112 .027
St Martin Vintry & St Michael Paternoster Royal 3 105 .029
St Alban Wood Street & St Olave Silver Street 8 257 .031
All Hallows The Great & All Hallows The Less 14 417 .034
St Mary Aldermary & St Thomas Apostle 4 109 .037
St Dunstan In The West 40 1001 .04
St Botolph Billingsgate & St George Botolph Lane 6 148 .041
St Gabriel Fenchurch Street & St Margaret Pattens 6 148 .041
St Swithin London Stone & St Mary Bothaw 7 171 .041
St Dunstan In The East 16 378 .042
Christchurch Newgate Street & St Leonard Foster Lane 24 468 .051
St Magnus The Martyr & St Margaret New Fish Street 12 235 .051
St Peter Le Poer 6 117 .051
St Nicholas Olave & St Nicholas Cole Abbey 6 107 .056
St Matthew Friday Street & St Peter Westcheap 7 117 .06
St Martin Pomeroy & St Olave Old Jewry 7 109 .064
St Michael Le Querne & St Vedast Foster Lane 17 238 .071
St Andrew By The Wardrobe & St Anne Blackfriars 12 167 .072
St Lawrence Jewry & St Mary Magdalen Milk Street 17 231 .074
St Mary Colechurch & St Mildred Poultry 8 108 .074
St Mary Magdalen Old Fish Street 5 68 .074
St Clement Eastcheap & St Martin Orgar 5 65 .077
St Mary Aldermanbury 13 153 .085
St Mary Le Bow & All Hallows Honey Lane & St Pancras Soper Lane 20 194 .103
St Margaret Moses & St Mildred Bread Street 12 107 .112
St Stephen Walbrook & St Benet Sherehog 15 109 .138
St Augustine Watling Street & St Faith Under St Paul 29 203 .143
St Gregory By St Paul 53 364 .146
St Lawrence Pountney & St Mary Abchurch 5 17 .294
All Hallows Bread Street & St John The Evangelist Friday Street 8 27 .296
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A.4 Additional results








Parish controls X X
Broader location controls X X
Number of clusters 70 70
Sample Pre-Fire Post-Fire
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties
in the parish before the Fire, the share of peers, high-
ranking military personnel and doctors living in
the parish. Notation for statistical significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.8: Effect of Fire on the number of hearths per property
(Dropping parishes which merged after the Fire)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Parish Burned X Post Fire 0.241** 0.224** 0.222* 0.277**
(0.105) (0.109) (0.129) (0.120)
Observations 69,466 69,466 69,466 69,466
R-squared 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.010
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 40 40 40 40
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.9: Effect of Fire on the number of hearths per property
(Using different control groups - Nearby sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Parish Burned X Post Fire 0.336*** 0.296*** 0.327*** 0.392***
(0.094) (0.080) (0.116) (0.121)
Observations 48,103 48,103 48,103 48,103
R-squared 0.013 0.021 0.022 0.025
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 61 61 61 61
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.10: Effect of Fire on the number of hearths per property
(Using different control groups - Further away sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Parish Burned X Post Fire 0.225** 0.136 0.137 0.236*
(0.105) (0.134) (0.151) (0.137)
Observations 62,466 62,466 62,466 62,466
R-squared 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.015
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 60 60 60 60
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.11: Effect of Fire on the number of hearths per property
(Applying the inverse hyperbolic sine transform to hearths)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Parish Burned X Post Fire 0.124 0.101 0.056 0.086
(0.112) (0.134) (0.159) (0.159)
Observations 79,730 79,730 79,730 79,730
R-squared 0.002 0.007 0.008 0.009
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 70 70 70 70
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.12: Effect of Fire on the number of hearths per property
(Using a Poisson pseudo-likelihood regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES No. hearths
Parish Burned X Post Fire 0.129 0.103 0.070 0.101
(0.088) (0.108) (0.129) (0.121)
Observations 79,730 79,730 79,730 79,730
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 70 70 70 70
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.13: Effect of Fire on the number of hearths per property
(Trimming extreme values of the outcome variable)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Parish Burned X Post Fire 0.124** 0.101* 0.086 0.103
(0.056) (0.055) (0.065) (0.065)
Observations 64,402 64,402 64,402 64,402
R-squared 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 70 70 70 70
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Parish controls X X
Broader location controls X X
Number of clusters 46 46
Sample Pre-Fire Post-Fire
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties
in the parish before the Fire, the share of peers, high-
ranking military personnel and doctors living in
the parish. Notation for statistical significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.15: Effect of legal rulings on the number of hearths per property
(Adding in other dimensions of the rulings as controls)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Pragmatic X Post Fire 1.050*** 1.031*** 0.926*** 0.835***
(0.294) (0.306) (0.249) (0.224)
Avg. change in tenancy length X Post Fire 0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Avg. change in rent X Post Fire -0.016** -0.013* -0.012** -0.009*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Observations 31,582 31,582 31,582 31,582
R-squared 0.018 0.026 0.027 0.031
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.16: Effect of legal rulings on the number of hearths per property
(Dropping parishes which merged after the Fire)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Pragmatic X Post Fire 2.128*** 2.038*** 1.917*** 2.025***
(0.657) (0.249) (0.304) (0.409)
Observations 24,384 24,384 24,384 24,384
R-squared 0.024 0.037 0.037 0.037
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 17 17 17 17
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.17: Effect of legal rulings on the number of hearths per property
(Applying the inverse hyperbolic sine transform to hearths)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Pragmatic X Post Fire 1.122** 1.091*** 1.015*** 0.915***
(0.422) (0.338) (0.246) (0.254)
Observations 32,383 32,383 32,383 32,383
R-squared 0.009 0.017 0.018 0.021
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.18: Effect of legal rulings on the number of hearths per property
(Using a Poisson pseudo-likelihood regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES No. hearths
Pragmatic X Post Fire 0.921** 0.934*** 0.885*** 0.784***
(0.424) (0.285) (0.210) (0.206)
Observations 32,383 32,383 32,383 32,383
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.19: Effect of legal rulings on the number of hearths per property
(Trimming extreme values of the outcome variable)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Pragmatic X Post Fire 0.852*** 0.709*** 0.663*** 0.620***
(0.220) (0.193) (0.151) (0.148)
Observations 25,965 25,965 25,965 25,965
R-squared 0.010 0.015 0.015 0.016
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.20: First-stage by different subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Pragmatic X Post Fire
Majority royalist in judging panels X Post 0.135*** 0.046 0.038 -0.010 0.179*** 0.125**
(0.048) (0.049) (0.062) (0.060) (0.032) (0.051)
Observations 20,737 10,845 1,726 8,419 21,437 19,984
Parish FE X X X X X X
Post FE X X X X X X
Sample Church not destroyed Church destroyed Abutting walls Within walls Outside walls Hearth tercile 1
Number of clusters 11 35 5 33 8 14
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Pragmatic X Post Fire
Majority royalist in judging panels X Post 0.036 0.133** 0.022 -0.096 0.159*** -0.011
(0.097) (0.054) (0.099) (0.064) (0.036) (0.072)
Observations 4,094 7,504 3,094 5,470 23,018 6,690
Parish FE X X X X X X
Post FE X X X X X X
Sample Hearth tercile 2 Hearth tercile 3 Size tercile 1 Size tercile 2 Size tercile 3 Peers tercile 1
Number of clusters 16 16 19 17 10 21
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
VARIABLES Pragmatic X Post Fire
Majority royalist in judging panels X Post 0.153*** 0.159*** 0.073 0.166*** 0.062 0.188***
(0.035) (0.043) (0.069) (0.024) (0.065) (0.021)
Observations 17,727 7,165 16,383 15,199 19,135 12,447
Parish FE X X X X X X
Post FE X X X X X X
Sample Peers tercile 2 Peers tercile 3 Doctors quantile 1 Doctors quantile 2 Military quantile 1 Military quantile 2
Number of clusters 11 14 27 19 39 7
Notes: All regressions include parish FEs and post FE. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level. Notation for statistical significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.21: Reduced-form – Effect of Royalist majority on the number of hearths
per property
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Majority royalist in judging panels X Post 0.270*** 0.221** 0.213*** 0.189**
(0.098) (0.087) (0.069) (0.074)
Observations 31,582 31,582 31,582 31,582
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.22: IV – Effect of legal rulings on the number of hearths per property
(Adding in other dimensions of the rulings as controls)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Pragmatic X Post Fire 2.198* 2.483** 2.141** 1.951**
(1.152) (1.058) (0.835) (0.866)
Avg. change in tenancy length X Post Fire 0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Avg. change in rent X Post Fire -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003
(0.016) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 31,582 31,582 31,582 31,582
R-squared 0.012 0.017 0.022 0.027
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46
KP F-stat 6.427 3.548 8.863 10.63
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.23: IV – Effect of legal rulings on the number of hearths per property
(Dropping parishes which merged after the Fire)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Pragmatic X Post Fire 2.065*** 1.886*** 1.904*** 1.945***
(0.549) (0.404) (0.361) (0.441)
Observations 24,384 24,384 24,384 24,384
R-squared 0.024 0.036 0.037 0.037
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 17 17 17 17
KP F-stat 16.12 7.611 40.30 25.22
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.24: IV – Effect of legal rulings on the number of hearths per property
(Applying the inverse hyperbolic sine transform to hearths)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Pragmatic X Post Fire 1.866*** 2.271** 1.909** 1.712*
(0.636) (0.942) (0.719) (0.872)
Observations 32,383 32,383 32,383 32,383
R-squared 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.019
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46
KP F-stat 10.03 3.831 9.195 10.43
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.25: IV – Effect of legal rulings on the number of hearths per property
(Trimming extreme values of the outcome variable)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(No. hearths)
Pragmatic X Post Fire 1.663*** 1.688*** 1.560*** 1.490***
(0.386) (0.556) (0.438) (0.439)
Observations 25,965 25,965 25,965 25,965
R-squared 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.010
Parish FE X X X X
Post FE X X X X
Parish controls X Post FE X X X
Broader location X Post FE X X
Pre-fire hearth tercile X Post FE X
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46
KP F-stat 12.07 4.716 9.581 10.83
Notes: Parish controls include the number of properties in the parish before
the Fire, the share of peers, high-ranking military personnel and doctors
living in the parish. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix B: Appendix to Made by History: The Spatial Distribution of
Manufacturing Industries in the US
B.1 Mathematical Appendix
B.1.1 Microfounding the fixed costs associated with producing in each county
In this Appendix, I show how the higher fixed cost associated with a county having more individualistic
culture and institutions can be microfounded using a model of sequential production. The production
of final goods entails a continuum of intermediate stages. In each stage, final good producers bargain
with suppliers of intermediate inputs. However, due to incomplete contracts, holdup occurs. In
counties with more individualistic culture and institutions, this holdup is more severe, leading to a
higher fixed cost of production.
Consumers









, ρ ∈ (0, 1)
subject to the budget constraint
∫
Ω
p(ω)q(ω)dω ≤ Y , where Y denotes total income. Ω denotes the
continuum of possible goods that can be produced and every firm produces a distinct good ω ∈ Ω.
Solving this maximization problem yields the optimum quantity demanded of good ω:
p(ω) = q(ω)ρ−1Y 1−ρP ρ
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Production function
The production function of each final good firm (i) is:
q(i) = z(i)K(i)l(i)γ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cobb−Douglas







where α ∈ (0, 1) captures the degree of substitutability among the intermediate inputs. I(g) is an
indicator function that equals 1 if input g is produced and intermediate stages g′ < g have occured
(sequential intermediate inputs).
The timing of decisions for the final good firm is as follows. First, the final good firm bargains
sequentially with a continuum g ∈ [0, 1] of suppliers of intermediate inputs (k(i, g)). Second, the
final good firm chooses the amount of labor l(i). Therefore, in the choosing of labor stage, the
cost of the intermediate inputs is a fixed cost as it has been determined in the previous stage. The
problem is solved by backward induction.
Choose labor l(i)




subject to the demand for each good p(i) = q(i)ρ−1Y 1−ρP ρ where q(i) = z(i)K(i)l(i)γ−1. f(φ) is
the fixed cost associated with producing in the county. In particular, f(φ) = β(φ)p(i)q(i) where
β (φ) is the share of the revenue that accrues to the final good producer’s suppliers.
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Firm’s employment is given by:



















where κ = [1− β (φ)] (ρ(γ − 1))
ρ(γ−1)
1−ργ+ρ − (ρ(γ − 1))
1
1−ργ+ρ .
Bargain sequentially with suppliers of intermediate inputs
Intermediate inputs are customized to make them compatible with the needs of the firm producing
the final good. There are incomplete contracts since the legal courts are not able to perfectly verify
whether inputs are compatible or not. Consequently, given the lack of binding contracts, a holdup
problem emerges. I assume that the actual payment to a supplier is negotiated bilaterally only after
that stage’s input has been produced and the firm has a chance to inspect it. Since the intermdiate
input is relationship-specific, the supplier’s outside option is zero.
I follow Antras and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019) and assume that the final good firm
and supplier bargain over how to split the incremental contribution to total revenue generated by the
supplier in that stage.








where A = Y 1−ρP ρz(i)ρl(i)ρ(γ−1)



















where A = Y 1−ρP ρz(i)ρl(i)ρ(γ−1).










ρ k(i,m)α − c(m)k(i,m)
β (φ) is the share of the incremental contribution that accrues to the supplier and c(m) is the cost
to produce one unit of k(i,m). In addition, I make the assumption that ∂β(φ)
∂φ
> 0. This is because
when culture and institutions become more individualistic, the holdup problem is more severe and
so a greater share of the marginal revenue has to be given to the intermediate good supplier.

























































































The fixed cost is thus increasing in individualistic culture and institutions (φ).
B.1.2 Derivation of Equation 2.1

















































+ f(φc) =(σ − 1)πc(ψ) + σf(φc)









σ + wc − 1
wc
f(φc)
Second, with Me denoting the number of firms that paid the fixed entry cost, the number of firms



























































































(σ − 1)π̃(ψ) +
C̄∑
s=1







































B.1.3 Derivation of ∂Jc
∂φc
































































































B.2 Additional figures and tables
Figure B1: Distribution of firms in each industry in 1998
Notes: Each dot represents a distinct industry.
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Table B1: Effect of time spent on the frontier on the present-day composition of
manufacturing industries (non-coastal counties)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Outcome: Establishments (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
R-squared 0.309 0.309 0.309 0.307 0.363 0.432
B. Outcome: Employment (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.022*** 0.012** 0.019*** 0.014** 0.015** 0.035***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
R-squared 0.236 0.236 0.236 0.234 0.277 0.329
Observations 24,624,380 24,624,380 24,624,380 24,416,140 24,416,140 24,416,140
Contractibility X Geography X X X X X
Contractibility X History X X X X
Industry Controls X Frontier X X X
State X Industy FE X X
County X 3-digit Industry FE X
Notes: All columns include county, industry and year fixed effects. Geographical controls include latitude, longitude, potential
agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Historical
controls include number of years that the county was connected to the railroad by 1890, distance to the nearest conflict with
Native Americans, the prevalence of slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share of
immigrants in 1910. Industry controls include the log value add of the industry in 1990 and its TFP in 1990. Standard errors
clustered at county level. Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B2: Effect of time spent on the frontier on the present-day composition of
manufacturing industries (coastal counties)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Outcome: Establishments (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.023*** 0.022** 0.023** 0.020** 0.005 0.002
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
R-squared 0.479 0.481 0.482 0.478 0.582 0.638
B. Outcome: Employment (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.064*** 0.045* 0.054** 0.046* 0.023 0.015
(0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.032)
R-squared 0.385 0.387 0.387 0.384 0.470 0.513
Observations 3,271,268 3,271,268 3,271,268 3,243,604 3,243,604 3,243,604
Contractibility X Geography X X X X X
Contractibility X History X X X X
Industry Controls X Frontier X X X
State X Industy FE X X
County X 3-digit Industry FE X
Notes: All columns include county, industry and year fixed effects. Geographical controls include latitude, longitude, potential
agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Historical
controls include number of years that the county was connected to the railroad by 1890, distance to the nearest conflict with
Native Americans, the prevalence of slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share of
immigrants in 1910. Industry controls include the log value add of the industry in 1990 and its TFP in 1990. Standard errors
clustered at county level. Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B3: Effect of time spent on the frontier on the present-day composition of
manufacturing industries (with density controls)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Outcome: Establishments (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.005** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
R-squared 0.358 0.358 0.422 0.491
B. Outcome: Employment (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.019*** 0.019** 0.010 0.025***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
R-squared 0.272 0.272 0.318 0.370
Observations 27,659,744 27,659,744 27,659,744 27,659,744
Contractibility X Geographical Controls X X X X
Contractibility X Historical Controls X X X X
Industry Controls X Frontier X X X X
Density Controls X Frontier X X X
State X Industy FE X X
County X 3-digit Industry FE X
Notes: All columns include county, industry and year fixed effects. Geographical controls include latitude, longitude, potential
agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Historical
controls include number of years that the county was connected to the railroad by 1890, distance to the nearest conflict with
Native Americans, the prevalence of slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share of
immigrants in 1910. Industry controls include the log value add of the industry in 1990 and its TFP in 1990. Standard errors
clustered at county level. Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B4: Dropping observations with zeros in the outcome variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Outcome: ln(Establishments)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.039*** 0.022** 0.023** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.037***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
R-squared 0.478 0.479 0.479 0.476 0.550 0.657
Observations 2,607,556 2,607,556 2,607,556 2,556,327 2,555,960 2,553,883
B. Outcome: ln(Employment)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.061*** 0.024 0.025 0.036 0.021 0.103***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.030)
R-squared 0.253 0.254 0.254 0.254 0.363 0.501
Observations 2,607,496 2,607,496 2,607,496 2,556,271 2,555,904 2,553,827
Contractibility X Geography X X X X X
Contractibility X History X X X X
Industry Controls X Frontier X X X
State X Industy FE X X
County X 3-digit Industry FE X
Notes: All columns include county, industry and year fixed effects. Geographical controls include latitude, longitude, potential
agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Historical
controls include number of years that the county was connected to the railroad by 1890, distance to the nearest conflict with
Native Americans, the prevalence of slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share of
immigrants in 1910. Industry controls include the log value add of the industry in 1990 and its TFP in 1990. Standard errors
clustered at county level. Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B5: Using PPML regression to account for the zeros in the outcome variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Outcome: Establishments
Contractibility X Frontier 0.172*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.106*** 0.090*** 0.150***
(0.034) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030) (0.036)
B. Outcome: Employment
Contractibility X Frontier 0.297*** 0.230*** 0.221*** 0.215*** 0.208*** 0.255***
(0.053) (0.062) (0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.067)
Observations 27,814,765 27,814,765 27,814,765 27,579,545 27,579,545 27,579,545
Contractibility X Geography X X X X X
Contractibility X History X X X X
Industry Controls X Frontier X X X
State X Industy FE X X
County X 3-digit Industry FE X
Notes: All columns include county, industry and year fixed effects. Geographical controls include latitude, longitude, potential
agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Historical
controls include number of years that the county was connected to the railroad by 1890, distance to the nearest conflict with
Native Americans, the prevalence of slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share of
immigrants in 1910. Industry controls include the log value add of the industry in 1990 and its TFP in 1990. Standard errors
clustered at county level. Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B6: Dropping counties that changed names or FIPS codes and counties
that had substantial boundary changes between 1980 and 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Outcome: Establishments (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
R-squared 0.358 0.359 0.359 0.358 0.424 0.492
B. Outcome: Employment (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.035*** 0.018*** 0.026*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.041***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
R-squared 0.274 0.274 0.275 0.273 0.319 0.371
Observations 27,293,519 27,293,519 27,293,519 27,062,707 27,062,707 27,062,707
Contractibility X Geography X X X X X
Contractibility X History X X X X
Industry Controls X Frontier X X X
State X Industy FE X X
County X 3-digit Industry FE X
Notes: All columns include county, industry and year fixed effects. Geographical controls include latitude, longitude, potential
agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Historical
controls include number of years that the county was connected to the railroad by 1890, distance to the nearest conflict with
Native Americans, the prevalence of slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share of
immigrants in 1910. Industry controls include the log value add of the industry in 1990 and its TFP in 1990. Standard errors
clustered at county level. Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B7: Dropping counties which spent zero years
on the frontier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Outcome: Establishments (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
R-squared 0.352 0.353 0.353 0.352 0.404 0.471
B. Outcome: Employment (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.048***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
R-squared 0.261 0.262 0.262 0.260 0.299 0.351
Observations 22,458,513 22,458,513 22,458,513 22,268,589 22,268,589 22,268,589
Contractibility X Geography X X X X X
Contractibility X History X X X X
Industry Controls X Frontier X X X
State X Industy FE X X
County X 3-digit Industry FE X
Notes: All columns include county, industry and year fixed effects. Geographical controls include latitude, longitude, potential
agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Historical
controls include number of years that the county was connected to the railroad by 1890, distance to the nearest conflict with
Native Americans, the prevalence of slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share of
immigrants in 1910. Industry controls include the log value add of the industry in 1990 and its TFP in 1990. Standard errors
clustered at county level. Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B8: Dropping industries with non-unique mapping when classifications changed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Outcome: Establishments (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.006*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.002 0.002 0.007***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R-squared 0.371 0.372 0.372 0.369 0.432 0.494
B. Outcome: Employment (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.021*** 0.012** 0.015** 0.008 0.007 0.024***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
R-squared 0.281 0.281 0.281 0.278 0.323 0.376
Observations 17,574,848 17,574,848 17,574,848 17,397,920 17,397,920 17,397,920
Contractibility X Geography X X X X X
Contractibility X History X X X X
Industry Controls X Frontier X X X
State X Industy FE X X
County X 3-digit Industry FE X
Notes: All columns include county, industry and year fixed effects. Geographical controls include latitude, longitude, potential
agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Historical
controls include number of years that the county was connected to the railroad by 1890, distance to the nearest conflict with
Native Americans, the prevalence of slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share of
immigrants in 1910. Industry controls include the log value add of the industry in 1990 and its TFP in 1990. Standard errors
clustered at county level. Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B9: Clustering standard errors based on 60-square mile grid cells
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Outcome: Establishments (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
R-squared 0.358 0.358 0.359 0.358 0.422 0.490
B. Outcome: Employment (Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed)
Contractibility X Frontier 0.036*** 0.020** 0.027*** 0.019** 0.021*** 0.043***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
R-squared 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.272 0.318 0.370
Observations 27,895,648 27,895,648 27,895,648 27,659,744 27,659,744 27,659,744
Contractibility X Geography X X X X X
Contractibility X History X X X X
Industry Controls X Frontier X X X
State X Industy FE X X
County X 3-digit Industry FE X
Notes: All columns include county, industry and year fixed effects. Geographical controls include latitude, longitude, potential
agricultural productivity, area, ruggedness, rainfall risk, distance to the nearest coast, river, lake and mineral deposit. Historical
controls include number of years that the county was connected to the railroad by 1890, distance to the nearest conflict with
Native Americans, the prevalence of slavery as measured by the population of slaves in each county in 1860 and the share of
immigrants in 1910. Industry controls include the log value add of the industry in 1990 and its TFP in 1990. Standard errors
clustered at county level. Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix C: Appendix to The Inspector Calls: The Effect of Local Land Use
Regulations and NIMBY-ism on Housing Prices
C.1 Mathematical Appendix
C.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First, we will ignore the PC for both problems and focus just on the IC. We can substitute the FOCs,
and apply the envelope theorem to the optimized profits of the honest problem to get:
∂πh
∂κ













+ δψ′(x− δs+ κ)
]
s +
P1(s, κ)− as. We know that ∂π
h
∂κ
≥ 0 because µ∗ ≥ 0. We can do the same for the optimized profits
of the gaming problem:
∂πg
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Define κ such that πh(s∗, κ) = 0. Since, ∂π
h
∂κ
≥ 0 we know that this is the lowest κ that
can satisfy the PC of the honest problem. At κ, πh(s∗, κ) ≤ πg(s̃, κ). If the IC is binding at κ
then πh(s∗, κ) < πg(su, κ) ≤ πg(s̃, κ), where su maximizes the unconstrained honest problem, or
MP (su) = 0.
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To proceed further, note that to satisfy the IC for the gaming problem we need I(s̃, κ) ≤ ω and
























πh(s∗, κ) ≥ lim
κ→∞
πg(s̃, κ)
Since πh(s∗, κ) ≤ πg(s̃, κ), ∂πh
∂κ




, we know that either πh(s∗, κ) = πg(s̃, κ) ∀κ ∈
[κ,∞) or the two optimized profits must cross once. Define the value of κ at this crossing as κ∗
then we know that πh(s∗, κ) ≤ πg(s̃, κ) ∀κ < κ∗ and πh(s∗, κ) ≥ πg(s̃, κ) ∀κ > κ∗.
Case 2: α→∞































. We can then use a similar
argument to show a single crossing.
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C.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Define:































C.2 Additional figures and tables
Table C1: Dynamic difference-in-differences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(price)
Success X Relative Year -2 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Success X Relative Year -1 -0.007* -0.006 -0.007* -0.006*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Success X Relative Year 0 -0.011** -0.011** -0.010* -0.010**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Success X Relative Year 1 -0.011** -0.011** -0.012** -0.011**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Success X Relative Year 2 -0.016** -0.017*** -0.016** -0.016***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Success X Relative Year 3 -0.023*** -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.019***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 1,237,943 1,177,861 1,237,706 1,177,683
R-squared 0.576 0.843 0.609 0.856
Time FE X X X X
Appeal FE X X
Appeal X Postcode sector FE X X
Controls X X
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C2: First-stage with controls
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Success*Postappeal
Leniency*Postappeal 0.680*** 0.664*** 0.664***
(0.136) (0.135) (0.135)
Observations 1,236,401 1,176,342 1,176,164
Time FE X X X
Appeal FE X X
Appeal X Postcode Sector FE X
Controls X X
KP F-stat 25.15 24.04 24.07
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C3: Effect of overturning the Local Authority’s decision (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(price)
Success*Postappeal -0.010** -0.010** -0.009** -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 1,237,943 1,177,861 1,237,706 1,177,683
R-squared 0.576 0.843 0.609 0.856
Time FE X X X X
Appeal FE X X
Appeal X Postcode sector FE X X
Controls X X
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C4: Effect of overturning the Local Authority’s decision (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(price)
Success*Postappeal 0.073** 0.060* 0.072** 0.062*
(0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
Observations 1,236,401 1,176,342 1,236,164 1,176,164
R-squared -0.002 0.623 -0.003 0.623
Time FE X X X X
Appeal FE X X
Appeal X Postcode sector FE X X
Controls X X
KP F-stat 25.15 24.04 25.08 24.07
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C5: Effect by distance from appeal site (500m)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV
VARIABLES ln(price)
Success*Postappeal -0.011** -0.009** 0.039 0.051
(0.005) (0.005) (0.033) (0.031)
Observations 381,188 360,933 380,811 360,563
R-squared 0.621 0.857 -0.001 0.615
Time FE X X X X
Appeal X Postcode sector FE X X X X
Controls X X
Sample <500m <500m <500m <500m
KP F-stat 31.68 28.96
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C6: Effect by distance from appeal site (500m to 1km)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV
VARIABLES ln(price)
Success*Postappeal -0.009** -0.010** 0.095** 0.073*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.042) (0.038)
Observations 856,381 816,622 855,217 815,474
R-squared 0.626 0.861 -0.004 0.619
Time FE X X X X
Appeal X Postcode sector FE X X X X
Controls X X
Sample 500m to 1km 500m to 1km 500m to 1km 500m to 1km
KP F-stat 20.13 19.85
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C7: Effect by supply shock (small suply shock)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV
VARIABLES ln(price)
Success*Postappeal -0.008 -0.009* 0.081** 0.070**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.036) (0.035)
Observations 960,928 913,192 960,333 912,619
R-squared 0.626 0.860 -0.003 0.618
Time FE X X X X
Appeal X Postcode sector FE X X X X
Controls X X
Sample Small shock Small shock Small shock Small shock
KP F-stat 25.64 24.70
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C8: Effect by supply shock (large suply shock)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV
VARIABLES ln(price)
Success*Postappeal -0.004 -0.007 -0.009 -0.011
(0.005) (0.005) (0.100) (0.083)
Observations 276,778 264,491 275,831 263,545
R-squared 0.518 0.831 0.000 0.646
Time FE X X X X
Appeal X Postcode sector FE X X X X
Controls X X
Sample Large shock Large shock Large shock Large shock
KP F-stat 1.470 1.838
Notes: Standard errors clustered at outward code level.
Notation for statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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